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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I am undertaking the analysis of the effects of increasing intellectual property rights on 
the reallocation of different kinds of research and development within an endogenous growth 
framework. This thesis’ approach considers the innovation process as sequential and cumulative in 
nature and studies the effects of different property rights regimes on a country’s innovative 
performance. In particular, by explicitly modelling basic and applied research and development 
(R&D) within a general equilibrium framework, I try to overtake the existing growth theory, which 
usually aggregates all sources of R&D and innovation, neglecting intermediate inventive steps. My 
approach is certainly inspired by the current Schumpeterian growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt, 
1998 and 2009), which envisages new products and processes arising from Poisson processes, 
whose arrival rates depend on private and public R&D. However, unlike the previous 
Schumpeterian models, in most of the chapters of this thesis, creative destruction itself is modelled 
as a two-stage processes, or more precisely, as a sequence of investment decisions in R&D, whose 
result is a probability to invent (basic research) or to innovate (applied research). Hence, the first 
step, "basic research", creates a research tool which is by itself not profitable, but has the potential to 
become the basis for the second step innovation. The second step is a marketable product which 
increases consumers' utility and, through the grant of a patent, generates the monopolistic rent for 
the second step innovator, i.e. the manufacturer of the new product. This is a natural and simple way 
to explicitly model basic and applied research, yet it entails non-trivial technical complications in 
the models along with strong policy implications.  
 
Chapter 2 tries to answer the following research question: in order to foster innovation and growth 
should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This chapter studies the impact of the shift in 
the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R&D 
undertaken by universities. Such a shift rendered the U.S. universities more responsive to "market" 
forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research employing researchers motivated by 
"curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in 
a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on 
innovation and welfare. Chapter 2 builds a Schumpeterian model and matches it to the data to 
evaluate this important turning point. 
 
 iii 
Chapter 3 extends the model presented by Chapter 2 by introducing Kremer’s (1998) mechanism for 
inducing innovation by means of auctions for new patents. Such patent buy-outs are run by the 
public sector in order to reward innovators and freely disseminate most of the new basic research 
findings. My work is the first attempt to use Kremer’s idea to address the issue of the patentability 
of basic research and the financing of early innovation. The same Chapter 3 also quantitatively 
analyses the impact of the so called “research exemption” of patented basic knowledge. Under the 
research exemption doctrine, if the second innovator is successful in developing a saleable product 
or process, then he or she can patent it and yet infringe another patent. 
 
The key question that modern economies' innovation systems have been facing in the past few 
decades is: how should basic research be funded in view of maximizing the efficiency of the 
innovation system as a whole? In other words, is it possible to conceive the privatization of a 
country's basic knowledge and an efficient system of incentives to basic research? The study 
presented by Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of the US patent reforms 
that, at the beginning of the Eighties, brought to the patentability of research tools, often invented by 
the university-led research activity. In particular, Chapter 4 re-examines the policy scenarios and the 
comparisons presented throughout Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in order to try to provide these two with 
a robust empirical support. In the first scenario, only the public sector institutions undertake basic 
research, rendering all results publicly available for firms, racing to find patentable applications. In 
the second scenario, important for assessing the post-1980 reforms in the US system of innovation, 
basic research itself is privatized, and hence patented by private firms. The most important question 
for the political economy of basic research is which system is most conducive to innovation and 
growth. The public system permits more idea dissemination, but may not give basic researchers 
enough incentives to focus their research on the directions most needed by the private developers 
downstream. The private system optimally channels basic research, but, by allowing the 
patentability of ideas upstream, precludes free entry into applied R&D. This generates conflicting 
effects, and the policy conclusions depend on the value of all the relevant parameters in the 
economy. 
In Chapter 4, I estimated the most important of these parameters with the US data immediately 
preceding the major reorganization of university and basic research in the 80s, and I simulated the 
two scenarios. The resulting simulations show that public R&D system, prevailing at that time, was 
indeed outperforming every privatized alternative scenario. 
 iv 
 
Since the incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, 
Chapter 5 tries to answer the following research question: how does increasing early innovation 
appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? 
Chapter 5 analyses the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage 
cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. It focuses 
on two issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic 
research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream 
innovators. It shows that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the 
empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation 
always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. In a common law system an explicit 
dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate; hence I have incorporated the mathematical 
modelling of the evolution of the common law into the rational expectations of the agents. This 
major modification allows me to schematically replicate the evolution of the skill premium, 
education, and strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR) happened in the US during the 
Eighties and Nineties of the XX century. Chapter 5 also provides a simple "rule of thumb" indicator 
of the basic researcher bargaining power and 5 shows that IPR evolution can be introduced into a 
fully rational expectation framework. This helps explaining the well-known dynamics of the skill 
premium and education in the US, that motivated well-known theories of skill biased technical 
change and directed technical change (see Acemoglu 2008). 
 
Chapter 6, finally, draws inspiration from an important recent empirical literature on competition 
and productivity in the service sectors (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Alesina et al., 2005; 
Griffith et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2006) to build a theoretical framework to predict whether 
innovation is hampered by the lack of completion in the non-manufacturing sectors. In this final 
chapter, I have built a simple model of process innovation where the provision of essential services 
(intermediate inputs, for example financial services or transports) for the production of the final 
good is subject to sectorial regulation, which shapes the market structure of the intermediate sector 
as a non-competitive one. The structure adopted in this chapter allows examining the effects on the 
economy of the presence of two different monopolized tasks: the intermediate service provision and 
the use of the innovation. The ultimate purpose is to show how the lack of competition in an 
 v 
intermediate essential sector, like the service sector, is actually able to depress productivity growth 
in the final sector.  
 vi 
Table of Contents 
 
Page 
ABSTRACT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ii 
LIST OF FIGURES_ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ix 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  xii 
1  CHAPTER 1: R&D-DRIVEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE INCENTIVES TO 
INNOVATION: BACKGROUD ON THE LITERATURE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _2 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ 2 
1.2 TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: FROM RESIDUAL TO LEADER OF THE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ 4 
1.3 VERTICAL VERSUS HORIZONTAL INNOVATION PROCESSES_ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _12 
1.3.1 R&D Models with Horizontal Innovation_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ 15 
1.3.2 R&D Models with Vertical Innovation_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _18 
1.4 THE SCALE EFFECT_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _26 
1.5 KNOWLWDGE: APPROPRIATION AND DISSEMINATION _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  40 
1.5.1 Knowledge Appropriation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _  42 
1.5.2 Knowledge Dissemination_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _  _ _ _  45 
1.6 RECONCILING ENDOGENOUS GROWTH AND THE PATENT LITERATURE _ 50 
 
2  CHAPTER 2: A MACROECONOMIC TOOL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE US 
PATENT POLICY _ _ _ _ _ _ _   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ 54 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 54 
2.2  THE MODEL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 57 
2.2.1 Households_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  57 
2.2.2 Firms’ Behaviour in the Final Good Sectors_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __  60 
2.2.3 Research Sectors_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 63 
2.2.4 Unpatentable Basic Research_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _  _  _ _ _  66 
2.2.5 Patentable Basic Research_ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _70 
2.3 OBSERVED REGULARITIES _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  76 
2.3.1 Calibration of the Model_ _ _ _ _ _   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 75 
2.3.2 Calibration Analysis _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ 76 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  __ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ 81 
 
 vii 
3  CHAPTER 3: ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO SPUR INNOVATION: RESEARCH 
EXEMPTION AND KREMER PATENT-BUY-OUT  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 82 
 
3.1       INTRODUCTION_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  __ _ _ _ _ _   _ _ _ _  82 
3.2 THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION SCENARIO_ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   85 
3.3   KREMER’S PATENY-BUY-OUT MECHANISM_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   88 
3.4       CONCLUSIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  91 
 
4  CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF THE US 
ACADEMIC PATENTING_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 93 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION_  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 93 
4.2 A RECALL OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ 99 
4.3 ESTIMATING THE UNOBSERVABLE_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _  111 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _    118 
 
5  CHAPTER 5: UPSTREAM INNOVATION PROTECTION: COMMON LAW 
EVOLUTION AND THE DYNAMICS OF WAGE INEQUALITY_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   _ _ _121 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _121 
5.2  THE MODEL_ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 126 
5.2.1     Households_ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ __ _ _ _ _ _  126 
5.2.2      Manufacturing_ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _128 
5.3  R&D AND INNOVATION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ __ __  _  _  _ _ _ _    129 
5.4  EQUILIBRIUM_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 133 
5.5  ANALYSIS OF A BENCHMARK SPECIAL CASE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   _  135 
5.6  NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _   137 
5.7  CONCLUSIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _  _ 144 
5.8 APPENDIX_ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  145 
5.8.1 Labour Supply and Education Dynamics _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 146 
5.8.2 Transitional Properties of Educational Choice_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 149 
5.8.3 Expenditure and Manufacturing Dynamics_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _  150 
 
 
6  CHAPTER 6: COMPETITON AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: A SCHUMPETERIAN 
APPROACH _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  152 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 152 
6.2  THE MODEL_ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ 154 
6.3  PROCESS INNOVATION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   156 
6.4  GROWTH_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _   158 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  160 
 
 
7  CHAPTER 7: FINAL CONCLUSIONS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  162 
 
8    REFERENCING_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _165 
 
 viii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Representation of the Economy by Flows of Industries_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 63 
Figure 2: Basic Research Productivity, Calibration for the US data from 1975 to 1981_  _ _  78 
Figure 3: Applied Research Productivity, Calibration for the US data from 1975 to 1981_ _  79 
Figure 4: Comparison Between the Innovative Performances, Calibration for the US data 
from 1975 to 1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  80 
Figure 5: Comparison Between the Innovative Performances, Calibration for the US data 
from 1975 to 1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ 88 
Figure 6: Comparison Between the Innovative Performances, Calibration for the US data 
from 1975 to 1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 91 
Figure 7a: Patents Granted to US Resident, US 1963-2008_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 95 
Figure 7b: Growth Rate of Patents Granted to US Resident, US 1963-2008_ _   _ _ _ _ _ _ _  96 
Figure 8a: Patents Granted to US Resident, US 1973-1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ 97 
Figure 8b: Growth Rate of Patents Granted to US Resident, US 1971-1979_ _   _ _ _ _ _ _  _ 97 
Figure 9: Representation of the Economy by Flows of Industries_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  104 
Figure 10: Estimated Basic and Applied Research Productivity, computed using the real basic 
R&D expenditure as the total R&D expenditure net of the industry performed R&D, US 1974-
1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  113 
Figure 11: Steady-state mass of performing basic or applied research, US 1974-1981 _ _ _ _114 
Figure 12: Estimated Basic Research Productivity, US 1974-1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  115 
Figure 13: Estimated Applied Research Productivity, US 1974-1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __  _ _ _ _  115 
Figure 14: Robustness to perturbation of the intra-sector congestion parameter, basic research 
productivity estimates, US 1974-1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  116 
Figure 15: Robustness to perturbation of the intra-sector congestion parameter, basic research 
productivity estimates, US 1974-1981_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  116 
Figure 16: Patentable vs Unpatentable Basic Research_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _118 
Figure 17: Research Exemption vs Unpatentable Basic Research_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _119 
Figure 18: After 40 periods the initial value of β=0.35 suddenly changes to β=0.5__ _ _ _ __ 142 
Figure 19: After 40 periods the initial value of β=0.55 suddenly changes to β=0.65_ _ _ _ __ 143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Throughout the challenging but most gratifying way to my PhD degree, there are some people to 
whom my gratitude flows for their guidance, support and inspiration. 
 
Above all, I am deeply thankful to Professor Guido Cozzi, whom I hold in the highest academic 
esteem. To undertake this research project without his support would have been impossible. I am 
truly indebted to him for introducing me into absorbing economics areas that I had very limited 
knowledge of. He guided me since the extremely difficult early steps and generously shared with me 
all his vast knowledge in the R&D-driven economic growth theory with the highest dedication and 
professionalism. Even if his presence beside me has enriched my existence with love and care, and 
hence I am also thankful for making a beautiful difference in my life, the feeling that that he will 
continue to be an invaluable source of intellectual learning is strongest that ever in me. I shall bring 
all this with me beyond this thesis: his wisdom, academic rigour, and lust for continuous intellectual 
challenges, unreserved help and generosity. Some ingredients of this thesis have featured in joint 
papers with Guido, I shall thank him once more for his excellent aid and collaboration in turning my 
PhD work into publishable form; nevertheless the analysis presented in this thesis draws on my 
original work and any errors or omissions remain my own responsibility. 
 
Special gratitude is also due to Doctor Thomas Renström who supervised me during my final PhD 
stages, for his insightfully suggesting me, helpful feedback and many enjoyable conversations we 
had, not only about this thesis but also on a personal level for his precious friendship. 
 
I was privileged to receive financial support for my PhD, as a consequence I wish to express my 
sincere gratitude to the Bank for Italy for appreciating my capabilities as a researcher and for 
granting me the “Bonaldo Stringher” Scholarship, which allowed my research to count on a solid 
financial start up. 
 
 x 
The very final phase of my PhD became tougher following my taking-up of my position as lecturer 
at the University of Hull. I wish to thank my friend and colleague,  Head of Economics at the 
University of Hull Business School, Professor Andrew J. Abbott, for his being so accommodating 
and supportive, and for appreciating the difficulties that I was encountering in completing my PhD. 
 
Last but not least, I wish to thank my parents, Rossella and Giovanni, and my sister Federica for 
their love, support and encouragement. The certainty that they would be proud of my achievements 
has always given me to push to face even the most challenging difficulties with confidence and good 
will.  
 
 
 xi 
Statement of Copyright 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be publishes without 
the prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CRRA 
CRS 
EC    
ELR 
ENIPerf 
ENIPerf 
GDP 
ICT 
IP(R) 
 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
Constant Returns to Scale 
European Community 
Economic Loss Rule 
Expenditure in Basic Research Net of the Industry Performed Basic Research  
Expenditure in Basic Research Net of the Industry Funded Basic Research 
Gross Domestic Product 
Information and Communication Technologies 
Intellectual Property (Rights) 
 
R&D 
RHS 
S&E 
Research and Development 
Right Hand Side 
Scientist and Engineers 
TFP 
TRIPs 
Total Factor Productivity 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
US(A) 
USPTO 
United States (of America) 
United States Patents and Trademarks Office 
 xiii 
To Guido  
 
 
 
Chapter 1
R&D-Driven Economic Growth and
the Incentives to Innovation:
Background on the Literature
1.1 Introduction
Technological progress is one of the main sources of economic growth (Helpman, 2004).
In this thesis, I will try to show how changes in the patent law (Chapter 2 and Chapter
4), in the system of innovation incentives (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), and in the court
orientation (with a special reference to common law systems - Chapter 5) may a¤ect the
long term performance of the economy particularly focussing on innovation, functional
inequality, and education.
The discussion on intellectual property in recent years has mainly focused on the
problem of rewarding R&D activity in the framework of sequential innovation according
partial equilibrium methodology. A large literature has developed around the idea that
innovations are not single cut o¤ discoveries with no relevance in terms of future innova-
tions1. However, the importance of integrating the traditional microeconomic approach
1Scotchmer (2004) and Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) provide two recent and optimal sur-
2
to the economics of innovation with the general equilibrium approach appears more and
more evident in the purpose of examining the e¤ects of di¤erent innovation policies on
market and non-market oriented institutions. In this sense, here I try to give micro-
economic foundation to the channels through which the system of innovation incentives
operates in generating better or worse performances in terms of both basic and applied
research at the macroeconomic level.
Starting in the early Nineties, two main stream of literature, aimed at exploring the
linkages between R&D activity, intellectual property and economic performance, devel-
oped. Probably motivated by the U.S. loss in technological competitiveness (compared
to Europe and Japan) during those years, these two streams tried to incorporate the logic
of the oligopolistic patent race literature rst invented during the Eighties (see, among
the others, Reinganum (1985), Grossman and Shapiro (1986) and (1987)) into two new
class of models. One adopted a dynamic general equilibrium approach in order to de-
pict the e¤ects on economic growth of the alternation in time of di¤erent monopolistic
positions producing (and selling) on the market2 only the top-quality existing good or
service in a given production line, each of these monopolistic position being the result of
an endogenous choice to invest in R&D by private entrepreneurs (this was the Schum-
peterian growth theory). The second stream of literature explored what type of incentive
dominates R&D activity in a contest of sequential and cumulative innovation.
In order to assess the performance of the standard multi-sector Schumpeterian growth
model as an analytical tool to perform economic analysis after the introduction of a two-
stage uncertain research activity, this chapter briey introduces the reader to the basic
features of the two literatures and suggests a possible route to reconcile them. My aim is
to provide a new insight on the link between intellectual property and innovation for the
case in which basic research and applied research are performed by heterogeneous agents.
veys on the literature.
2It will become more clear in the following as, from the point of view of the intellectual property
policy, the fact of a rm producing a good may not necessarily imply the fact the rm itself it is allowed
to sell it.
3
In fact, traditionally basic research ndings used to be conceived in public institutions
and put into the public domain, thus triggering patent races by freely entering perfectly
competitive private R&D rms aiming at inventing a better quality product.
1.2 Technological Progress: FromResidual to Leader
of the Economic Growth
Macroeconomic growth theory recognizes three fundamental sources for economic growth:
the accumulation of physical capital, the building-up of human capital, and the increase
in the stock of knowledge and technical progress.
Robert Solow (1956, 1957) analysed the relationship between physical accumulation
and income growth. Solows results stress the mechanism through which the growth
rate of income per capita is negatively related to the capital-labor ratio in the economy.
Consider, for example, the Cobb-Douglas production function3:
Y (t) = A(t)K(t)L(t)1  (1.1)
where the term A(t), known as total factor productivity (TFP), indicates the level of
technology4, and K(t) and L(t) are respectively the physical capital and labor inputs.
As usual, the constant  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share over the output. Because of
the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) and perfect competition the capital
share and the labor share sum up to one. After taking the derivative of the logarithm of
the previous equation, it is immediate to express the output growth rate as:
_Y
Y
=
_A
A
+ 
_K
K
+ (1  )
_L
L
(1.2)
The growth rate of aggregate output equals, the growth rate of TFP _A
A
, plus a weighted
3It is straightforward to see how this Cobb-Douglas case satises the properties of a neoclassical
production function (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, page 30).
4Here technology is assumed to be output augmenting.
4
average of the growth rate of the two inputs, where the weights are the corresponding
inputs shares.
The analysis assumes population growing at a constant rate, labor productivity im-
proving at a constant rate, and capital depreciating at a constant rate. Because of
these assumptions, without capital accumulation the capital-labor ratio in the economy
is meant to decline over time. Hence, the role of investment is to replace the depreciated
capital and to further increase the capital stock up to point where the original capital
intensity is restored. Technological progress - treated as exogenous in this framework -
increases the productivity of workers and thus enlarges the quantity of labor e¤ectively
supplied. Two fundamental implications of Solows analysis are:
1. the growth rate is inversely related to the capital intensity;
2. in the international comparisons countries exhibiting lower capital intensity are
predicted to be the fastest growers.
As emphasized by the literature on income convergence, the main trouble with the
approach to growth theory based on physical capital accumulation pioneered by Solow
arises when one wishes to compare the growth rates across di¤erent countries because
it does not pass the test to the data (Helpman, 2004). The reason for such a theo-
retical impasse is explained in the following: poor countries, characterized by a lower
capital/labour ratio, are those which have the strongest incentive to accumulate capital
and thus poor countries should exhibit larger growth rates. The literature on income
growth convergence emphasized how by the end of the Nineteenth century the income
growth and living standard of many poor countries dramatically failed to reach the levels
of rich and middle-income countries.
A second large literature stressed out the importance of human capital as factor de-
termining the growth of the economy aggregate output. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)
found that a non-negligible fraction of the Solow residual could be explained by changes
in the quality of inputs as improvements in the quality of labor force. Borrowing Uzawas
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(1963) approach to "optimal education", Robert Lucas (1988) pioneered an endogenous
growth model where the representative consumer decides her time-allocation between
supplying labour and educating herself and thus becoming a skilled worker. The higher
the level of accumulated skills (i.e. human capital) the individuals have, the higher is the
output that they are able to produce. Hence, a higher human capital implies a higher
growth rate for the economy. Goldin and Katz (2001) showed that during the twentieth
century about a quarter of the U.S. per worker income growth was determined by the
increase in the education level. Consistently with these studies on the U.S. economy,
Young (1995) resultsconrm the relevance of schooling and education for growth for
Asian countries. The concern about measuring the contribution of labour to the produc-
tion by taking into account just the number of hours per worker and not the quality of
the labour itself is well expressed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) words:
. . . If persons with college education have higher wage rates (and are presum-
ably more productive) than persons with high school education, then an extra
worker with college education accounts for more output expansion than would
an extra worker with a high school education.
(...)The overall labor inputs is the weighted sum over all categories, where
the weights are the relative wage rates. For a given total of worker hours, the
quality of labor force improves and, hence, the measured labor input increases
 if workers shift towards the categories that pay higher wage rates.(Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004), page 437).
Along this thesis, I will focus on a branch of the innovation literature that does not
assign to physical capital any role as an engine of growth. The focus on technology has
a long tradition, arising from Solows (1956) model with decreasing returns to capital
o¤set by the linear depreciation of capital: this is well known to imply that capital
accumulation (per e¢ ciency unit of labour) only matters along the transition to a steady
state, in which only labour augmenting technological progress can guarantee persistent
growth.
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It is worth noticing that a recent literature exists which re-establishes a role for cap-
ital accumulation and growth, by focussing on endogenous growth through investment-
specic technological change. In fact, if, as in Hu¤man (2007) and (2008), one assumes
that R&D activity is targeted to increase the productivity of new investment goods, this
may render capital accumulation and technological growth complementary, thereby ob-
taining an important link between investment and growth. Quite interestingly, in this
class of models, despite capital being an essential factor of persistent growth, a positive
capital tax rate can be optimal, as long as it serves to subsidize research and development.
I will not incorporate R&D aimed at investment-specic technological change in any of
my models, but I certainly acknowledge the potential importance of analysing the e¤ects
of basic/applied research composition in deepening our understanding of investment-
specic innovation.
Since the early 1990s, a large literature on endogenous growth theory focussed on
technological progress as the most important factor determining the growth rate of the
per-capita output. As highlighted by Elhanan Helpman (2004, page 33), a compelling
empirical and theoretical literature exists in favour of the argument that TFP growth
- i.e. the residual factor in the Solows model - plays a central role in explaining the
discrepancies in per-capita income across di¤erent countries.
Since Robert Solows (1957) pioneering contribution, the main purpose of growth ac-
counting has been to break down the growth rate of aggregate output into the contribu-
tions from the growth of inputs, usually capital and labor, and the growth of technology.
From the equation (1.2), it is possible to express the rate of technological progress _A
A
as a residual:
_A
A
=
_Y
Y
 
"

_K
K
+ (1  )
_L
L
#
. (1.3)
Hence the Solow residual _A
A
would capture the contribution of technological progress to
the aggregate output growth rate as the share non-captured by the inputs growth. For
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this reason it is usually assumed that Solow residual is the measure of our ignorance
about the determinants of output growth rates.
Economic growth scholars have argued whether the Solow residual is the ultimate
measure that captures the contribution of technological progress and of knowledge to the
advances of the standard of living. Put into di¤erent words, they have asked if the overall
economic consequences of scientic advance do merely get captured by the technological
parameter _A
A
. The answer to this question, maybe the fundamental question underlying
the last thirty years of research on endogenous economic growth, is "no", or at least "not
directly". The reason for that answer will hopefully appear clearer to the reader after that
she completed the reading of this chapter. For the moment, let the author anticipate the
intuition that the contribution of technological progress and of knowledge to development
resides in the quality of the inputs employed in the production of the nal output or in the
better-quality goods (qualitatively di¤erent goods) providing the individuals with more
utility compared with the old lower quality goods. Hence, the contribution of knowledge
and technological progress is captured not only by the productivity parameter but is also
captured and incorporated by a better quality of the inputs employed in the nal output
production or by better-quality consumption-goods.
Now let us turn to a canonical exposition of the economic growth theory. According
to the Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) exogenous growth theory, in order to sustain a
positive per-capita output growth rate in the long run, the economy must feature a
continuous advance in technological knowledge in the form of new goods, new markets
or new process. In fact, in the absence of technological progress, the output growth rate
will eventually be driven by the population growth rate and coincides with it. This in
turn implies that growth as measured by the rate of increase of output per-person will
cease in the long run because of the diminishing returns to capital.
Pre-dated in the 1960s and in the 1970s by a few notable exceptions (later specied),
during the mid-1980s a group of economists became increasingly dissatised with the
exogenously driven explanations of long run productivity growth. This brought to the
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rst attempts to endogenize growth. The fundamental issue of endogenizing technolog-
ical change was to consider technological progress not as exogenous and hence as an
unexplained event but as depending on economic decisions by agents at least as much
as the decisions about capital accumulation (or education). Hence, the rst challenge to
the usual general competitive equilibrium appeared. In fact, introducing technological
progress together with physical capital and labor as a coe¢ cient in the production
function of the nal output and making it depend on individual choices maximizing an
objective function, implies that also this factor of production together with labor and
physical capital has to be rewarded as any other production input. This in turn gener-
ates increasing returns to scale in these three factors whenever the production function
exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labor together, and when the coe¢ cient
representing technological progress is held constant. Because of the Eulers theorem, not
all factors could be paid at their marginal productivity in the case of increasing returns,
which in turn generates the necessity to try another avenue than the traditional theory
of competitive equilibrium.
The increasing dissatisfaction about the traditional explanation of long-run productiv-
ity growth based on exogenous factors as population growth rate spurred various attempts
to solve this problem, often based on important models of the Sixties. Most notably, Ken-
neth Arrow (1962) introduced the concept of learning-by-doingaccording to which the
technological progress derives as an unintended consequence of the experience in pro-
ducing new capital goods. In order to solve the problem of increasing returns to scale,
learning-by-doing is assumed external to the rms, both the producing capital goods
rms and the acquiring ones. Technological progress becomes endogenous because an
increased saving propensity would a¤ects its time path. However Arrows (1962) model
assumed a constant capital/labor ratio and xed labor requirements, meaning that the
long-run growth is ultimately limited by labor growth.
Karl Shell (1966, 1967 and 1973) built a rst growth model in which technological
progress is driven by deliberate individual choices motivated by the prospect of monop-
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olistic rents. Shell was well aware of the importance of technological progress as the
source of economic growth, in fact he maintained that While it is probably incorrect to
attribute all the residual (unexplained increase in productivity) to technical progress, it
is clear that inventive activity contributes importantly to increased productivity.(Karl
Shell (1973), page 77).
Shell considered technical knowledge as an input into the production function of the
three sectors of the economy: consumption, investment and inventive sector. He assumed
three routes to spur the inventive activity. The incentive to undertake R&D activity 
and hence the ow of new ideas developed into the economy can derive from government
expenditures, in this case the technical knowledge is considered as a pure public good
which must therefore be supported by non-market institutions. Otherwise the inventive
activity can be nanced by monopolistic rents in the production of physical capital goods.
Since Shell assumes that there exists no patent system (there is no way to appropriate
directly the fruits of inventive activity) inventive activity is pursued by the monopolist
in order to lower her production costs in machine-goods production (and, when possible,
to raise the rental rate on physical capital). The third route is a mere combination of
the two above. In fact Shell (1966, 1967 and 1973) assumes the new ideas produced by
the following production function:
_A = f(k)  A (1.4)
where k is the per worker physical capital, A is the technology index,  2 [0; 1] is the
fraction of output devoted to invention,  2 (0; 1] is the fraction of inventions that are
successful, and  > 0 represents the decay in the technical knowledge reecting, according
to Shell, either the loss to the economy due to the retirement of the technically trained
members of the labor force or the imperfect transmission of technical information from
one generation of labor force to the next. Shell (1966, 1967 and 1973) assumes a dynamic
optimization framework to get to the solution of the model and he shows that, as the
time tends to innity, the two accumulable factors of the economy physical capital and
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technical knowledge tend to constant values.
From the our perspective, Shells pioneering contribution to economic growth theory
was remarkable in its brilliant idea of combining the macroeconomic analysis with the
study of non-perfectly competitive market structures allowing the successive economic
modelling to envisage ways to incorporate the endogenous technical change into a growth
model. As Shell wrote in 1973:
"For the most part, in these contemporary growth models of the mixed or
enterprise economy, either perfect competition is assumed or the specica-
tion of the industrial organization is vague. The Schumpeterian vision of the
capitalist development, that the level of inventive activity and in turn growth
in productivity are crucially dependent upon the prevailing form of industrial
organization, is largely overlooked." (Karl Shell (1973) page 77)
Based on Frankel (1962), later attempts to endogenize the long run growth rate
conduced to the AK approach, a class of models in which technology is assumed to
grow in proportion to capital, and in which this additional element in the production
function counteracts the e¤ects of decreasing returns to capital, allowing to output to
grow in proportion to capital. The typical production function of this type of models
is in fact Y = AK, where A is a xed coe¢ cient representing technological progress,
K is the capital stock, and Y is output. It is evident in such a case that the marginal
productivity of capital is constant and equal to A.
Romer (1986) and Griliches (1979) emphasized the role of externalities in the process
of accumulation of knowledge. In this way, they were able to allow for increasing returns
in the model even with rms perceiving themselves as price-takers.
1.3 Vertical versus horizontal innovation process
Despite Shells (1966, 1967 and 1973) inuential attempts to introduce endogenous tech-
nical change into growth theory, the birth of R&D-based endogenous growth literature is
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traditionally attributed to the seminal works of Romer (1990) and Segerstrom, Anant and
Dinopoulos (1990), subsequently developed in works of Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991a). These works present some important di¤erences.
In particular, while Romer (1990) analyses the case in which technological progress takes
the form of an ever expanding product variety, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991a) consider technical knowledge arising by the introduction of better
qualities of the existing goods.
These are the two principal forms of innovation envisaged by the R&D-based endoge-
nous growth models:
1. horizontal innovation process (Romer, 1990), and
2. vertical innovation process (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, and Grossman and Helpman,
1991a).
The horizontal innovation process consists of an ever expanding product variety (hor-
izontal) which may be interpreted both as nal goods and as intermediate inputs for
the production of the nal output.
The vertical innovation process is so dened because new ideas get incorporated into
better-quality versions of the existing goods, in the form of either a new good which
provides a higher quality service or in the form of a new production process for the
same good. In this case growth is generated by a random sequence of quality improving
innovations (vertical) resulting from uncertain research activities on the existing
goods which can be produced at a lower cost providing the same quality service of the
actual vintage. Leapfroggingis the metaphor used to describe this type of technological
progress, as well as the so called quality ladder for each good.
The main di¤erence between these two forms of innovation resides in the substitutabil-
ity relation with the existing goods. In fact, horizontal and vertical innovation processes
are distinguishable on the basis of the elasticity of substitution between the new vintage
and the existing goods (see for example Grossman and Helpman, 1991b ch.3-4). Since
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the vertical innovation process consists in the developing of better versions of the existing
goods, there exists a high degree of substitutability between the actual vintage of a good
in a sector and the next one introduced in the same sector. The horizontal innovation
process consists instead in the introduction of a completely new good which has a lower
elasticity of substitution with the actual vintage; in fact with the horizontal innovation
process a new sector is created beside the existing sectors, whereas with the vertical in-
novation the newly invented good replaces a good in the same sector. In order to better
explain this distinction consider Grossman and Helpmans (1991, ch.3 pag.43) words:
industrial research may be aimed at reducing the cost of producing known
commodities (process innovation) or at inventing entirely new commodities
(product innovation). We may further distinguish product innovation accord-
ing to whether new invented goods bear a vertical or horizontal relation to
existing products. That is, innovative products may perform similar func-
tions to those performed by existing goods, but provider grater quality, or
they may serve new functions, thereby expanding variety in consumption or
specialization in production.
Hence with the vertical innovation process better goods or services are introduced.
They will respond to same needs and perform similar functions with the existing goods.
Then, the goods characterized by di¤erent vintages in the same sector will have a high
level of the elasticity of substitution between them, at limit an innite elasticity of substi-
tution. On the contrary, the horizontal innovation process consists of introducing goods
and services which perform completely new functions, new sectors are created beside the
existing ones, in the words of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch.7 pages 342-343):
. . .we assumed that the new varieties were no direct substitutes or com-
plements of the existing types; innovation did not tend to drive out the old
varieties (...). In contrast, when a good or technique is improved, the new
good or methods tend to displace the old one. That is, it is natural to model
di¤erent quality grades for a good of a given type as close substitute.
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Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) assume that R&D consists of in-
troducing completely new varieties of goods and services (either as intermediate or nal
goods) which have an unitary elasticity of substitution among one another. Segerstrom,
Anant and Dinopoulos (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt
(1992) assume that the R&D process aims at introducing better-quality versions of ex-
isting nal or intermediate goods; each new good has an innite elasticity of substitution
with the pre-existing goods: this reintroduces the Schumpeters (1913, 1934, 1939) cre-
ative destructionconcept.
Di¤erent substitutability relations between new and existing goods entail major con-
sequences in the contest of the R&D-based growth literature. In fact, as remarked above,
within a vertical innovation framework each new product occurs with its industry and so
it aims at downsize the market share of the old vintage within the same sector. This hap-
pens because the new product incorporates the new knowledge through a better quality
compared to the existing good, it brings a higher utility to the consumer or it has a lower
production cost. Instead, within a context of horizontal innovation each introduction of
new goods does not push any of the existing products out of the market, but whenever
a new sector is created, it will downsize the market share of each of the existing sectors.
Every horizontal innovatorlooks for a niche of unsatised consumer/producer ne-
cessities. Hence succeeding in the R&D race does not require the inventor to incorporate
all the existing techniques of production in the new good, because there does not emerge
the necessity to enter at a lower cost of production (this is because of the low elasticity
of substitution with the existing goods)5.
The present digression on the R&D-based growth literature refers to the seminal
paper by Romer (1990) for the analysis of technological progress consisting in an ever
expanding product variety, while it considers Aghion and Howitt (1992)s model as a
benchmark for the analysis of technological progress consisting in the introduction of
5Pietro Peretto (1998) and Peter Howitt (1999) assume that the newly created sectors enter into the
market with a productivity parameter which is drawn randomly from the distribution of the existing
industries and hence it will be the average productivity level.
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always better qualities of the existing goods.
1.3.1 R&D models with horizontal innovation
This section considers Paul Romers (1990) model as it is explained by the Aghion and
Howitt (1998, chapter 1).
Romer (1990)s model examines an economy which is made up of three sectors: a
nal output sector (competitive), an intermediate goods sector (monopolistic competi-
tion) and a research sector (competitive). Following Shells intuition of exploring the
potential of non-perfectly competitive market structures for endogenizing the techno-
logical progress, Romer (1990) borrows the product variety theory of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) and introduces monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector. Deliberate
R&D activity is performed by rms aiming at generating new knowledge rewarded from
monopoly rents on successful innovation. Hence, knowledge accumulation derives from
intentional individual choices, spurred by monopolistic rents providing the incentive to
undertake R&D activity.
The economy is populated by innitely-lived individuals who derives utility from
consuming the homogenous nal good and inelastically supply labor.
The total labor force, L, is employed either in manufacturing the nal output (LY )
or in research (LR). Hence the following constraint on the labor employment must be
veried:
L = LY + LR (1.5)
Final Output Sector
The nal sector produces a homogenous nal good Y , capable to be utilized either for
consumption or as an input for the di¤erentiated intermediate goods i:
Y = L1 Y
Z N
0
x (i) di with 0 <  < 1. (1.6)
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In a symmetric equilibrium x(i)  x and (1.6) becomes:
Y = L1 Y Nx
. (1.7)
Each rm in the competitive nal output sector takes prices as given in the prot maxi-
mization problem:
maxY = L
1 
Y
Z N
0
x (i) di  wLY  
Z N
0
p (i)x (i) di (1.8)
where the nal good as been chosen as numeraire, pY = 1, w is the wage rate, and p (i)
is the price of x (i).
The rst order conditions determine the inverse demand functions:
p (i) = L1 Y x (i)
 1 8i 2 [0; N ] (1.9)
and
w = (1  )L Y
Z N
0
x (i) di. (1.10)
Intermediate Goods Sector
Let  denote an exogenous productivity parameter. The following equation is key to
Romer (1990)s model as it represents the research technology, i.e. the way in which
the R&D rms produce new economically valuable ideas by combing labor6 and the
di¤erentiated capital goods:
_N = NLR. (1.11)
6In the present exposition, the distinction between unskilled labour and skilled labour (human capital)
- present in Romers (1990) model - is dropped because it is not essential for the results (see also Gancia
and Zilibotti, 2005).
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From the previous equation it is immediate to notice that the number of blueprints created
in the economy per unit time, is directly proportional to the number of researchers and
to knowledge accumulated over time, here represented by the number of the existing
product lines.
As a technical (and legal) requisite for production, each intermediate rm must pur-
chase the right to utilize the (patented) blueprint (sunk cost). In equilibrium, the patent
holder decides its production level to maximize its prot,  (i) = p (i)x (i) x (i), subject
to equations (1.9) and (1.10).
The optimal price that will be chosen by the monopolist is therefore determined as:
p (i) =
1

(1.12)
and the quantity produced as:
x (i) = 
2
1 LY , (1.13)
hence the maximum prot for an intermediate rm is given by:
 (i) =
1  


2
1 LY . (1.14)
In a steady-state the growth rate of output g is equal to the growth rate of technology.
Hence
g = LR. (1.15)
Equations (1.12), (1.13), and (1.15), together with the steady-state Euler equation
(where r is the interest rate,  the subjective discount factor, and 1

is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function):
g =
r   

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can be solved for the steady-state growth rate of the economy is given by:
g =
L  
 + 
. (1.16)
From equation (1.16) it is immediate to notice how the long-run growth rate positively
depends on the population size (scale e¤ect), that is a greater population size (i.e. a
greater number of researchers in the economy) implies a greater number of new interme-
diate goods and hence a higher per capita growth rate.
It is important to remark that, according to Romers (1990) analysis, technological
progress is the result of the intentional actions taken by prot-maximizing individuals.
This is why Romers (1990) model deserves to merit (among the others) of having intro-
duced endogenous technical change deriving from the deliberate decisions of individuals
who respond to market incentives.
1.3.2 R&D models with Vertical Innovation
According to Romers (1990) theory of horizontal innovation, whenever a new variety is
introduced a new intermediate or nal sector immediately arises, and hence a monopolis-
tic rm which will produce that good. Every intermediate (or nal) monopolist7 will last
forever because there is no trace of any kind of obsolescence of old intermediate inputs
or nal goods and because the legal pant life is assumed to be innite. The R&D models
with vertical innovation try to microfound rm exit by introducing the Schumpeterian
concept of creative destruction as a fundamental characteristic of the technological
progress occurring within a capitalistic economy.
In Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitts (1992) works the rst
departure from Romers (1990) article is in fact the appropriate consideration given to the
concept of obsolescence, as here the introduction of better products renders the previous
ones obsolete.
7See Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
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This section considers a multisector version of Aghion and Howitts (1998, chapter
3) model, where the analysis of each intermediate sector coincides with the Aghion and
Howitts (1992) model. The economy is populated by a continuous mass of individuals
with identical intertemporally additive preferences. There exists a perfect capital market
and each individual is endowed of a one unit ow of labor.
There exist two important categories of labor: unskilled and skilled. The former type
can be only employed into the production of the nal consumption good, while skilled
labor can be used either in research or in the intermediate sector. There is one nal good
which can only be consumed and which is produced by a continuum of intermediate goods,
indexed on the unit interval. Each intermediate good is produced using labor on one-
for-one technology and each intermediate good can be used to produce the nal output
independently of the other intermediate goods, there no exists complementarity between
them. Furthermore each intermediate sector is monopolized by the patent-holder of the
latest generation of that good; in fact each intermediate rm produces a good protected
by an innitely-lived patent. The intermediate producer could either be thought of as
being the latest innovator on that sector (who then set up a new intermediate rm), or
an existing intermediate rm that purchases the patent for the innovation from the latest
innovator. In either case the latest innovator is able to extract the whole net present value
of monopoly prots generated by that innovation during the lifetime of this innovation.
Each intermediate input is able to produce the nal output according to the following
production function8:
Yit = Aitx

it (1.17)
where Ait represents the productivity of the latest generation of intermediate good i, and
0 <  < 1. Aggregate output of the nal good is thus expressed by the integral:
8The reader should be aware that in this specication of the production function is implicit the
normalization to one of a xed production factor (land or unskilled labour), so that the production
function exhibit constant returns to scale.
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Yt =
Z 1
0
Yitdi. (1.18)
The local monopolist sells its output to the competitive nal good sector at a price equal
to the marginal product of the intermediate input xit, that is pit = Aitx 1it . Thus, the
monopolists output and demand for labor (because of the one-for-one technology into
manufacturing sector) will be:
xit = ~x

wt
Ait

=

wt
2Ait
 1
 1
, (1.19)
where wt is the wage rate measured in consumption goods.
The monopolists equilibrium prot will be:
it = pit~x

wt
Ait

  wt~x

wt
Ait

= Ait
1  

wt
Ait
~x

wt
Ait

. (1.20)
Noteworthy is the negative relationship between both demand for labor and prots with
the productivity-adjusted wage rate. As we shall see later, this is an e¤ect which adds to
the creative destruction e¤ect determining a negative relationship between current and
future research.
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) represent the ow of new ideas, and hence the output
growth rate as:
_Amaxt = A
max
t n ln ,  > 1. (1.21)
As in Romer (1990) the ow of new ideas is proportional to the number of researchers.
The arrival rate of the Poisson process  describes the instantaneous arrival rate of
innovations, hence n is the Poisson arrival rate of innovations to the economy as a
whole representing the creative destruction e¤ect due to the next innovations and hence
depending on the number n of researchers existing in the economy9. Amaxt is the leading-
9The Poisson process are assumed independent, and independent Poisson processes are additive. This
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edge technological parameter, i.e. the productivity parameter in the last innovating
sector, and measures the increment of the technology parameter in the nal production
function and represent the increases of the logarithm of the nal output.
The scale e¤ect is evident in the model: a greater population size determines a greater
number of researchers and hence a higher ow of new ideas per unit of time. There exist
linear spillovers between the stock of knowledge accumulated in the economy until time
t and the ow of new ideas; at t each discovery is implementable only in the innova-
tors chosen sector, but its discovery allows the next innovator to discover a marginally
better technique in another sector, by adding to the general knowledge used by that
innovator. Because we are in a multisector economy and each new idea is not developed
simultaneously in all the intermediate sectors there will be a distribution of productivity
parameters across the sector of the economy, with values ranging from 1 to 1. Aghion
and Howitt (1998, ch.3) assume that the shape of the distribution does not need to
change: over time the distribution will be displaced rightward as innovating sectors move
and as technological progress raises itself, then over time only the name of the sectors
occupying di¤erent places in the distribution will change. Moreover Aghion and Howitt
(1998, ch.3) consider the long-run cross-industry distribution of the relative productivity
parameters which does not change over time. Then it is convenient to classify sectors not
by their index but by their relative productivity. Let us dene the relative productivity
parameters ait as ait  AitAmaxt . In the long run, the cross-imdustry distribution of ait will
be given by the distribution function:
H(a) = a
1
ln  , 0 < a  1.
We are able to rewrite the monopolists output and labor-demand for a sector with
means that if there exists a sequence of independent Poisson processes with the same arrival rate then
the expected number of arrivals per unit of time is the same parameter , the Poisson arrival rate of
innovations in the whole economy will be expressed as the parameter  time the number of researchers
in the whole economy n, and the total ow of arrivals is measured by the canonical Poisson distribution.
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relative productivity ait at the date t as:
~x
!t
a

=
 !t
2a
 1
 1
, (1.22)
where !t = wtAmaxt is the productivity-adjusted wage rate paid to skilled workers employed
in the manufacturing sector.
The aggregate demand for labor can be found multiplying this demand by the density
of such sectors h(a)  H 0(a) and summing over 0 < a  1. The labor-market clearing
condition L = nt +
1R
0
~x
 
!t
a

h(a)da determines the productivity-adjusted wage rate in
terms of the mass of research workers.
Classifying the sectors by their relative productivities, it is possible to express the
aggregate nal output production function as:
Yt = A
max
t
Z 1
0
a~x
!t
a

h(a)da (1.23)
where h(a) denotes the density of the relative productivity parameter distribution. Con-
sidering that population is held constant over time and hence the manufacturing labor
force is a constant fraction of the population, it follows that the instantaneous growth rate
of aggregate output at each date will be the growth rate of the leading-edge parameter
Amaxt as indicated by the above spillover equation.
Creative destruction
As mentioned above, the new element introduced by the seminal work by Aghion and
Howitt (1992) regards the Schumpeterian creative destruction concept which character-
izes the capitalistic process incorporated into a benchmark model of general equilibrium
with vertical innovations. The creative destruction consists of destroyingthe economic
rents of the incumbent through the introduction of either a new product or a new produc-
tion process which allows producing at a lower cost. This in turn on one side determines
the destruction of the economic rents of the incumbent, and on the other side contributes
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to the technological progress creating better products for the consumer and creating bet-
ter opportunities for the whole economy because of the advances in the technological
frontier.
In virtually all Schumpeterian growth models it is predicted that the incumbent in-
novator chooses not to do any research: all research is conducted by outside research
rms/individuals which are attracted by the prospect of the monopolistic ow rents
for a successful innovation  rather than the incumbent monopolist. The incumbent
does not conduct research because it would internalize its monopoly rights obsolescence
and therefore would subtract its current value from the payo¤ of a successful innovation.
This implies that the value to the incumbent innovator of making the next innovation
is strictly less than the value to an outside researcher: this is an example of the Arrow
e¤ect or replacement e¤ect (see Tirole, 1988).
The innovation process is random because the new ideas arrive according to a Poisson
process, but the relationship between the amounts of research in two successive periods
is dened as deterministic. In particular there exists a negative relationship between
research e¤orts of two successive periods, more research next period discourages current
research through at least two e¤ects.
The rst e¤ect is creative destruction: the incentive to undertake research this period
depends on the payo¤ of the successive periods, wich is on the future expected monop-
olistic rents. These rents will last until the next successful innovator will displace the
incumbent introducing a better quality of the good, and at that time the knowledge
underlying the rents of the incumbent will be rendered obsolete. Hence more research
next period means a higher probability to be soon replaced by the next innovation 
through the assumption of a positive (usually linear) relationship between the number
of researchers and the ow of new ideas per unit of time discouraging current R&D
activity due the reduction of the rents ow.
The second e¤ect works through the wage paid to skilled labor. In fact in this model
it is assumed the existence of skilled labor which may be employed either in manufactur-
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ing or in research. The expectation of more research next period determines a greater
expected demand for skilled labor thereby increasing the future real wage rate of skilled
labor and hence reducing the monopolistic ow rents that will be gained after the intro-
duction of a better quality of good: this in turn discourages current research. The model
shows the existence of unique steady-state equilibrium and also the possibility of cyclical
growth patterns.
Considering a multisector economy that is an economy in which there exists several,
at the limit innite, intermediate inputs to produce a unique nal output (see Aghion
and Howitt, 1998, chapter 3) there exists another important e¤ect that discourages the
current research, the crowding out e¤ect. This e¤ect arises because innovations are
continually arriving somewhere in the economy determining a continual wage rise, this
in turn implies a reduction of employment and prots in the non-innovating sectors.
These considerations may well be summarized by the following formulation of the
present expected value of an innovation in the steady state:
!t =
Vt
Amaxt
=
1 

~x (!t)
r + n+ 
1 n ln 
(1.24)
where Vt is the discounted expected payo¤ of an innovation. This equation represents a
fundamental relationship in the model: the arbitrage condition between manufacturing
and research activity. The skilled labor force can be employed either in the manufacturing
sector or in the research sector, then the arbitrage equation allows to have a positive
amount of skilled worker in the both sectors. The numerator of the RHS is the prot
ow earned by the monopolistic producer of the latest innovation of an intermediate good,
the negative dependence of the prot ow on productivity-adjusted wage rate is evident
from this expression where the skilled labor employed in the manufacturing sector with
the most advanced technology ~x (!t) is a decreasing function of the productivity-adjusted
wage rate. The term n represents the next periods research e¤ort (in the steady state
each time the number of researchers will be constant and equal to n) and hence the
probability ow to be displaced by the next innovator. Thus future research discourages
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current research by reducing the discounted expected payo¤ of an innovation. Again r is
the interest rate and the last term 
1 n ln  represents the crowding out e¤ect.
From a normative point of view Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998) consider both
intertemporal spillover and appropriability e¤ects, which generate a less than optimal
growth rate in Romers (1990) model, but they consider another e¤ect that works in the
opposite direction. In Aghion and Howitts (1992 and 1998) models the average growth
rate may be too low or too high than the welfare maximizing level. There exist positive
externalities represented by the intertemporal and inter-industry spillovers whereby the
knowledge embedded in each innovation can be used by all future researchers, and by
the appropriability e¤ect, whereby the monopoly rents from an innovations cannot be
totally appropriated by the successful innovator (they can appropriate only a fraction
of the output, i.e. the fraction of equilibrium revenue in the intermediate sector accru-
ing to the monopolist), and the remaining part of these rents are appropriated by the
consumer as surplus. The third e¤ect which operates in the opposite direction is the so
called business-stealing e¤ect familiar to the patent-race literature (Tirole, 1988). Each
successful innovator does not consider the destruction of the incumbent rents when she
introduces a better quality of the existing intermediate input. When the size of inno-
vation is xed, the business-stealing e¤ect could lead to too much innovations in the
economy because it dominates the other two positive e¤ects.
The same conclusions are obtained by Grossman and Helpman (1991b, chapter 4),
who state that in a decentralized economy the incentives for R&D may be more or less
than optimal.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b, chapter 3) nd that when R&D aims at introducing
completely new products lines the market incentives for product developments always
are insu¢ cient when industrial research generates technological spillovers. The di¤erent
conclusions are due to the above external e¤ects: a positive spillover for consumers of
innovative products, who obtain greater services after any new innovation; a second ex-
ternal benet due the knowledge spillover to latest innovators, and a negative spillover
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due the business-stealing e¤ect. Hence also the welfare analysis put in evidence the
fundamental distinction between vertical and horizontal innovation process. Indeed the
business stealing e¤ect takes place because of the high substitutability between the exist-
ing goods and the new ones. The introduction of a new good replaces the actual vintage
of the same good and then destroys the monopolistic rents of the incumbent, this in
turn could generate too much innovations. Conversely, the horizontal innovation process
introducing new varieties of goods which have a low degree of substitution with the ex-
isting varieties will show a lower business-stealing e¤ect ( in the measure of the reduced
market share for each good) which will be dominated by the above positive externalities.
1.4 The Scale E¤ect
The rst strand of Schumpeterian growth models was plagued by the so called scale
e¤ect on per-capita output growth rate: not only do the research e¤orts a¤ect per-capita
output growth rate but a higher aggregate research e¤ort in the form of a higher number
of researchers engaged into R&D activity generates a higher per-capita output growth
rate. The prediction that skill acquisition a¤ect the per capita output growth rate was
not new at the time of Schumpeterian growth literature, in fact Lucas (1988) inspired
by Beckers (1964) theory of human capital sustained that human capital accumulation
rate drives growth in the economy, so di¤erences in the growth rates across countries are
mainly attributable to di¤erences into rates at which those countries accumulate human
capital over time. This depends on the specication of human capital as an input in the
nal output production function, just like any other production input; it follows that the
output growth rate depends on the growth rate of human capital. Di¤erently, Nelson
and Phelps (1966) maintained that growth rate is driven by the stock of human capital
accumulated in an economy, thus cross-country di¤erences in the growth rate depends
on the di¤erent stock of human capital existing in each country, and most importantly,
a countrys ability to innovate or to catch up with more advanced countries depends on
26
the human capital stock existing and on the past educational attainment. In this case
human capital as incorporated in the labor force is the primary source of innovations.
Thus the growth rate of output will depend on the rate of innovation and hence on the
level, rather than the accumulation rate, of human capital.
Turning to the rst strand of Schumpeterian models of economic growth these mod-
els predicted at least three important consequences for long-run economic growth. First,
larger economies should grow faster; second, population growth over time determines an
accelerating per-capita income growth rate, and third, changes in inputs used in knowl-
edge creation and hence policies that inuence these variables should be accompanied
by changes in the growth rate.
An inuential paper by Charles Jones (1995a) put forward an important empirical
critique to the endogenous growth literature, both in the AK-type models of endogenous
growth, and in the R&D-based growth models. In fact, the AK model predicts that a
permanent increases in the investment rate generates a permanent increases in the GDP
growth rate, while the R&D-based growth models predict that increases in the research
e¤ort in the economy generate permanent increases in the per-capita output growth
rate. The scale e¤ect prediction consists in the ties between the research e¤ort and
per-capita output growth rate, which means that per-capita GDP growth rate is almost
proportional to the population size, hence a greater population size would determine a
higher per-capita GDP growth rate, an economy with growing population would show
an explosive growth rate.
Jones(1995a,b) critique is based on two empirical works showing how the growth
rates of per-capita GDP has shown little or no persistence increases in the post-World
War II era of OECD countries. Then whatever endogenous growth models predict that
permanent movements in some variable (investment rate or population size and hence
number of researchers) have permanent e¤ects on per-capita GDP growth rate, then ei-
ther the same variable must exhibit no large persistent movements or some other variable
must o¤set these movements; this last hypothesis is considered unlikely by Jones (1995a)
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who state . . . either nothing in the U.S. experience since 1880 has had a large, persistent
e¤ect on growth rate, or whatever persistent e¤ect have occurred have miraculously been
o¤setting.
The data described by Jones (1995a) indicate that for some OECD countries the
investment rates have increased substantially in the post-world war II period, and the
producer durable investment rates too; this strong trend with a high probability could
not be o¤set by any other variable inuencing the growth rate as human capital and
openness which both certainly have shown for the same period an upward trend. More-
over from Jones(1995a) analysis appears that a permanent increase in the investment
rate has no permanent e¤ect on per-capita GPD growth rate, but also that the horizon
over which the increased investment rate generates its e¤ects on the growth rate is short,
it is on the order of ve-eight years.
More drastic conclusions are reached referring to R&D-based growth models, in par-
ticular for the rst strand of Schumpeterian growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991a; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). The time series evidence shows how the
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in France, Germany and Japan since
1965, and the same variable in the United States since 1950, have dramatically increased
at least up to 1987. Jones (1995a) shows how the same trend emerges if we refer to
the real R&D expenditure. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth data show negative
trends for France and Japan and no distinct trend for U.S. and Germany. This in turn
implies that the conclusions of the rst strand of R&D-based growth models the scale
e¤ect on growth existing in Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) models are at odds with the data.
The same conclusions are obtained if we consider that technological progress is driven
by a constant share of labor force devoted to R&D. In fact Jones (1995b) shows how this
share had strongly positive trend in the U.S. in the post-war period, passing from about
0.25% in 1950 to nearly 0.80% by 1988. The evidence is similar for France, Germany and
Japan.
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Moreover, the rst strand of R&D-based growth models has an additional important
conclusion which is radically changed with the alternative analysis by Jones (1995a, b).
Eliminating the prediction of scale e¤ects induces a return to the Solow-like implications
for long run growth: long run per-capita growth depends on parameters that are con-
sidered exogenous and consequently whichever policy changes, such as subsidies to R&D
or subsidies to capital accumulation, produce no e¤ects on the per-capita output growth
rate.
The empirical analysis conducted by Jones (1995a, b) spurred a second strand of
Schumpeterian growth models aiming to eliminate the scale e¤ect prediction and to
restore a role both to the endogenous technological progress for long run growth of an
economy and to government policies inuencing the pace of knowledge accumulation and
hence per-capita output growth rate.
Jonescontributions also motivated further empirical evidence in this eld. Kocher-
lakota and Yi (1997) construct a simple model in which long-run growth depends pos-
itively on public capital and negatively on distortionary taxation. Their analysis refer
to the U.S. and United Kingdom data and shows how government investment stimulates
growth but the budget constraint requires raising taxes o¤setting growth e¤ects, that is
their e¤ects are almost exactly o¤set, a very di¢ cult case as argued by Jones (1995a, b).
Several studies also investigated the existence of scale e¤ects at the industry level,
i.e. as the result of the industry evolution. The empirical evidence is not uniform on
the validity of Gibrats Law, but all of these studies point in the direction of no scale
e¤ects at the level of rm. Other two important studies respectively by Jovanovic and
MacDonald (1994), and Klepper (1996) have suggested that the scale e¤ect may underlie
factors that generates industry shake-outs.
In conclusion the empirical evidence about scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian growth
models shows that growth rates have accelerated over the course of a century or more,
but they have failed to accelerate in the face of increasing R&D e¤ort during the last
forty years.
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Moreover, the empirical evidence provided by Jones (1995a, b) has been subject to
a di¤erent critique, this time based on some measurement problem associated with the
output growth rate and with the measure of the increasing quality of goods and services.
Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch.12 Appendix) consider at least four major problems for the
measure of the knowledge-based growth models. These may be summarized as:
 Knowledge-input problem: this considers many workers which are employed in pro-
duction, management, or other non-research activities. In this case these workers
spend a lot of time looking for better ways of producing and selling the output of
the rm for which they work, this time and e¤ort should be considered as part of
the cost of creating knowledge.
 Knowledge-investment problem: the product of formal and informal R&D activities
is typically not well measured at all because it does not result in an immediate
commodity with a market price. That is the output of knowledge often produces
his payo¤ not instantaneously or at least not in the same productive cycle, then its
e¤ect on GNP may be counted with a certain delay.
 Quality-improvement problem: the product of the research activity often consists
of better qualities of goods and services, there exist several di¢ culties constructing
price indexes that account for quality improvements especially in the service sector
where the same output presents measurement problems per-se; this in turn implies
that much of the resulting benet goes unmeasured.
 Obsolescence problem: the standard measure of GNP ought to include a separate
investment account for the production of knowledge in order to account for the
depreciation of the stock of knowledge that takes place as it becomes obsolete
being superseded by new discoveries and innovations. Moreover, the creation of
new knowledge creates the depreciation of existing physical and human capital,
and these problems become more and more acute when a wave of innovations
accelerates the obsolescence rate.
30
Up to now we have considered the scale e¤ect on the per capita output growth rate.
However it is not the only scale e¤ect which result from several Schumpeterian growth
models. Jones (1999) shows that changes in research intensity positively a¤ect the long
run level of per capita income along a balanced growth path, whereas Howitt (1999) show
that population size negatively a¤ects the level of per capita income. Di¤erently to the
scale e¤ects on per capita output growth rate, there exists no empirical evidence on the
scale e¤ects which operates on the level of per capita income. Moreover in any model in
which the steady state per capita output depends on the population growth rate, there
exists a sort of once-over scale e¤ect on the steady state growth rate engendered by an
increase of population growth rate.
In order to show the routes used to purge the scale e¤ects from the rst strand of
Schumpeterian growth models we follow Dinopoulos and Thompsons (1999) account.
Let the nal output be obtained according to the following production function:
Y (t) = A (t)LY (t) (1.25)
where Y (t) is output, LY (t) is the labor force devoted to the nal good production and
A (t) denotes the state of technology at time t.
The output growth rate evolves over time following the advances in the technological
frontier whose specication depends on the type of R&D assumed, vertical or horizontal.
The rst type of models (Segerstrom and Dinopoulos, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991a; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) assume that A (t) = q(t) where  > 1 (is equal to one
plus the quality increment of a good relative to its immediate predecessor in an industry),
and q(t) is the number of innovations that have occurred since time zero.
The models with horizontal innovation (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991b)
assume that A (t) = N(t)
1
 1 where N(t) is the number of varieties active at time t and
 > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The technological frontier evolves according to
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_A (t)
A (t)
= I(t) (1.26)
where  = 1
 1 in the variety expansion class of models, and  = ln in the quality ladder
models. I(t) represents the e¤ective R&D investment, i.e. the number of innovations per
unit of time _q(t) = I(t). A general relationship which describes the scale e¤ects generated
from this rst strand of Schumpeterian growth literature may be written down as
I(t) =
LA (t)
X(t)
; (1.27)
where LA (t) is type labor force engaged into research activity; the interpretation give to
the term X(t) is the key to remove the scale e¤ect. Let us proceed by combining the
equations (1.26) and (1.27) as follows:
_A (t)
A (t)
= 
LA (t)
X(t)
= 
LA (t)
L(t)
L(t)
X(t)
. (1.28)
Because of the symmetry hypothesis and because in steady-state the fraction of labor
force employed into R&D has to be constant, the removal of the scale e¤ects requires
that the steady-state growth rate of the term X(t) be exactly the same as the population
growth rate.
From equation (1.28) it is evident that routes followed to eliminate the scale e¤ects
coincide with the term X(t) with an economic meaning.
One route introduced the concept of increasing complexity into R&D activities, which
is the idea that research becomes more and more di¢ cult over time because the most
obvious ideas are discovered rst (see Jones, 1995b, Kortum, 1997, and Segerstrom, 1998
for examples of this way out of the scale e¤ects). In such a case X(t) is a R&D di¢ culty
index that evolves according to a simple dynamic formulation capturing the idea that
the most obvious discoveries are obtained rst.
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A second route appended the horizontal innovation process to the vertical R&D ac-
tivity. Such type of models considers both types of innovations (Young, 1998; Aghion
and Howitt, 1998, ch.12; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; Peretto, 1998; Peretto and
Smulders, 1998; Howitt, 1999). In this case X(t) represents the number of sectors ex-
isting in the economy at time; the scale e¤ect is eliminated through the dilution e¤ect
because the economy wide R&D is di¤used over a greater number of varieties in larger
economies. As population grows over time completely new product lines are introduced
into economy at the same population growth rate, the ow of new sectors per unit of
time and population grow at the same rate, at least in the steady state. It follows that
the increasing size of researchers is spread over the increasing ow of new sectors, leaving
the per-sector vertical R&D e¤ort unchanged.
Both approaches generate a steady state in which there only exists scale e¤ect on the
level of per-capita output, but not on growth rate.
The increasing complexity argument generates the so-called exogenous Schumpeterian
growth models in which long-run per capita income growth is proportional to the rate of
population growth rate and hence the policies by the government does not produce any
long-run e¤ect. The second route gives origin to the endogenous Schumpeterian growth
models in which the per-capita output growth rate depends both on population growth
rate and on a term that may be a¤ected by a variety of permanent policy changes.
The third way adopted in the literature to purge the Schumpeterian growth model
from the strong scale e¤ect was developed by Cozzi (2003) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2004).
The argument is simple: one should be able to identify a theory which is independent
from any assumption on the di¢ culty index X(t). The authors state that in order
to invent new or better products it is necessary to invest a fraction of the researchers
population into an updating activity aimed on the last relevant innovations introduced
in the economy. Hence the updating activity subtracts ow labour time from the pure
inventive activity. Let the time spent on updating be denoted by the constant  2 [0; 1],
it is possible to express the evolution of the economy-wide technology as:
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_A (t) = A (t)LA (t)
 
1  
_A (t)
A (t)
!
, (1.29)
where  captures the R&D productivity; 
A(t)
is a positive ow labour unit cost of keeping
oneself updated about the latest innovations. Crucial is the idea that in order to try to
bring a technology improvement in the sector in which a researcher operates, he or she
must devote 
A(t)
> 0 to acquire the latest technology improvements. From equation (1.29)
it is immediate to notice that the higher is the already accumulated general knowledge,
the lower the updating cost is. This captures the e¤ect of the ICT or general purpose
technologies in facilitating the information transmission across the economy. Solving
(1.29) for
_A(t)
A(t)
yields:
_A (t)
A (t)
=
1
1
LA(t)
+ 
=
LA (t)
1 + LA (t)
. (1.30)
Hence the growth rate of knowledge is bounded by a constant value:
gA =
_A (t)
A (t)
<
1

.
Moreover, from (1.30) we notice that the growth rate of technology (and hence of the
per-capita output) is an increasing function of the amount of labour allocated to R&D,
LA (t), but exhibit strongly decreasing returns to R&D everywhere, being strictly concave
and bounded by 1

from above.
From equation (1.30) it is possible to see that if population tends to innity, the
per-capita output growth would tend to innity if and only if:
_A (t)
A (t)
=
1
1
LA(t)
+ 
=
LA (t)
1 + LA (t)
!1, (1.31)
which implies:
1
LA (t)
+ ! 0,
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which is possible if and only if  ! 0. Hence, the per-capita growth is explosive if and
only if the in the long rung the researchers do not spend a fraction of their time in getting
updated.
The updating cost productivity adjustment approach can be generalized to include
the case of decreasing returns to ideas. Following Jones (1995), let ' [A (t)] = A (t),
with 0 <  < 1. With this new ingredient equation (1.30) becomes:
_A (t)
A (t)
=
1
A(t)1 
LA(t)
+ 
. (1.32)
Cozzi (2003) shows that, provided that the growth rate of the population is not too
high, the relationship between the output growth rate and the population growth rate is
increasing as in Jones (1995), otherwise, for relatively high population growth rates, the
balanced growth rate of the per-capita output becomes identical to the case of constant
or increasing returns to R&D, i.e. 1

.
In-House and Outside Innovation: Two Inuential Papers
Two inuential papers considered innovations from a di¤erent point of view: innovations
are conducted either by larger and larger incumbent rms or by new rms, in the former
case we have in-house innovation and in the last case outside innovation. In particular we
refer to the inuential works respectively by Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999). Peretto
(1998) uses the dilution argument to eliminate the scale e¤ect, but the distinctive element
of his work that makes it worthy to treat, even albeit briey, is the industrial structure
analysis conducted by the author.
Peretto (1998) assumed that the existing rms incur xed costs in order to reduce
marginal costs and increase product quality, moreover new rms incur xed costs in
order to bring new varieties to the market. The key aspect is that rms set up R&D
facilities and accumulate proprietary knowledge in order to reduce costs, o¤er lower price,
and expand sales. In this set up, increasing returns to innovations are internal to the
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rm. With permanent increases in the population growth rate the economy converges
to a steady state in which productivity growth rate is the same as before the permanent
population growth rate change, but in which rm size is larger and entry is faster. Hence
the author considers the case in which vertical R&D is conducted by larger and larger
incumbent rms. This depends on the assumption of increasing returns to scale internal
to the rm whereby the scale of the economy matters because it inuences the scale of
production of an individual rm. As a rm produces more, it applies its knowledge over
a larger volume of output and the rate of return to R&D increases; this implies that an
economy with larger rms grows faster because rms run larger R&D programs. The
forward looking expectations allow rms to anticipate that a larger economy attracts
entry of new rms producing new varieties and this exactly o¤sets the e¤ect of a larger
market on the returns to innovation.
These arguments together determine the steady state productivity growth rate and
rm size. The rm size however will be larger for countries with a higher population
growth rate, i.e. for countries where population grows faster. The above argument
implies that steady-state rm size is increasing (linearly in the model) in the population
growth rate, this is because entry of new rms is costly and requires time. Hence in
countries where population grows faster  i.e. have a higher population growth rate 
there is at any moment in time a larger inuxes of workers that nd their employment in
the existing rms. Hence the key aspect of Perettos (1998a, b) models resides not only
in the elimination of the scale e¤ect through the dilution argument, used in many other
papers, but in the industrial structure in which R&D in conducted by larger and larger
incumbent rms.
Peter Howitts (1999) analysis incorporates both the increasing complexity and dilu-
tion arguments.
Consumption and R&D are both produced under perfect competition by a continuum
of intermediate products. Total output of the economy at any date is
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Yt = Ct +Nvt +Nht =
QtZ
0
Aitx

itdi (1.33)
where Ct is consumption, Nvt and Nht are respectively vertical and horizontal R&D ex-
penditures, Qt is the number of sectors existing at time t, xit is the ow of intermediate
product i, Ait is the productivity parameter attached to the latest version of the inter-
mediate product i. Each intermediate product is produced by a monopolistic rm using
labor with a one-for-one technology, hence the total cost of each intermediate incumbent
will be xit and the price will be pit = Aitx 1it . Considering the relative productivity
distribution F (a) = a
1
ln 
it , where ait =
Ait
Amaxt
, prot maximization implies that each local
monopolist supplies the quantity ~x

!t
Ait

=

!t
2Ait
 1
 1
.
In the vertical innovation process Howitt (1999) envisages the increasing complexity
argument in order to prevent growth from exploding as the amount of available capital
as an input to R&D grows without bound. In the horizontal innovation process the
author assumes that variety-creation depends on resources devoted to horizontal innova-
tions and on nal output through a constant returns to scale production function, and
there is free entry in varieties. The most important novelty regards the di¤erent ability
of the potential R&D workers; in fact Howitt (1999) assumes the existence of an un-
changing cross-sectional distribution of horizontal R&D ability, and only the best ones
are allocated to the introduction of new product lines  i.e. have the Schumpeterian
entrepreneurial abilitysince there exist no quality di¤erences among workers engaged
in either manufacturing or vertical R&D. Hence Howitt (1999) assumes an exogenous
distribution of entrepreneurial abilities among the population.
Howitt (1999) eliminates the scale e¤ect through the assumption that what is really
important for the advances in the technological frontier is the per-sector research e¤ort;
he assumes that knowledge spillovers produced by vertical innovations have to consider
the impact on the stock of public knowledge, the greater the public knowledge stock the
smaller the marginal impact of a new innovation on the aggregate economy. This in turn
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allows to only considering the role of the per-sector research e¤ort to spur technological
advances.
This reasoning is well summarized by the di¤erential equation describing the growth
of the leading-edge technology Amaxt :
g =
_Amaxt
Amaxt
= Qtnt
ln 
Qt
= ln nt (1.34)
where nt is the Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations for each sector (nt is the
productivity-adjusted expenditure on vertical R&D in each sector), hence the term Qtnt
represents the economy-wide Poisson arrival rate of vertical innovations. The term ln 
Qt
measures the marginal impact of each innovation on the stock of public knowledge as
said above, this implies that advances in the technological frontier depend on the per-
sector research e¤ort. The theoretical argument against the scale e¤ect is based both on
dilution arguments and on the spillover arguments. Indeed when population grows over
time completely new varieties are introduced into the economy at the same growth rate,
this leaves the productivity-adjusted per-sector research e¤ort unchanged. But what
allows to eliminate the scale e¤ect is also the always decreasing marginal impact on the
whole economy of the vertical research spillover, which decreases as the number of sectors
(and hence population size) rises.
In Howitt (1999) the absolute value of the research spillover, i.e. the term ln nt,
remains constant over time, but the marginal impact of the latest innovations on the
stock of public knowledge tends to decrease as the number of new sectors grows over
time. At the same time there will be more and more sectors which are active in vertical
R&D and from which the research spillover operates. Then on the one side the marginal
impact of the latest innovations decreases over time and to the other side this spillover
operates in an increasing number of sectors, because these two opposite e¤ects depend
on the number of product lines they cancel out respectively causing the productivity-
adjusted research e¤ort per sector and hence to productivity growth rate to remain
unchanged.
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Horizontal R&D is driven by a concave, constant-returns production function with
positive marginal products, which, expressed in intensive form, is given by:
_Q =
 (ht)
Amaxt
(1.35)
where ht =
Nht
Yt
is the fraction of GDP allocated to horizontal R&D. Howitt (1999)
introduces the assumption that R&D expenditures (both vertical and horizontal) are
subsidized at the proportional rate, then the marginal cost of both vertical and horizontal
R&D is 1   . In this case the two arbitrage equation for both vertical and horizontal
R&D can be written down as:
Vt
Amaxt
= 1   =  0 (h)   1 Vt
Amaxt
. (1.36)
where Vt is the discounted expected payo¤of an innovation and   1 = E(a)
1
1  is the long
run expected value of the invariant distribution of the relative productivity parameter.
The rst equality represents the arbitrage condition for vertical R&D, while the equality
between the rst and the last term represents the arbitrage condition for horizontal R&D.
Considering the second equality we are able to obtain the constant fraction of GDP
allocated to horizontal R&D:
 0 (h) =  . (1.37)
In the steady state per-capita output can be written as:
Y
L
= y = Amaxt  
 1

L
Q
 1
(1.38)
In the steady state the amount of labor per product line l = L
Q
is assumed constant 
i.e. population and the ow of new sectors per unit of time grow at the same rate so
that population growth creates no continual scale e¤ects through demand channel. Then
the per-capita output growth rate depends on the ow of new ideas developed for the
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introduction of better versions of the existing goods. Equation (1.34) shows that the
growth rate of output per person depends on the number of per-sector vertical R&D.
The potential supply-side scale e¤ect of a raising number of R&D workers is nullied
by the rise in the number of product lines, which reduces the spillover coe¢ cient 
Qt
.
This means that the scale e¤ect is eliminated not only through the dilution argument
a higher number of researchers spread over a higher number of sectors whereby the
per-sector research e¤ort remains unchangedbut also by the fact that a higher number
of products reduces the marginal contributions of the inter-industry spillover, in fact as
Howitt (1999) maintains: an innovation of a given size with respect to any given product
will have a smaller impact on the aggregate economy.
The fundamental consequence of this line of reasoning is that an economy with more
sectors could produce as many innovations as an economy with only one sector. Hence
an economy with only one sector could grow at the same pace as larger economy with
more sectors, which is admittedly questionable. However the aim by Howitt (1999) was
to show how the long run growth rate of output per-person is determined by the same
forces as in the original model by Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) but is increased by a
subsidy to R&D, moreover there exists an additional positive e¤ect of the growth rate of
population, not its level.
1.5 Knowledge: appropriation and dissemination
The peculiar character of public good of knowledge and information is recognized through-
out the economic literature. Like any public good knowledge is non-rivalrous its pos-
session by one party does not naturally exclude its possession by another party (Arrow,
1962) and non-excludible, at least once it is made public. Moreover, the incremen-
tal cost of an additional user is virtually zero and, unlike the case with other public
goods, not only is the stock of knowledge not diminished by extensive use, but it is often
enlarged.
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The character of public good of the knowledge is particular because it is often possible
to exclude other individuals from its use; a typical form of legally protected exclusion
is the institutions of patents, copyrights, etc. It is noteworthy to underline that not
all the information incorporated in patents or in other forms of legal protection of the
information as well as the information made public through the commercialization of
the products or through the codication of the productive process  are su¢ cient to
reveal all the relevant knowledge.
The exclusive practice of knowledge is so naturally assumed that in the recent years
a completely new paradigm emerged in competitive strategies that identies the primary
role of rms to be that of generating rents form sourcing, creating, replicating, integrat-
ing and commercializing knowledge (Liebeskind, 1997). This means that knowledge is
the primary and fundamental source of economic rents and competitive advantage of in-
dividuals and rms in the economy, and this in turn implies a great e¤ort both formally
legal and informal aiming to protect and to exclude other individuals or rms from own
knowledge. The Schumpeterian growth models usually assume a typical form of infor-
mation protection, patents, which on one hand confers the market power to produce in
exclusive way a good obtaining monopolistic rents which give the economic incentive to
undertake R&D and on the other hand allow to di¤use the knowledge incorporated into
the patent throughout the whole economy. Hence the peculiar character of knowledge as
a public good is that it is highly valuable for any individual and rm when it is privately
kept. This in turn implies a high incentive to produce this knowledge goods i.e. the
classical problem of scarce incentive to produce public good is at least highly mitigated
and to exclude others from its possession.
Developing knowledge takes time, e¤ort, and manpower, moreover it is an uncertain
process, involving both search and luck. Hence one individual or rm has always an
incentive to acquire others knowledge if it can reduce her costs by so doing. This
reasoning raises the appropriability question: is the inventor provided with the right
incentive to protect and transfer her own knowledge in order to obtain rents from it
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without incurring into the risk that somebody else expropriates its innovation even before
it is made public?
1.5.1 Knowledge appropriation
Knowledge appropriation is an important requirement of the appropriation of the mo-
nopolistic rent ows by the innovator through patent grants. The Schumpeterian growth
literature considers the knowledge appropriation problem assuming that the patent sys-
tem confers to the winner of a patent race that is to the researcher or the rm who
obtains the patent from its own invention a monopoly power on the production of the
good for which the patent is granted, or at least the right to sell the patent in the market
at a price corresponding to the monopolistic rent ow obtained from the exclusive use
of the patent. This in turn implies that the Schumpeterian growth literature does not
consider some peculiar characteristics of knowledge, particularly those tied to the dis-
semination and appropriation of the information before it is legally protected, or at least
the fact that not all the knowledge may be legally appropriated by the possessor.
On one hand, all the knowledge disseminated throughout the economy by the mecha-
nism based on patent system refers to codied knowledge, and it does not consider tacit
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is not codied and can only learned by observation or by
doing (Liebeskind, 1997), furthermore tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in an individ-
uals actions and experience, as well as in the ideas, values or emotions she embraces.
Hence the endogenous growth literature should consider this form of knowledge as well,
as it appears to be particularly important in dealing with the appropriability problems
connected the dissemination of knowledge throughout the economy.
Moreover, there exist other non-market-based mechanisms to reward knowledge and
to solve the appropriation problem. Shell (1973, page 78), treating the objection to
the capital-theoretic view of technical knowledge, maintained that While in life we can
nd two pieces of machinery that are essentially alike, if two inventions are very alike
they are indeed the same invention. Possession of the rst invention is enough; virtually
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nothing is gained by possession of a second scrap of paper describing an already known
invention.The most appealing attribute of a reward system that is rooted in priority is
that it o¤ers non-market-based incentives for producing the public good knowledge. But
how and when is it possible to attribute the priority of an innovation? The innovation
has a compounded nature, it is a social activity, it is the result of a set of information and
knowledge accumulated over time by each individual and derives from both introspective
and human relationship activity. As shown by Cozzi (2001 and 2003) and Rajan and
Zingales (2000), innovation  and hence the incorporated knowledge  is a socialised
activity, moreover each invention is a compounded object, that it is a set of di¤erent
information, it is a result of a problem solving activity, it is the result of the knowledge
accumulated throughout the external and internal environment of an individual.
Any single individual who interacts with others in the period in which she is devel-
oping new ideas may be expropriated, or at least may disseminate her information and
knowledge before to be recognized being as the rst at introducing that innovation. The
priority system is based on the assumption that each individual who make an innovation
is publicly recognized as the mother of that innovation, hence the priority system does
not consider the moment before an innovation is made public. It is possible that an
individual could be expropriated of her own ideas, again not completed as innovation,
before the moment in which it is made public, either formally or informally. This means
that the priority system does not resolve the appropriability problem, while the existence
of more trusty and conscious social norms and beliefs may instead contribute to create a
favourable environment to develop ideas and to di¤use knowledge.
Hence it is possible that not only each inventor could be unable to appropriate her own
inventions because of the particular character of knowledge, as described above (public
good and not always legally protected), but that the behaviour of each researcher is inu-
enced by the cultural environment and from her internal inclination and nature. This in
turn implies that the social environment, the social norms and beliefs, have an enormous
role for the behaviour of the researchers on the expropriation of the othersknowledge
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and information. Moreover the existence of certain social norms and beliefs such as
those based on more trust and condence and on more awareness of the importance of
knowledge as a public good to be supplied in the interest of all could spur a more ef-
fective legal system aiming to spur the innovations. This in turn implies that the human
capital accumulated in the schools (see Cozzi, 1998) and in the working environment
plays a crucial role in spurring technological progress not only as in the traditional
capital view, and hence as a production factor like the physical capital but also as the
basis of the creation of social norms and beliefs that inuence the day-by-day behaviour
of the people. This arguments are valid not only in market relationships, that is between
single individuals, but can be extended to the behaviour among organized structures,
and to relationship within institutions like rms.
The existence of more trusty and conscious social norms and beliefs are fundamental
for a better functioning of the knowledge appropriation mechanism legal and informal
and hence are at the core of the knowledge creation and dissemination. Beside the
problem arising from the di¢ culty to attribute the priority of an innovation before it
is made public a certain type of social norms and beliefs which improve and create
a trusty and cooperative environment may give an environment highly favourable to
develop innovations and ideas (see Cozzi, 2008).
1.5.2 Knowledge dissemination
The Schumpeterian growth models usually assume that new innovations are disseminated
throughout the economy thanks to patents granted to the inventors, i.e. the individuals
who win the patent race. Patent law grants patents for inventions that are useful, non-
obvious, and novel, that is under a well-functioning patent system one gets the patent
only if she proves to have been the rst to invent something that her peers typically could
not straightforwardly invent, given their actual skills. The patent would add new useful,
novel, and non-obvious knowledge to the whole economy and the researchers.
Because in the theoretical models the monopolistic rents are due to an innitely lived
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patent system, the important point about this literature regards not the legal patent
duration usually assumed innite but its e¤ective life, which will usually be nite with
probability one, because a patent will last until the next better good will be introduced.
Before analysing the knowledge dissemination mechanism we shall briey treat the
legal system of intellectual property rights. Assuming a dynamic framework closer to the
Schumpeterian paradigm in which innovations are sequential and cumulative and hence
where each innovator is both an initial innovator and a second generation innovator the
prospective on legal system of intellectual protection rights must address not only how
to transfer prot to initial innovators but also how to increase prot for each innovator.
This in turn implies that in a dynamic innovation framework what is also important for
a patent system is the protection against future innovators, not only to ensure a large
prot ow to the current innovator, because she could be soon replaced by the next
patent-holder. This is a legal consequence of the creative destruction introduced by the
vertical innovation process and it is strictly tied to Arrows replacement e¤ect, at least
in the rst strand of Schumpeterian growth models.
The literature on patent systems considers in addition to patent life at least three
tools of patent design: patentability requirements, leading breadth, and lagging breadth.
Patentability requirement consists of a minimum threshold innovation size required to
receive a patent and it is usually determined by the interpretation of the statutory re-
quirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. The breadth of a patent is dened
as the degree of vertical or horizontal di¤erentiation which a new product must satisfy
vis-à-vis an existing patented product in order to avoid infringement of the patent. Hence
a patent breadth species a set of products that no other rm can produce without per-
mission from the patent-holder (in the form of a licensing agreement). Lagging breadth
species a set of inferior products (i.e. products that require no further innovation) that
would infringe a patent, whereas leading breadth species a set of superior products (i.e.
products that require further innovation) that would infringe the patent. Hence while
lagging breadth puts restrictions on imitators, leading breadth and patentability require-
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ment put restrictions on future innovators. ODonoghue and Zweimuller (1998) try to
merge the patent-design literature and the endogenous growth literature in a general
equilibrium framework. Usually the patent-design literature adopts a partial equilibrium
analysis where stronger patents imply increased prots for successful rms (see, among
the others, Chang, 1995; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Green and Schotchmer, 1995; Klem-
perer, 1990; Van Dijk, 1996). Adopting a general equilibrium framework, ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (1998) nd two important di¤erences: on one hand the increased prots
imply higher aggregate income and therefore increased demand for all industries, which
increase prots further; on the other hand the fact that multiple industries use patents
can imply that output distortions created by patents are small. They identify a role for
patents in providing protection against future innovators, in particular both patentabil-
ity requirement and leading breadth could inuence the characteristics of new products,
or the types of cost reduction that rms pursue and could counteract the tendencies of
sub-optimally small innovations.
As said above, on the one hand the patent system gives the incentive to undertake
R&D activity due the monopolistic rents accruing to the patent-holder, and on the other
hand the patents reveal the knowledge incorporated into new innovations. Knowledge
dissemination and appropriation is allowed from the patent system. The information
revelation mechanism based on the patent system generates the knowledge spillovers
which allows to researchers to make further advances in the technological frontier.
General knowledge accumulation is the result of all adoption e¤orts (side e¤ect) plus
direct general knowledge production (by public R&D, foundation sponsored R&D, univer-
sities, etc.). It is usually assumed that the advances in general knowledge in a sector spills
over to the other sectors, i.e. it is an economy-wide general knowledge. This economy-
wide spillover is usually assumed instantaneous and it does not require researchers any
waste of time or e¤ort to absorb the new advances of the technological frontier. This
allows each researcher and the economy in general to increase the technological frontier
by introducing always better quality products along the quality ladder, adapting the new
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knowledge of the latest patents to their own sector, or by introducing completely new
product lines as in Romer (1990). Borrowing from Aghion and Howitts (1998, Chap-
ter 3) and Howitts (1999) idea of intersectoral spillover it is essential to realize that
is a state variable that summarizes all economy-wide technological information: hence
the whole distribution of vertical productivities across sectors and the number of active
sectors. Therefore technological frontier summarizes the knowledge accumulated in the
whole economy. Hence as Romer (1990, pages S83-S84) maintains:
The second is that the larger the total stock of design and knowledge is, the
higher the productivity of an engineer working in the research sector will be.
According to this specication, a college-educated engineer working today and
one working 100 years ago have the same human capital, which is measured
in terms of years of forgone participation in the labor market. The engineer
working today is more productive because he or she can take advantage of all
the additional knowledge accumulated as design problems were solved during
the last 100 years.
Moreover in Grossman and Helpmans (1991b, ch.3 pag.57) words:
. . . each research project contributes to a stock of general knowledge capital.
This capital stock represents a collection of ideas and methods that will be
useful to later generations of innovators. It may include components such as
scientic properties of particular materials, the chemical formulas for certain
compounds, or the structure of new computer algorithms.
These considerations mean that knowledge spillovers are fundamental for the creation
of new ideas, each researcher who wants to introduce either a better version of the existing
goods or a completely new product line has to be updated with the on-going innovations.
In fact because any further invention will supersede the previous ones, Cozzi (2003) and
Cozzi and Spinesi (2004) assume that in order to absorb the new knowledge created
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through the vertical innovation process each researcher has to spend costly time and
e¤ort. As said above each researcher engaged in the vertical innovation process has
to be updated with the on-going innovations in order to introduce a better version of
the existing goods, i.e. in order to incorporate all existing techniques of production to
minimize costs. We assumed that the updating time cost is inversely proportional to
general knowledge, but it is indispensable to innovative activity.
The above considerations imply that technological frontier considered as the accu-
mulated knowledge is related to both quality improving and variety creation i.e. both
vertical and horizontal innovation.
In fact Romer (1990) assumes horizontal innovation and maintains that a researcher
working today benets of all technological advances accumulated over time. The in-
tertemporal spillover within the same sector and between sectors allows researchers to
introduce completely new product lines. The author of this thesis agrees with Romer
(1990) point of view also if the assumption of perfectly linear spillovers assumed by the
author is questionable but also think that the horizontal innovation process requires
further peculiar factors in order to take place. For this reason, the author of this thesis
refers to the original Schumpeterian view of the entrepreneur by considering the entre-
preneur not as an individual who applies the problem solving technique accumulated
over time, but as a skilled individual endowed of a genial capacitythat could not be
summarized by a routinized activity as problem solving.
In order to better explain this point it is important to distinguish between two aspects
of the innovative activity. Vertical innovation aims to improve an existing product line
whereas horizontal innovation creates an entirely new industry. The rst kind of inno-
vative process, according to Howitt (1999), entails adapting to a pre-existing product
the advances generated by the evolution of general knowledge at the economy wide level.
Conversely, horizontal innovation involves a typical entrepreneurial activity in which a
new eld never existed before is opened thanks both to a pioneers e¤ort and to the innate
ability of the entrepreneur. Hence vertical R&D requires the ability to invent something
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that her peers typically could not easily invent, that is each researcher engaged in ver-
tical R&D has to go beyond the standard problem solving activity in order to obtain a
patent grants. Horizontal R&D requires not only the capacity to invent something that
adds new useful, non-obvious, and novel knowledge to the current technological frontier
in order to obtain a patent grants, but also requires an entrepreneurial abilitywhich
allows to discover completely new sectors. Given this peculiar qualitative character of
horizontal innovation, it is not unreasonable to assume that people di¤er in their ability
to create market niches, i.e. to escape direct competition with existing incumbents.
To conclude this brief overview of the neo-Schumpeterian approach to economic
growth it is worthwhile to underline how the relationship between information appropri-
ability and dissemination has been studied intensively since Schumpeters ( 1934, 1939,
1942) seminal works. Despite Schumpeters contention that market power is the most
powerful engine of technological progress(1942, p.106), two other factors are generally
considered better predictors of innovation-intensity. The rst is the set of industry-
specic variables; the second is the level of technological spillovers and hence the infor-
mation appropriation and dissemination mechanisms.
1.6 Reconciling Endogenous Growth and the Patent
Literature
Robert Merger and Richard Nelson (1990), and Susanne Schotchmer (1991 and 2004)
stressed how "most innovators stand on shoulders of giants". Innovation is a process
sequential and cumulative in nature where each invention builds on previous ideas. Some
authors have argued that, particularly in the biosciences and in the software industry,
fundamental patents are often overbroad and this can slow down follow-on research.
The debate specially warmed up with reference of the ability of basic research to spawn
product development for the marketplace. Historical perspective on many technological
achievements shows that in most cases the value of an idea cannot be directly embodied
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into the market value of a good. It is the partial equilibrium patent literature that merits
the analyses of the e¤ects of patent law changes on the activity of follow-on researchers.
The numerous contributions in this framework showed how the relation between patent
scope and innovation incentives is unclear in many cases.
According to the standard Schumpeterian paradigm, R&D is an uncertain activity
modelled by a Poisson process. Each (private) R&D rm employs a ow of skilled labor
input z in order to obtain, under the assumption of constant return to scale, a ow
probability of innovation z, where  is the given arrival parameter of the Poisson process.
However, as a wide literature on cumulative and sequential innovation (see, for instance,
Scotchmer, 1991 and 2004) emphasizes, in most cases the value of an idea cannot be
directly embodied into the market value of a good. Think about the practice of research
activity in the medical/pharmaceutical sector: once a new chemical active principle for
treating a human pathology is individuated, a long period of pure experimental use begins
in order to implement the new drug saleable to the drug market.
The contrast between the evidence of an upstream conditioned R&D activity and
the conception that only the concrete embodiment of an idea is provided with economic
value emerges also from the increasing concern among both scholars and the business
community about the ability of researchers to conduct sequential R&D activity e¤ectively
(see Heller and Eisemberg, 1998).
After the pioneering microeconomic contributions of Reinganum (1985), Grossman
and Shapiro (1987) and Green and Scotchmer (1995), economists became aware of the
strategic dimension of sequential research activity. The possibility that in the real world
innovators may use the patents they hold just to block future innovators raised a still
increasing concern10. It has been proposed to adopt a statutory research exemption as a
denitive solution to this problem. By research exemption we mean a situation in which,
10Moreover, Heller and Eisemberg (1998) suggested the existence of a tragedy of the anti-commons,
i.e. a proliferation of upstream intellectual property rights which greatly amplify transaction cost of
downstream R&D, thus hampering downstream research for biomedical advancement.
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in a contest of sequential and cumulative innovations, after have been undertaking re-
search on a research tool and obtained a saleable innovation, the second innovators is
allowed, by the judge (or simply by the law if the research exemption is statutory), to
infringe the patent held by the rst innovator, but the second innovator is not allowed
to bring its product to the market11. As Susanne Scotchmer argued, "perhaps counter-
intuitively, a research exemption on rst innovation works to benets of its owner".
The core of the reasoning is in that research activity is intrinsically uncertain. When
innovation is cumulative so is its uncertainty: not only in terms of results, but also,
and this is what has most relevance here, in terms of the appropriability of such results.
Uncertainty in cumulative research environment is central in Hopenhayn, Llobet and
Mitchells (2006) analysis. By extending ODonoghue, Scotchmer and Thisses (1998)
structure to the case of incomplete information about the quality of the innovations from
the patent granting authority, they develop a model of cumulative innovation where new
ideas arrive continually. Within the framework of partial equilibriummodels, Hopenhayn,
Llobet and Mitchells (2006) work stands out for its completeness, in fact it also provides
a very instructive discussion on the di¤erent methods available to reward innovators by
showing the relative advantages/disadvantages according to the literature (Cornelli and
Shankerman, 1999; Scotchmer 1999).
In fact, recent developments of the Schumpeterian growth theory did not miss to
acknowledge the importance of accounting for the sequential and cumulative nature of
ideas, by identifying basic research with horizontal innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1996),
by merging the patent-design literature and the endogenous growth literature in a general
equilibrium framework (ODonoghue and Zweimuller, 2004), by allowing the possibility
for an idea at pre-commercial stages of development, or for an essential part of it, to be
stolen and afterward used by agents distinct from the inventor (Cozzi, 2001).
In this framework, ODonoghue and Zweimullers (2004) work is particularly interest-
11For a primer on the law related aspects of the research exemption and patents see Maurer and
Scotchmer (2004) and Mueller (2001 and 2004).
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ing in that it identies a role for patents in providing protection against future innova-
tors: patentability requirement and leading breadth are able to a¤ect the characteristics
of new products, or the types of cost reduction that rms pursue, and could compensate
the tendencies of sub-optimally small innovations.
I believe that it is important to acknowledge the presence of basic research in all
industries, rather than only in the newly created ones. To accomplish this, my work
assumes, unlike Aghion and Howitt (1996), that in each sector of the economy the inno-
vation process can be decomposed into two stages: basic research and applied research.
In the next Chapter 2, I build a model to analyse the behaviour of the public sector
under di¤erent intellectual property regimes; I then calibrate the model to the US data
and I punctually estimate the basic and applied research productivities after 1980.
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Chapter 2
A Macroeconomic Framework for
the Analysis of the US Patent Policy
The ultimate limits to growth may lie not as much in our ability to generate
new ideas, so much as in our ability to process an abundance of potentially
new seed ideas into usable forms.
(Martin Weitzman, 1998, page 333).
2.1 Introduction
The contribution of this chapter is central to the thesis, as it develops an entirely new
macroeconomic framework to address the issue of allowing patents on early-stage research
results. The traditional argument in favour of patenting basic research relies on the ar-
gument that this will encourage basic research and direct it in a way likely to inspire
commercial applications. On the other hand, granting patents means that monopoly
power will limit the ultimate exploitation of the commercial potential. Whether protec-
tion is worthwhile depends on which e¤ect dominates.
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In order to investigate the macroeconomic e¤ects of the trade-o¤between the incentive
provided by property rights to basic research and the resulting monopolistic distortion,
this chapter studies the sequential innovation process and evaluates the impact of intellec-
tual property design under di¤erent conditions on economic growth. Within a standard
Schumpeterian framework, I will try to analytically capture the important distinction be-
tween invention and innovation well outlined by the economics of innovation literature.
For example, consider the denition provided by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010):
"Another feature (...) of innovation is that the product or process must be
introduced into the market place so that consumers or other rms can benet.
This distinguishes an innovation from an invention or discovery. An inven-
tion or discovery enhances the stock of knowledge, but it does not instanta-
neously arrive in the market place as a full-edged novel product or process.
Innovation occurs at the point of bringing to commercial market new products
and process arising from applications of both existing and new knowledge."
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010, page 5).
Evidence of non-applicable discoveries generating over time the necessary foundation
for marketable innovations can be found in di¤erent sources. For example, Gersbach et
al. (2009) provide a detailed report of several cases of scientic discoveries waiting for
their marketable potential to be targeted and nally fully exploited.
Hecht (1999) reports as, at the end of 1926, Clarence W. Hansell, researcher at the
RCA Rocky Point Laboratory in Long Island, had already outlined the principles of opti-
cal bres bundle functioning; in 1927 RCA was awarded the U.S. patent. However, until
1970, optical bre had very little practical applicability for commercial use. The second
fundamental step to innovation came only with the development of laser technology and
the increasing demand for high frequency telecommunication tools in the late 1960s,
when a group of researchers at Corning Glass Works began to work on purifying glass.
In 1970 they rened an optical bre bundle using pure SiO2 (it was the purest glass ever
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made) and awarded the patent for the Optical Waveguide Fibres capable of transmitting
65,000 times more information than metallic wire.
Heller and Eisemberg (1998) have pointed out that the patenting of gene sequences
produces a tragedy of the anti-commons, i.e. a crumbling of rights which greatly am-
plify transaction cost, thus hampering downstream research for biomedical advance. A
number of examples of patented research inputs in the process of developing new mar-
ketable applications and therapies in biotechnology is collected by the National Research
Councils (2004) (2004, pp.74, 75) report.
Several studies in the law and economics of intellectual property documented how,
over the last 25 years, U.S. Court decisions switched from the traditional jurisprudential
limitation on patentability of early-stage scientic ndings lacking in current commercial
value to the conception that also fundamental basic scientic discoveries (such as scientic
theories, algorithms and genetic engineering procedures) fall in the general applicability
of the patent system design. In 1980, in the Diamonds vs. Chakrabarty case, the Supreme
Court of United States ruled that microorganism produced by genetic engineering could
be patented. The Supreme Courts decision arrived two years before the introduction of
the rst commercial product, human insulin, obtained with recombinant DNA techniques.
Jensen and Thursby (2001) study the licensing practices of 62 US universities. They nd
that "Over 75 percent of the inventions licensed were no more than a proof of concept
(48 percent with no prototype available) or lab scale prototype (29 percent) at the time of
license!". Moreover, most of the inventions licensed were in such an embryonic state of
development, that no one could estimate their commercial potential and the inventors
cooperation was required to get a successful commercial development.
Universities and public laboratories have always been the main performers of basic
R&D in the United States and in Europe (OECD, 2004). Certainly, an important reason
for the relatively low private contribution to basic R&D is often found in the high degree
of uncertainty that this activity involves in terms of future commercial application and
success.
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2.2 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of di¤erentiated nal goods sectors with corre-
sponding di¤erentiated R&D sectors, along the line of Grossman and Helpman (1991a)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Product improvements occur in each consumption good
industry, and within each industry, rms are distinguished by the quality of the nal
good they produce.
Time (indexed by t > 0) is continuous with unbounded horizon and there is a contin-
uum of innitely-lived dynasties of households with identical intertemporally addictive
preferences. Heterogeneous labor, skilled and unskilled, is the only factor of production.
Both labor markets are assumed perfectly competitive. In the nal good sectors, indexed
by ! 2 [0; 1], monopolistically competitive patent holders of the cutting edge quality
good produce di¤erentiated consumption goods by combining skilled and unskilled la-
bor, whereas R&D rms employ only skilled labor. At time t, population P (t) is assumed
growing at rate g  0 and its initial level is normalized to 1.
2.2.1 Households
The representative households preferences are represented by the following intertempo-
rally additive utility functional1:
U =
Z 1
0
e rtu (t) dt, (2.1)
where r > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Per-family member instantaneous
utility u (t) is dened as:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
jdjt (!)
#
d!, (2.2)
1To save notation, the initial expectation operator is omitted in this formula. As the experienced
reader knows, a more general setting of the consumer problem would not change results, as in this frame-
work, due to perfectly diversiable risks, the consumers asset evolves deterministically in equilibrium.
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where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; ::: (that is, a
product that underwent j quality jumps) and produced in industry ! at time t. Parameter
 > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades. This formulation, the same as Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998), assumes that each consumer prefers higher
quality products.
The representative consumer is endowed with L > 0 units of skilled labor and M >
0 units of unskilled labor summing to 1. Since labour bears no disutility it will be
inelastically supplied for any level of non-negative wages. Since initial population is
normalized to 1, L andM will also equal, in equilibrium, the per-capita supply of skilled,
respectively, unskilled labour.
In the rst step of the consumers dynamic maximization problem, they select the set
Jt(!) of the existing quality levels with the lowest quality-adjusted prices. Then, at each
instant, the households allocate their income to maximize the instantaneous utility (2.2)
taking product prices as given, in the following static (instantaneous) budget constraint
equation:
E(t) =
Z 1
0
X
j2Jt(!)
pjt(!)djt (!) d!. (2.3)
HereE(t) denotes per-capita consumption expenditure and pjt(!) is the price of a product
of quality j produced in industry ! at time t.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the static demand function:
djt(!) =
8<: E(t)=pjt(!) for j = jt (!)0 otherwise. (2.4)
Only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is consumed, since there is no
demand for any other good. In fact, as usual in this literature, this model assumes that if
two products have the same quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy the higher quality
product - although they are formally indi¤erent between the two products - because the
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quality leader can always slightly lower the price of its product and drive the rivals out
of the market.
Let us dene jt (!)  max fj : j 2 Jt(!)g. Using the instantaneous optimization
results, equation (2.2) can be reformulated as follows:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln

j

t (!)E(t)=pjt (!)t(!)

d! = (2.5)
= ln[E(t)] + ln()
Z 1
0
jt (!)d!  
Z 1
0
ln[pjt (!)t(!)]d!. (2.6)
Therefore, given the independent and - in equilibrium and by the law of large number -
deterministic evolution of the aggregate quality jumps and prices, the consumer will only
choose the piecewise continuous expenditure trajectory, E(), of each family member that
maximizes:
U =
Z 1
0
e rt ln[E(t)]dt: (2.7)
Assume that all consumers possess equal shares of all rms at time t = 0. Letting W (0)
denote the present value of human capital plus the present value of non-human asset
holdings at t = 0, each individuals intertemporal budget constraint is:
Z 1
0
e I(t)egtE(t)dt 5 W (0) (2.8)
where I(t) =
R t
0
i(s)ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real interest rate up to time
t .
Finally, the representative household chooses the time pattern of consumption ex-
penditure to maximize (2.7) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2.8). The
optimal expenditure trajectory satises the Euler equation:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (r + g) (2.9)
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where i(t) = I(t) is the instantaneous market real interest rate at time t.
Euler equation (2.9) implies that a constant (steady state) per-capita consumption
expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous market interest rate equals the consumers
subjective discount rate r plus the population growth rate g. Since preferences are ho-
mothetic, in each industry aggregate demand is proportional to the representative con-
sumers one. E denotes the aggregate consumption spending and d denotes the aggregate
demand.
2.2.2 Firmsbehaviour in the Final Good Sectors
Constant returns to scale characterizes technology in the (di¤erentiated) manufacturing
sectors,
y (!) = X (!)M1  (!) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (2.10)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!) is the output ow per unit time, X (!) andM (!) are, respectively,
the skilled and unskilled labour input ows in industry ! 2 [0; 1]. Letting ws and
wu denote the skilled and unskilled wage rates, in each industry the quality leader seeks
to minimize its total cost ow C = wsX (!) + wuM (!) subject to constraint (2.10).
For y (!) = 1, the solution to this minimization problem yields the conditional unskilled
(2.11) and skilled (2.12) labour demands (i.e. the per-unit labour requirements):
M (!) =

1  


ws
wu

, (2.11)
X (!) =


1  
1 
wu
ws
1 
. (2.12)
Thus the (minimum) cost function is given by:
C(ws; wu; y) = c(ws; wu)y (2.13)
where c(ws; wu) is the per-unit cost function:
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c(ws; wu) =
h 
1 

 (1 )
+
 

1 
 i
wsw
1 
u . (2.14)
Let P (t) denote population size at time t. Since unskilled labour is uniquely employed
in the nal good sectors and all price variables (including wages) are assumed to in-
stantaneously adjust to their market clearing values, unskilled labour aggregate demandR 1
0
M (!) d! is equal to its aggregate supply, MP (t), at any date. Since industries are
symmetric and their number is normalized to 1, in equilibrium2 M (!) = MP (t).
The choice of unskilled labour as numeraire imposes wu = 1. From equations (2.11)
and (2.12) the rms skilled labour demand are derived as negatively depending on skilled
(/unskilled) wage (ratio):
X(!) =
1
ws


1  

MP (t). (2.15)
In per-capita terms,
x(!)  X(!)
P (t)
=
1
ws


1  

M . (2.16)
In each industry, the nal sector is characterised as a contestable market. More
precisely, one rm produces the top-quality product and a competitive fringe produces
the second-best quality product. This is due to the assumption, usual in the quality-
ladder endogenous growth literature, that old patents expire as soon as a better quality
is introduced.
The top-quality monopolist prot function in per-capita terms is given by:
jt(!) = pjt(!)djt(!)  c(ws; wu)djt(!) = (2.17)
= pjt(!)E(t)=pjt(!)  c(ws; wu)E(t)=pjt(!) = (2.18)
= E(t)  c(ws; wu)E(t)=pjt(!), (2.19)
2More generally, with mass N > 0 of nal good industries, in equilibrium M (!) = MP (t)N .
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which is monotonically increasing in pjt(!). Due to Bertrand (price) competition, the
top-quality producer price-limits the competitive fringe. In other words, since demand
functions (2.4) imply that within each industry product innovation is non-drastic3, each
quality leader will x its (limit) price by charging a mark-up  over its unit cost (remem-
ber that parameter  measures the size of product quality jumps):
p = c(ws; 1)) d = E
c(ws; 1)
. (2.20)
Note that the mark-up set by the top-quality producer is equal to the quality parameter
, capturing the constant marginal rate of substitution across qualities for the consumer
In fact, the price charged by the top-quality producer cannot exceed its "utility-value"
for the consumer, because otherwise she will buy from the competitors, who price at the
unit-cost.
Hence each monopolist earns a ow of prot, in per-capita terms, equal to:
jt =
   1

E = (   1)wsx

jt = (   1) 1
1  M . (2.21)
It follows that:
   1

E = (   1) 1
1  M ) E =

1  M . (2.22)
Interestingly, equation (2.19) implies that in equilibrium total expenditure is always
constant. Therefore, the Euler equation implies a constant real interest rate:
i(t) = r + g. (2.23)
3Following Aghion and Howitts (1992) and (1998), an innovation is dened as drastic if generates
a su¢ ciently large quality jump to allow the new monopolist to maximize prots without risking the
re-entry of the previous quality producers. Given the unit elastic demand, here the unconstrained prot
maximizing price would be innitely high: that would induce the previous quality to re-enter.
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2.2.3 Research Sectors
The Mechanics of the R&D, Scale E¤ects, and Preliminary Results
In each industry, the R&D activity is a two stage process by which, rst a new idea
is invented upstream (a seminal idea) and then it is used to nd the way to introduce
a higher quality product. A seminal idea is a new, non-obvious, non-tradeable nding,
necessary to research on the nal product innovation: hence upstream ideas are research
tools.
Of course, assuming a two-stage R&D process can be viewed as an albeit stylized
approximation of a more complex research process.
Hence the whole set of industries f! 2 [0; 1]g can be sub-divided into two subsets of
industries: at each date t, there are industries ! 2 A0 with (temporarily) no research
tools and, therefore, with one patent holder on the nal product, no applied research,
and a mass of basic (upstream) researchers, and the industries ! 2 A1 = [0; 1]n A0,
with one seminal idea and one patent holder on the nal product, and a mass of applied
(downstream) researchers directly challenging the incumbent monopolist. The following
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the ows of industries from a condition to the other:
when a quality improvement occurs in an ! 2 A1 industry, the innovator becomes the
new quality leader and the industry switches from A1 to A0. Similarly, when a seminal
idea discovery arises in an industry ! 2 A0 this industry switches to A1.
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Notice that in this multisector two-stage environment with perpetual innovation basic
R&D alternates with applied R&D in all sectors of the economy. The two sets A0 and
A1 change over time, even if the economy will eventually tend to a steady state. Assume
that at any instant it is possible to measure the mass of industries without any seminal
idea as m(A0) 2 [0; 1], and the mass of industries with an uncompleted seminal idea as
m(A1) = 1   m(A0). Clearly, in the steady state these measures will be constant, as
the ows in and out will o¤set each other. The analytical structure showed by gure
1, represents the core of the approach here adopted: analysing the economy innovative
performance in terms of ows of industries which are in turn determined by the basic
research and applied research outcomes.
Let i = B;A denote basic or applied research. Ni(!; t) indicates the mass of basic
research skilled labor employment and, respectively, applied research skilled labour in
sector ! 2 [0; 1] at date t. A researchers Poisson process arrival rates for a seminal idea,
or for a completion (i.e. he product innovation), is i (Ni(!; t); P (t); !; t), decreasing in
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the aggregate sectoral R&D labor, Ni  0. In particular, we specify the Poisson process
arrival rates for a basic and applied research labour unit respectively as
B(NB(!; t); P (t); !; t)  0
P (t)

NB(!; t)
P (t)
 a
, ! 2 A0 (2.24)
A(NA(!; t); P (t); !; t)  1
P (t)

NA(!; t)
P (t)
 a
, ! 2 A1 (2.25)
where k > 0, k = 0; 1, are R&D productivity parameters and constant 0 < a < 1 is an
intra-sectoral congestion parameter, capturing the risk of R&D duplications, knowledge
theft and other diseconomies of fragmentation in the R&D. Each Poisson process - with
arrival rates described by (2.24)-(2.25) - governing the assumed two-stage innovative
process is supposed to be independent across researchers and across industries. Hence
the total amount of probability per unit time of inventing a basic idea in a sector ! 2 A0
at date t is NBB and the total amount of probability per unit time of completing a basic
idea in a sector ! 2 A1 is NAA.
Equations (2.24)-(2.25) imply that the probability intensity of the invention of a
research tool decreases with population. This assumption, shared by Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (1999), captures the di¢ culty of improving a good in a way that renders a
larger population happier4. Notice that, consistently with the assumption that the risk
of R&D duplications declines with the di¢ culty of duplications and that the industrial
espionage activities are rendered more complicated with the technological di¢ culty of
the ideas being targeted, here the congestion externality, parameterized by a, is assumed
to decrease with population. The specic form postulated for increasing technological
di¢ culty is su¢ cient to guarantee that the equilibrium long run per-capita growth rates
do not increase with population (thereby rendering the framework here developed immune
to the embarrassing strong scale e¤ect amply discussed in the previous Chapter 1).
Let us express the model by adopting the per-capita notation: dene nB(!; t) 
4Despite its simplicity, this assumption is equivalent to eliminating the strong scale e¤ect by means
of an R&D "dilution e¤ect" over an increasing range of varieties, as proved by Peretto (1998), Young
(1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and (1999), and Howitt (1999).
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NB(!;t)
P (t)
and nA(!; t)  NA(!;t)P (t) - where P (t) denotes total population at time t - as the
skilled labor employment in each basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector. Moreover,
the existence of symmetric equilibria, allows the author to further simplify notation:
nB(!; t)  nB(t) and nA(!; t)  nA(t). Notice that there is no loss of generality if in
what follows the more microeconomic-oriented reader interprets such derivations under
the assumption of constant population, implying that researchersprobability intensities
are normalized to B  0n aB and A  1n aA .
In every equilibrium, the per-capita mass of skilled labour employed in manufacturing
sector ! 2 [0; 1] at time t, labelled x(!; t), will be constant across sectors and equal to
x(!; t) = x(t). Hence, after dropping time indexes for simplicity5, in every equilibrium,
the following skilled labor market equilibrium in per-capita terms must hold:
L =
1
ws


1  

M +m(A0)nB +m(A1)nA. (L)
Equation (L) states that, at each date, the aggregate supply of skilled labor, L, nds
employment in the manufacturing rms of all [0; 1] sectors, x, and in the R&D laboratories
of the A0 sectors, nB, and of the A1 sectors, nA.
The more micro-oriented reader may regard equation (L) as stating that the supply
of R&D resources is described by an upward sloping curve - L  x - in unit R&D cost.
2.2.4 Unpatentable Basic Research
A Model for the Public Basic Research Sector
The aim of this section it to describe a pre-1980 US normative environment. The current
European patenting regime - still heterogeneous6, with more restricted patent subject
5Of course time dependence is implicit, as employment variables, wage, and the mass of sectors in
which a half idea is present, respectively absent, keep changing over time, except in the steady state.
6Strong research exemptions being present in some countries, such as Belgium and Germany.
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matter7 - shares many features of this scenario.
Lacking the patent protection of the rst seminal ideas, the innovative process would
need to resort to non-prot motivated R&D organizations to take place: publicly funded
universities and laboratories have often been motivated by the induced scientic spillover
on potentially marketable future technical applications.
The public sector is liable to an important form of moral hazard in its role of basic
research performer: if researchers get paid regardless of the protability of their discover-
ies, their activity is "curiosity driven", and their rewards are not aligned to downstream
needs. Hence their e¤orts might, from a social viewpoint, be wrongly targeted. To stylize
the partially "unfocused" research behaviour of the public researchers, assume that the
public researchers are totally indi¤erent to sectorial protability: when in a sector ! that
lacked a seminal idea, i.e. belonged to A0, a research tool appears, i.e. it becomes A1, the
public R&D workers keep carrying out basic research in that sector. More formally, here
we assume that the public researchers are allocated across di¤erent industries according
to a uniform distribution. This may represent the case of university researchers who keep
investigating along intellectual trajectories even when they know that no private rm will
ever prot from adapting to their market the new knowledge they may create. Unguided
by the invisible hand, researchers will keep devoting their e¤orts just to prove that they
are able to re-invent a second, third, ..., nth genial - but socially useless - idea aimed at
enriching their cv and justifying their academic carrier (see Aghion and Tirole, 1994 a
and b).
The traditional argument, highlighted by Green and Scotchmer (1995), stressed the
role of the patent system in providing the upstream inventor with the right incentive while
preserving at the same time the incentive to follow-on (applied) product development in
contest of two-stage cumulative R&D process.
By assuming basic researchers uniformly distributed across industries, di¤erently from
7Unlike the US Patent Code, stressing the "utility" of a protected idea, the European Patent Con-
vention stresses the clearly dened "industrial applicability" of the patented object. This renders the
patentability of each research tool more disputable.
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other important models in this eld, like Bessen andMaskin (2009), this study emphasizes
a new role for the patent system: providing the R&D laboratories with the right incentive
and to urge them to divert their resources from the temporarily unimportant projects and
quickly reallocate them towards more protable aims. In other words, in a macroeconomic
model, the patent system has the ability to target the basic research activity and to direct
it towards the most expected protable applications. This is why, the scenario considered
by this section, could be rightly said to depict a model for the public basic research sector.
The government exogenously sets the fraction, LG 2 [0; L], of population of skilled
workers to be allocated to the heterogeneous research activities conducted by universities
and other scientic institutions and funds it by lump sum taxes on consumers. Assum-
ing lump sum taxation guarantees that government R&D expenditure does not imply
additional distortions on private decisions.
The ratio of skilled workers, LG, is also equal the per sector amount of R&D. There-
fore, the seminal ideas arrival rate in basic research is O  0 L aG . Therefore the prob-
ability that in any given A0 sector a useful seminal idea will appear is LGB  L1 aG 0,
whereas the probability that an existing seminal idea generates a new marketable product
is nAA = n1 aA 1.
Let v0L denote the value - normalized by population - of a monopolistic rm producing
the top quality product in a sector ! 2 A0, and let v1L indicate the value - normalized
by population - of a monopolistic rm producing the top quality product in a sector
! 2 A1. These two types of quality leaders - competing instantaneously a la Bertrand
- both earn the same prot ow, , but the rst type has a longer expected life, before
being replaced by the new quality leader, i.e. by the patent holder of the next version of
the kind of product it is currently producing. In sectors that are currently of type A0 the
applied R&D rms cannot enter because there is no research tool to be exploited: they
shall wait until the public researcher invent one, causing that sector to switch into A1.
Instead, in an A1 sector applied R&D rms hire skilled workers in order to complete the
freely available research tool. Since there is free entry into applied research, the R&D
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rms expected prots are dissipated8 and transferred to skilled workers.
The following equations describe the nancial arbitrage conditions for the R&D sector:
ws = 1n
 a
A v
0
L (2.26a)
rv0L =    L1 aG 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(2.26b)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
. (2.26c)
where r denotes the relevant interest rate. Equation (2.23a) is the free entry condition in
the applied R&D in any given sector ! 2 A1: it equalizes the skilled wage to the marginal
expected gains of completing the next version nal product multiplied by the value of
its patent, v0L. Equation (2.23b) shows that perfectly e¢ cient nancial markets lead v
0
L
to the unique value that equalizes the risk free interest income9 achievable by selling the
stock market value of a leader in an A0 industry, rv0L, and the ow of prot  net of the
expected capital loss from being challenged by a seminal idea on a better product in the
case a follower appears, L1 aG 0 (v
0
L   v1L), plus gradual appreciation in the case of such
event10 not occurring, dv
0
L
dt
.
Equation (2.23c) equate the risk free income per unit time deriving from the liquida-
tion of the stock market value of a leader in an A1 industry, rv1L, and the relative ow of
prot  minus the expected capital loss deriving from the downstream applied researcher
rms endeavour, n1 aA 1v
1
L, plus the gradual appreciation if replacement does not occur,
dv1L
dt
.
8Due to perfectly e¢ cient nancial market that completely diversify the portfolios of risk adverse
savers.
9The reader may view r as the real interest rate, exogenous in a microeconomic framework, or equal
to the constant subjective rate of time preference in an alternative macroeconomic framework with linear
instantaneous utility function (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992, or Howitt 1999). Here the Euler equation
and the derivative of the population-adjusted rm value with respect to time bear to the simplied
expression of safe rate of returns in terms of r = i  g instead of i.
10The reader should keep in mind that in continuous time the probability of this event tends to 1 as
dt! 0. This is why this probability does not appear in the equation.
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The jump processes occurring at the industry level are independent across industries,
but, in the aggregate, the law of large number transforms ow probabilities into deter-
ministic ows. Hence, after aggregating over the set of sectors, the dynamics of the mass
of industries is described by the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))n1 aA 1  m(A0)L1 aG 0. (2.27)
From the skilled labor market clearing condition:
x+ LG + (1 m(A0))nA = L, (2.28)
and the denition of x, we get to the equilibrium mass of per-sector challengers:
nA =
L  1
ws
 

1 

M   LG
(1 m(A0)) . (2.29)
Hence the dynamics of this economy is completely characterized by the di¤erential equa-
tion system (2.23a)-(2.23b) and (2.23c), with cross equation restriction (2.26).
In the steady state dv
0
L
dt
=
dv1L
dt
= dm(A0)
dt
= 0. In the stationary distribution the ow of
industries entering the A0 group must equal the ow of industries entering the A1 group.
2.2.5 Patentable Basic Research
This section describes a post-1980 US scenario. Once a basic research result is invented
in an A0 sector, it gets protected by a patent with innite legal life. The e¤ective life
of a patent will be dictated by its ideas obsolescence, which is expected nite in any
equilibrium we are studying. This fully privatized basic research scenario does not of
course exclude the presence of public universities which patent their discoveries: in so far
as it spurs innovation, private patent races determine equilibrium quantities11 anyway.
11This is similar to introducing public R&D into Aghion and Howitts (1992) model: the equilib-
rium value of n would not change, provided public research is not higher than the equilibrium amount
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Post-1980, thanks to the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler acts, the boundaries between
public and prot-motivated science are correspondingly fuzzy.
The stock value of all rms is determined by privately arbitraging between risk free
consumption loans, rm bonds and equities, viewed as perfect substitutes also due to the
ability of nancial intermediaries to perfectly diversify portfolios and eliminate risk12.
As in the previous section, the value of the manufacturing monopolistic rms is related
to their prots, their expected capital losses (due to obsolescence) and stock market
gains. In particular, let v0L, and v
1
L denote respectively the stock market values of an
A0 industry quality leader and of an A1 industry quality leader. Let vA, denote the
- population adjusted - present expected value of being a research tool patent holder
running a downstream applied R&D rm, operating in an A1 industry and aiming at
becoming a new quality leader. Such a rm - similarly to Grossman and Shapiros (1986)
monopolist - will optimally choose to hire an amount nA of skilled research labour in
order to maximize the di¤erence between its expected gains from completing its own
research tool - probability of inventing, (nA)
1 a 1, times the net gain from inventing
the nal product, (v0L   vA) - and the implied labour cost wsnA. From its rst order
conditions, the optimal applied R&D employment in an A1 sector is obtained:
nA =

(1  a)1(v0L   vA)
ws
 1
a
. (2.30)
Unlike the previous section, now only the research tool patent holder can undertake
applied R&D in its industry, whereas free entry is relegated to the basic research stage,
where researchers vie for inventing the basic idea that will render the winner the only
owner of a research tool patent worth vA. Hence their freely entering and exiting mass
will dissipate any excess earning, by equalizing wage to the probability ow 0n aB times
determined by a fully private R&D scenario.
12Hence, despite individuals being risk averse, average returns will be deterministic, the risk premia
will be zero, and agents will only compare expected returns. As usual in this class of models, the law of
large numbers is invoked, which allows individuals who invest in a continuum of sectors with idiosyncratic
risk, thereby transforming probabilities into frequencies.
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the value of a patent on a seminal idea13, vA.
Costless arbitraging between risk free loans and rmsequities implies that at each
instant the following arbitrage equations must hold in equilibrium:
ws = 0n
 a
B vA (2.31a)
rvA = (n

A)
1 a 1(v0L   vA)  wsnA +
dvA
dt
(2.31b)
rv0L =    (nB)1 a 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(2.31c)
rv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
(2.31d)
The rst equation, (2.28a), is the free entry condition in the basic research market. The
second equation (2.28b) equalizes the risk free income deriving from the liquidation of
the expected present value of the research tool patent holder in an A1 industry, rvA,
and the expected increase in value from becoming a quality leader (i.e. completing the
product innovation process), (nA)
1 a 1(v0L   vA), minus the relative R&D cost, wsnA,
plus the gradual appreciation in the case of R&D success not arriving, dvA
dt
.
The third equation - (2.28c) - determines the stock value of a quality leader monopolist
in an A0 sector by equalizing its expected prots and capital appreciations to the risk
free interest earning, rv0L, in case of anticipated liquidation.
Finally, equation (2.28d) must be satised by the stock value of a quality leader
monopolist in an A1 sector by equalizing its expected prots and capital appreciations
to the alternative risk free interest earning.
Even in case of licensed research tool, the licensee is required to pay a sunk cost to use
the tool, which guarantees that R&D activity is non-discouraged. This avoids imposing
any impediments to downstream research other than the monopolistic patentees expected
13Unlike Grossman and Shapiro (1987), the research tool patent holder has no incentive to license,
because in the present framework the scale diseconomies are assumed at the industry level but not at
the rm level.
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prot maximization.
By plugging ws = 0n aB vA into the expression of the skilled labour wage ratio, it is
possible to re-express the skilled labor demand in manufacturing as:
x =
1
ws


1  

M = min

naB
0vA
; 1


1  

M . (2.32)
Therefore the skilled labor employment in the manufacturing sector is inversely related
to the market value of patented research tools. In fact, anticipating higher valued re-
search tools draw more skilled labor from the manufacturing plants into the basic research
laboratories, thereby increasing the manufacturing unskilled/skilled labor ratio and con-
sequently raising skilled labor marginal productivity and the relative wage. Since the
patent on a seminal idea derives its value from the expectation of future direct produc-
tion of a marketable good, vA is in turn pinned down by v0L. Therefore, the equilibrium
value of the skilled wage is indirectly related to the stream of prots expected from the
future commercialization of the product of the completed idea. Unlike the traditional
Schumpeterian innovative process, the skilled wage here does not immediately incorpo-
rate the discounted expected value of the next commercially fruitful patent, but it does
so only one step ahead: the value of the future monopolist is scaled down to current R&D
labor wage by the composition of two innovation probabilities.
Since wages are pinned down by the optimal rm size and by the zero prot conditions
in the perfectly competitive basic R&D labor markets, the unique equilibrium per-sector
mass of entrant basic R&D rms consistent with skilled labor market clearing L =
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA is determined as:
nB =
L  x  (1 m(A0))nA
m(A0)
. (2.33)
Unlike the public researchers, in this completely privatized scenario, basic researchers
target their activity only in the A0 sectors.
To complete the analysis, take a closer look at the inter-industry dynamics depicted by
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Figure 1. In the set of basic research industries a given number of perfectly competitive
(freely entered) upstream researchers, nB, have a ow probability of becoming applied
researchers, while in the set of the applied R&D industries each of the nA per-industry
applied researchers has a ow probability to succeed. Hence the industrial dynamics of
this economy is described by the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (2.34)
System (2.28b)-(2.28d) and equation (2.31) - jointly with cross equation restrictions x
and nB - form a system of four rst order ordinary di¤erential equations, whose solution
describes the dynamics of this economy for any admissible initial value of the unknown
functions of time v0L, v
1
L,vA, and m(A0).
In a steady state, dv
1
L
dt
=
dv0L
dt
= dvA
dt
= dm(A0)
dt
= 0.
Given the analytical complexity of such system, numerical analysis is necessary to
analyse the properties of the balanced growth path equilibrium. In all numerical simu-
lations performed, the steady state exists, it is unique and it is saddle point stable for
any set of parameter values14. Therefore, given an initial condition for m(A0), there is
(locally) only one initial condition for v0L, v
1
L, and vA such that the generated trajectory
tends to the steady state vector: the equilibrium is determinate.
Interestingly, the introduction of R&D subsidies is easily done by replacing ws with
ws(1   s) - where subsidy rate is 0  s  1 - in equations (2.28a), (2.28b), and (2.27),
but not in equation (2.29).
If upstream ndings are patentable downstream research can be blocked if the patent
holder neither undertakes research nor licenses the protected research tool. In this Schum-
peterian framework the incumbent monopolist in the corresponding nal good sector is
the natural suspect of such anti-innovative behaviour. In fact, by appropriating the
patent on a research tool and stopping R&D it will eliminate expected obsolescence on
14The les are available from the author of this thesis upon request.
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its product, causing its stock market value to jump up to 
r
. Hence, at least in the
steady state, the incumbent monopolist will buy the patent in order to block innovation
in that sector if its willingness to pay for the research tool is higher than the outsiders
reservation price, that is if and only if
vA <

r
  v0L.
Simple algebra show that this holds if and only if:

1
0
 1
a

v0L   vA
vA
 1
a
(1  a) 1 aa a < v
0
L   v1L
vA
. (2.35)
Since v0L, v
1
L, and vA are endogenous in the model, it is impossible to reach an analytical
conclusion. The simulations of the privatized economy show that this is certainly satised
at realistic values of the parameters, which points to a potentially serious blocking patent
concern, which, by coupling static ine¢ ciency with dynamic ine¢ ciency, practically van-
ishes the benecial side of the Schumpeterian dilemma. Fortunately the usual practice
addresses the well know problem15 of broad intellectual property rights, as, according to
Maurer and Scotchmer (2004a, p.90) courts "usually approve arrangements that remove
blocking patents so that rms can bring technologies to market." The typical arrangement
is compulsory licensing of the patented innovative tool.
2.3 Observed Regularities
A rst numerical result seems to suggest that the privatized economy outgrows the public
basic research economy when the applied R&D productivity parameter, 1, becomes very
low: in such cases the equilibrium innovative performance of the private economy with
patentable research tools becomes better than the equilibrium growth performance of the
economy with a public R&D sector. In fact, if 1 is very small or 0 is ceteris paribus
15This is an old problem in the history of patents. As reported by Scotchmer (2004, p. 14), "James
Watt (d. 1819) used his patents to block high-pressure improvements... Watts refusal to license com-
petitors froze steam-engine technology for two decades."
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high, the ow out of A1 will be relatively scarce, whereas the ow out of A0 will be
intense. Therefore in the steady state m(A0) will be small, thereby exalting the wasteful
nature of the public R&D activity uniformly diluted over [0; 1]   A0: in this case the
social cost of a public R&D blind to the social needs signalled by the invisible hand
would overwhelm the social costs of the restricted entry into the applied R&D sector
induced by the patentability of research tools.
2.3.1 Calibration of the Model
Patent data are indicators for the innovative performance of the economic system. Well
known data suggest that in the U.S. the ratio of the patents granted each year to US
residents to applied R&D expenditure per year (in year 2000 dollars) decreased by about
four fths from 1953 to 1982. This indicates the existence of an increasing di¢ culty in
the applied R&D, because prior to 1980 most patents were applied. A reader may conjec-
ture that a public innovation infrastructure poor of selective economic incentives could
have been acceptable in a world in which the industrial applications of basic scientic
discoveries were rather straightforward. In the modern industry, in which applications of
science are eagerly searched by often highly sophisticated downstream researchers, cur-
ing the ine¢ ciencies of basic research may become the top priority for a steadily growing
economy. This might have motivated the switch in the US patenting rules in the early
Eighties and at the same time may provide an explanation for the growing relative dis-
advantage of the European, Asian and Latin American systems of innovation, in which
the protection of research tools is not guaranteed. In order to test this conjecture to the
data, in the next section the calibration analysis is performed.
2.3.2 Calibration Analysis
This section provides the calibration of the model to the U.S. data from 1975 to 1981.
Moreover it presents the estimation of the di¢ culty of basic and applied R&D, summa-
rized inversely in the model by the basic/applied productivity parameters, 0 and 1,
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whose evolution cannot be inferred by patent statistics, also because in the Seventies
basic R&D outcomes could hardly be patented in the US. Only the skilled and unskilled
labour, and the numbers of qualied innovations as R&D output, as represented by
patents, are utilized as inputs. All variables are normalized by population.
The calibration procedure consists of the following three steps:
1. estimation of the values of the unobservable parameters, 0 and 1 during the
1975-1981 U.S. period.
2. Use of the estimated parameter values ^0 and ^1, in the system of equations of the
balanced growth path equilibrium of the Privatized Basic Research Economy.
3. Use of the previous parameters and of the steady state equilibrium amount of basic
research labour, m(A0)nB, estimated in Step 2, into the Public Basic Research
Economy scenario, setting LG = m(A0)nB, and simulation of the corresponding
Public Basic Research Economy model.
L is the percentage of people who were 25 year old or more and who had completed at
least 4 years of college, collected by the U.S. Census (2010a), Current Population Survey,
Historical Tables16.
The intra-industry congestion parameter a is set equal to 0:3, consistently with Jones
and Williams(1998) and (2000) calibrations.
LG is the share of S&E doctorate holders in research universities and other academic
institutions17 over the U.S. total employment from 1975 to 1981;
ws is the skilled premium estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante
(2000).
16Available at: www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.xls
17National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics,Science and Engineering Indi-
cators 2006, Appendix table 5-22, available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/append/c5/at05-22.pdf.
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The g data (according to the model, the measure of the actual U.S. innovation rate
before 1980) are the number of patents granted to U.S. residents per million inhabitants18.
The mark-up  is set equal to 1:68, consistently with what estimated by Roeger (1995)
and Martins et al. (1996).
The relevant real interest rate series, r, follows a path similar to the true real interest
rates through the Seventies19. Several di¤erent data sets are known on the real interest
rates in the US in the years 1975-1981, all heterogeneous but all signicantly di¤erent
from the usual constant 5% benchmark level. Some estimated real interest rates were
even negative in that period20.
The following Table 2 reports the parameters utilised and their sources:
Table 2: Calibration Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source
 Mark-up 1:68 Roeger (1995) and Martins et al. (1996)
a R&D congestions 0:3 Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000)
L Skilled Labour (intensity 1979) Data U.S. Census, Current Population Survey
M Unskilled Labour (intensity 1979) Data U.S. Census, Current Population Survey
 Skilled Share in Manufacturing 0:1 Assumption
0 Basic Research Productivity Estimation
1 Applied Research Productivity Estimation
Solving for the steady state values of the variables in consistently with the data
18Source: WIPO, 100 Years Protection of Intellectual Property Statistics, available on
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/.
19To obtain as ne estimates of the productivity parameters as possible, ranges from di¤erent available
real interest rate series consistent with their observed dynamics were constructed, but - as done by Jones
and Williams (1998) and (2000) - shifted up towards the stock market average returns, which was 0.03
in the 1969-1978 decade.
20See the estimated real interest rate (of three-month treasury bill) series constructed by Mishkin
(2006, p. 88-89), based on Mishkins (1981) method of using the after tax nominal interest rate minus
expected ination.
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return the values for the basic/applied R&D productivity parameters, 0 (Figure 2) and
1(Figure 3).
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As the reader can notice, during the Seventies R&D di¢ culty increased in applied
R&D whereas it decreased in basic R&D. Hence, in principle, the relative advantage for
the patentability of research tools over the public basic R&D system was getting more
and more desirable.
The estimated values of the technological parameters - as well as all the previously
described relevant exogenous data - were used to compute the hypothetical steady state
equilibrium of the two scenarios - unpatentable research tools versus patentable research
tools - for each other year from 1975 to 1981.
Note that this exercise allowed the author of this theses to compare the steady state
equilibrium innovative performance of the patentable research tool scenario not only
with the actual performance in those years, but also with a hypothetical public scenario
constrained to employ the same number of basic researchers as would the privatized
system have done. In this way, the possible e¤ects of di¤erent levels of employment were
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eliminated, allowing this study to focus on the induced e¢ ciency gains from research tool
patentability.
The following Figure 4 lists the comparative innovation rates in the two scenarios:
2.4 Conclusions
From the calibration of the model to the US data, it emerges that at the end of the
Eighties the unpatentability of the basic scientic ndings imposed less ine¢ ciency to the
US innovation system than would the monopolization of research tool have implied. Had
the policy makers or the courts been aware of this, maybe they would have postponed the
patentability of research tools, which instead prevailed at the beginning of the Eighties.
Therefore the analysis carried out in this chapter suggests that the policy change in favour
of the research tools patentability occurred in the United States from the early Eighties
may not have been the best institutional reaction to the increase in R&D di¢ culty.
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Chapter 3
Alternative Mechanisms to Spur
Innovation: Research Exemption
and Kremer Patent-Buy-Out
3.1 Introduction
As analysed by the previous Chapter 2, from 1980 on the US national system of innovation
has been re-shaped by a sequence of important innovations in the IP law. All these
changes pointed to an increase in the appropriability of innovations at their initial stages1.
The pro-early-innovators environment was also reected in the increasing protection of
trade-secrets - starting in the 80s with the Uniform Trade Secret Act and culminating
with the Economic Espionage Act of 19962 - as well as in the increasingly positive attitude
towards software patents (Hunt, 2001, Hall, 2009), culminating in the Final Computer
Related Examination Guidelines issued by the USPTO in 1996. The debate on the
desirability of basic research patenting over the last 30 years focussed on the possibility for
1In particular the Stevenson-Wydler act and the Bayh-Dole act (both passed in 1980) amended the
patent law to facilitate the commercialization of inventions obtained thanks to government funding,
especially by universities.
2See Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2006).
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the patent law to contemplate a statutory research exemption. Also called "safe harbour
exemption3", or "217 (e) (1) exemption", or "Hatch-Waxman exemption", the research
exemption is actually a common law concept in the US and Canada4. In Europe, it is
granted statutory dignity by the EUDirectives 2001/82/EC (as modied by 2004/28/EC)
and 2001/83/EC (as modied by Directives 2002/98/EC, 2003/63/EC, 2004/24/EC and
2004/27/EC), acknowledged by most European countries. It is an exemption to the
rights conferred by the patents to the rst innovator (i.e. the patent holder), whenever
it is possible to recognise that second innovators research activity entailing the patent
infringement was not-for-prot motivated. Under the research exemption doctrine, if the
second innovator is successful in developing a saleable product or process, then he or she
can patent it and yet infringe another patent (the patented research tool).
In fact, if a patent gives the inventor the exclusive rights to manufacture, use or sell the
invention, still it is important to stress that all these rights are veto-rights. This chapter
develops two alternative scenarios. The rst emphasizes the e¤ect of ex-post bargaining
between an upstream patent holder and its downstream developer: an innovation can
be patented and yet infringe another patent (the patented research tool). This kind
of strategic R&D environment is known as "Research Exemption", and it is subject
to intense juridical controversies5, following the famous Supreme Court decision on the
Madey vs. Duke University case (2002), which practically eliminated the possibility
of appealing to it, except under very narrow circumstances. In cases where access to
research tools through the marketplace is highly problematic, a research exemption is
deemed desirable (Mueller, 2004).
Green and Scotchmers (1995) model pioneered the microeconomic research on this
3The relevance of the research exemption institute is particularly high for the pharmaceutical sector.
In fact, there, besides the considerations concerning the sequentiality of the R&D and the use of
research tools, the research exemption is advocated by the generic drug manufactures to start the
preparation of the compounds during the period antecedent the patent expiring.
4In Canada, it is known under the name of "Bolar Provision" or "Roche-Bolar Provision" from the
name of the Roche Products v Bolar Pharmaceutical case, which rst introduced it into the Canadian
jurisprudential history.
5See Mueller (2004) for a detailed discussion of the research exemption debate in the US.
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important issue6. In order to cast their insight within the general equilibrium framework
developed by Chapter 2 of this thesis, the next section 3.2 assumes that the newly
introduced nal product is patentable but infringes its research tool. Unlike Green and
Scotchmers (1995) assumption of a unique downstream researcher, here it is assumed
that the downstream unauthorized research with a patented research tools can be carried
out by a multitude of freely entrant R&D rms, thereby implying a demand e¤ect on
R&D inputs dissipating expected prots. The analysis is also valid in the case of reach-
through licensing agreements, which seem pervasive in the US.
Michael Kremer (1998) suggested a mechanism to encourage innovation without incur-
ring in the e¢ ciency losses associated with patent generated monopolies. In particular,
Kremer (1998) imagined a mechanism in which the government elicits information in
order to buy out the patent at a price that reects the full innovation value. The market
value of an invention is likely to be known by the rivals of the rm which has invented
it. Hence the government appropriates the patent and auctions it to the rival rms.
The winning bid will truthfully reveal the auctioneersprivate values because with small
probability the government commits to deliver the patent to the highest bidder. With
the complementary probability, the government o¤ers the patent back to the inventor
at the winning bid price - to make sure the rivals value is not too low - and, if the
inventor does not buy the patent back, the government will transfer to the inventor a
mark-up times the winning bid and immediately thereafter it will put the innovation into
the public domain. The mark-up is meant to capture the ratio of total surplus to rms
prots. According to Kremer, this reward would better align the inventors e¤orts to the
approximate social benets from the innovation.
The following section 3.3 in this chapter develops a scenario in which Kremers mech-
anism is used only in the basic research outcomes.
6See Scotchmer (2004, section 5.2) for an accessible exposition of this complex issue.
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3.2 The Research Exemption Scenario
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), time is continuous with an unbounded horizon and
there is a continuum of innitely-lived dynasties of expanding households with identical
intertemporally additive preferences. Heterogeneous labour, skilled and unskilled, is the
only factor of production. Both labour markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
In the nal good sectors ! 2 [0; 1] monopolistically competitive patent holders of the
cutting-edge-quality good produce di¤erentiated consumption goods by combining skilled
and unskilled labour, whereas research rms employ only skilled labour. The analysis of
the representative consumer behaviour and the problem of maximization of prot in the
nal good sector are identical to those modelled in Chapter 2, page 57. The reader is
there refered for the most standard analytical details of the model.
Following the framework introduced by the previous Chapter 2, basic and applied
research technologies are heterogeneous and the bargaining power of the upstream inno-
vation is subject to institutional changes. Ex post bargaining is rationally expected to
transfer to the basic research patent holder a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the value of the nal
product patent, representing its relative bargaining power.
Let vB,v0L, and v
1
L denote respectively the present expected value of a basic blocking
patent (vB), an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and an A1 industry challenged leader
(v1L).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply that at each
instant the following equations shall hold in equilibrium:
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ws = 0n
 a
B vB (3.1a)
rvB = 1n
1 a
A
 
v0L   vB

+
dvB
dt
(3.1b)
ws = 1n
 a
A (1  ) v0L (3.1c)
rv0L =    n1 aB 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(3.1d)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
(3.1e)
Equation (3.1a) is the zero prot condition of a free entrant basic R&D rm in an A0
industry, equalizing the skilled wage and the probability 0n aO of inventing a seminal
idea times the value vB of the resulting blocking patent.
Equation (3.1b) states that nancial arbitrage pins down the unique value of the
blocking patent that equals the risk free income from its sale, rvB, to the expected
present value of maintaining it in an A1 industry. These are the expected increase in
value deriving from someone elses - the nA downstream researchers - discovering the
industrial application, plus the gradual appreciation in the case of someone elses R&D
success not arriving, dvB
dt
.
Equation (3.1c) is the free entry condition for downstream completers that rationally
expect to appropriate only fraction 1    of the value of the nal good monopolist.
Notice that the expectation of ex-post bargaining or the presence of reach-through licenses
introduces a negative incentive e¤ect of downstream innovation, because the infringers
use of a research tool can appropriate only a fraction of the value of its marginal product.
The last two equations have the usual interpretation.
Note that here free entry is assumed into basic and applied research. Each inventor,
be she basic or applied, is granted a patent. However, though the rst R&D rm that
invents a new nal product gets the patent anyway, it will infringe the patent held
by the previous basic research inventor. Therefore it will have to bargain with the
basic research patent holder in order to produce the new version of this good. Such
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a framework, corresponding to Green and Scotchmer (1995) research exemption regime
for pure research tools7, captures important aspects of the real world disputes between
inventors whose patent claims allow the blocking of invention8.
It is also important to notice that these results do not hinge on assuming that the rst
stage patent holder undertakes no applied R&D. In fact, the free entry condition (3.1c)
dissipates all excess prots from doing so: the research tool patent holder, by hiring a
marginal unit of skilled labour to complete its patent would increase its expected gains by
1n
 a
A (1  ) v0L  ws = 0. Hence, it would just be equivalent to one of the free entrants
into downstream R&D. Therefore, the model is consistent with an indeterminate R&D
participation of the rst stage blocking patent holder.
Finally, let the author of this thesis remark how free entry into downstream research
vanies any attempt to resort to ex ante licensing, which would instead hold if, as Scotch-
mer and Green (1995), Scotchmer (1996), Denicolo(2001), and Aoki and Nagaoka (2006),
we restricted entry to the second stage of R&D to one completing rm.
The industrial dynamics of this economy is described by the following rst order
ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (3.2)
This equation, supplemented with the skilled labour market equilibrium condition
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L (3.3)
and by equation (2.16) for x (x(!) = 1
ws
 

1 

M), determine the equilibrium trajecto-
ries.
7Also see Scotchmer (2004) and Nagaoka and Aoki (2006) for microeconomic analysis of this important
case.
8ODonoghue (1997), ODonoghue et al. (1998), and ODonoghue and Zweimueller (2004) are indi-
rectly related, as they capture the role of patent claims in moluding the bargaining between current and
future innovators: their concepts of patentability requirement and leading breadth could be re-adapted
here to accommodate the blocking power of the upstream patent holder.
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The private basic R&D scenario was simulated by using the previously found (in
Chapter 2) exogenous parameters 0 and 1, and compared it with a public upstream
research scenario constrained to the same basic research employment as in the privatized
case. The implied steady state equilibrium innovation rates are shown in the Figure 5:
As the reader can easily notice, reach-through agreements would the patentability of
basic knowledge not be desirable: despite correcting the public research ine¢ ciency, it
would have depressed applied R&D too much.
3.3 Kremers Patent Buy-Out Mechanism
Assume that both basic research and applied research sectors are characterised free entry,
because both kinds of discoveries are publicly accessible.Yet, accordin to Kremers (1998)
mechanism, bidders will o¤er a positive value to the research tool by computing the
stock market value of being a research tool patent holder. This "theoretical" value
of an applied R&D rm, vTA, is what a successful basic researcher would earn (from
the government). Hence the usual free entry condition will dissipate expected R&D
prots upstream. Consequently, upstream researchers will target the right sectors, despite
downstream research almost never being monopolized. Therefore, the following equations
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will hold in a Kremer equilibrium:
ws = 0n
 a
B vTA (3.4a)
rvTA = 1 (n

TA)
1 a  v0L   vTA  wsnTA + dvTAdt (3.4b)
ws = 1n
 a
A v
0
L (3.4c)
rv0L =    n1 aB 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(3.4d)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
(3.4e)
Equation (3.4a) is the zero prot condition of a free entrant basic R&D rm in an A0
industry, equalizing the skilled wage to the probability 0n aTA of inventing a research
tool times the theoretical value vTA of the resulting applied patent. Interestingly, vTA
is endogenously determined in general equilibrium. Hence possible positive innovative
e¤ects of Kremers auctions are dampened, via lower vTA, by higher expected obsolescence
and by higher R&D input prices (higher skill premium ws).
Equation (3.4b) states that nancial arbitrage pins down the unique value of the
theoretical value vTA of the downstream applied rm that would maximize its prots, by
optimally choosing skilled labour employment nTA. The rst order conditions yield the
optimized value of applied R&D employment:
nTA =

(1  a)1(v0L   vTA)
ws
 1
a
:
Plugging this expression for nTA into (3.4b) determines its stock market value. Expecting
this value, the bidding rms willing to monopolize downstream research by appropriating
the research tool would bid vTA. This is the value that the government pays to the
inventor of this research tool in exchange for appropriating the patent and putting it into
the public domain.
Free access to the research tools triggers a patent race in each A1 industry, thereby
pinning down quantities, wage and prices so that the zero expected prot condition (3.4c)
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holds. Notice the di¤erence between the theoretical applied R&D labour employment,
nTA, chosen by each would-be monopolistic applied researcher rm and the actual free
entry equilibrium value, nA, of applied R&D labour.
The nal two equations determine the values of the monopolistic manufacturing pro-
ducers in each A0 and A1 industry.
As in the previous sections, the industrial dynamics of this economy is described by
the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (3.5)
The previous equations, supplemented by the skilled labour market equilibrium condition
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L;
and by equation (2.16) for x, determine the equilibrium trajectories.
The steady state is unique and determinate in all numerical simulations.
After simulating this scenario, the implied innovation rates are plotted in the following
Figure 6:
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As the reader can see, Kremers (1998) mechanism is the only privatized scenario
which dominates the public basic research case. In fact, the R&D e¢ ciency gains from
giving upstream researchers the right targets are coupled with the freely accessible patent
race to downstream R&D. Our results suggest that if policy makers had known this
mechanism a couple of decades before Kremers result they should have adopted it as a
useful complement to the patentability of basic research9.
3.4 Conclusions
The debate on the e¤ects of the patentability of research tools on the incentives to in-
novate is still very controversial, not only in the US but also in Europe and in other
important areas of the world. This chapter analysed from a general equilibrium perspec-
tive the US policy shift towards the extension of patentability to research tools and basic
scientic ideas that took place around 1980. These normative innovations have been
modifying the industrial and academic lives in the last three decades, raising doubts
on their desirability. The losses from the monopolization of basic research induced by
intellectual property of research tools have been compared with the ine¢ cacy of public
research institutions to promptly react to downstream market opportunities. Results are
not a priori unambiguous, which forced the author of this thesis to use the available data
to calibrate and simulate the model in order to check if the US did it right in changing
their institutions around 1980. According to such calibration, maintaining free access to
basic research ndings would have been better for innovation despite the ine¢ ciency of
the public laboratories and universities. This chapter extended the basic model presented
by Chapter 2 to incorporate research exemptions and reach-through licensing, without
modifying the main conclusion.
The possibility that in the real world innovators may use the patents they hold just
9Adding R&D subsidies in Kremers scenario would have make it overtake the actual public scenario
as well. Of course the "public basic R&D scenario" of Figure 6 costs much less to the taxpayer than the
actual public scenario.
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to block future innovators, and/or prevent them from commercializing their products,
raised a still increasing concern not only among academics. The adoption by the US
patent law of a statutory research exemption has been proposed as a denitive solution
to this problem. But, by postponing bargaining between innovators it may put the down-
stream inventor at disadvantage and, as Susanne Scotchmer argued, "counterintuitively,
a research exemption on rst innovation works to benets of its owner". This chapter
has tried to tackle these important issues from a macroeconomic perspective.
Interestingly, it turns out that private research would have been enhanced if the gov-
ernment bought out the research tool patents and rendered them publicly available to
the private applied R&D rms, as suggested by Michael Kremer (1998). Notice that
in such a framework basic research is indeed patentable, but the government interven-
tion removes the restriction to the downstream patent races. This is consistent with a
completely privatized research environment in which the government organizes societal
knowledge procurement in a growth enhancing manner. Such third way eliminates pub-
lic research ine¢ ciency while guaranteeing perfect competition at all stages of research
and development. In light of the current international negotiations on the application
of TRIPs, our analysis might be helpful in providing insights from the experience of an
important turning point in the US national system of innovation.
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Chapter 4
Quantitative General Equilibrium
E¤ects of the US Academic
Patenting
4.1 Introduction
The key question that modern economies innovation systems have been facing in the
past few decades is: how should basic research be funded in view of maximizing the
e¢ ciency of the innovation system as a whole? In other words, is it possible to conceive
the privatization of a countrys basic knowledge and an e¢ cient system of incentives to
basic research? The study presented by this chapter provides a quantitative assessment
of the e¤ects of the US patent reforms that, at the beginning of the Eighties, brought to
the patentability of research tools, often invented by the university-led research activity.
The birth of the US patent system can be traced back to the very origin of the
United States as a nation came into being during the industrial revolution. In fact the
US national patent law is founded on Clause 8, Article 1 of the US Constitution, which
states that "The Congress shall have Power (...) to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
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to their respective Writings and Discoveries". The rst US Patent Act, entitled "An Act
to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts" was approved by the Congress in 1790.
Now, it is commonly believed that the time series of the US patents from the second
post-war period to the late Nineties displays no signicant trend (Segerstrom,1998). It
is believed simply because it is true: the growth rate of the number of patents granted
to US residents in the period exhibits a pattern oscillating around a null mean, showing
the distinctive characteristics of a weakly stationary stochastic process (see the following
Figure 7a and 7b).
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Figures 8a and 8b show the same statistics in the sub-sample 1973-1979. An observer
living in 1979 and looking back to the past six years patent data to examine the pattern
of the US innovation would probably have a not so positive impression.
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This discussion on the data is aimed at depicting the US innovative performance, as
it was in a pre-Eighties patent regime. In fact, during the early Eighties in the United
States the change occurred in the jurisprudential orientation that led to the patentability
of the research tools. The time series on patents will eventually show a signicant growth
in the number of patented innovations from the end of the Ninethies onward, but it looks
reasonable to presume this change is due to the e¤ect of di¤erent innovation policies like
the 1996s Economic Espionage Act (see Cozzi, 2001 and Cozzi and Pietrosanti, 2005).
The US industrial worldwide challenged leadership and the dissatisfaction about the
US innovative performance during that period are very well described by Roberts Hunts
(1999) words:
"At the end of the 1990s, it seems ironic to question the performance of
the American patent system. (...)
Twenty years ago, the perspective was quite di¤erent. Reacting to the
most severe recession since World War II, and observing the rapid emer-
gence of Japanese and other foreign competitors in the computer and other
high technology sectors, policymakers became increasingly concerned about the
technological competitiveness of American companies. There was reason for
this concern. During the 1970s, private R&D spending and the number of
patents issued to U.S. residents stagnated at a time when both were growing
rapidly abroad. (...) From the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, the market share
of important industries such as steel, automobiles, and semiconductors held
by foreign companies increased dramatically.
These pressures prompted a re-examination of the American system of
intellectual property law, which resulted in many signicant legislative changes
and important changes in the way federal courts decide patent cases."1
The circumstance that the US innovation policy was inuenced by the on-going ob-
1Hunt (1999), pp. 15-16.
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servation of a downward trend in the number of patents granted to the US is undoubted.
Whether or not the responses of such a policy were the most appropriate, needs to be
analysed in a macroeconomic theoretical framework incorporating a two-stage R&D in-
vestment decision.
At the same time, almost paradoxically, the Seventies saw a generalized ourishing
of new inventions developed within the US universities: a sort of a US technological
revolution, lacking of a formal US industrial recognition. Gersbach et al. (2009) - reports
some of the US university scientic discoveries belonging to that period and the relative
impact in terms potential commercial applications (later developed).
The intellectual property reforms aiming at fostering the commercialization of new
technologies lead to a dramatic the change in the traditional role played by the academic-
led R&D within the US innovation system as universities became more and more involved
in industry partnerships and research collaborations.
By highlighting the channels through which the patent policy transmits across the
innovation system, this study put forward a possible explanation for the dramatic dimin-
ishing in the US patenting activity and, nally, tests this conjecture to the data.
The approach adopted here follows the model presented throughout chapters 2-3. As
the reader was able to appreciate, chapters 2 and 3 constitute quite a complete instrument
for the innovation policy analysis, providing four di¤erent scenarios corresponding to as
many di¤erent patent system design. Since the aim of this chapter is merely to try to
provide the previous chapters with a robust empirical support, this work does not embark
a detailed discussion of the theoretical model. However, expositional clarity requires to
briey illustrating the main theoretical aspects.
4.2 A Recall of the Theoretical Model
This work aims at answering the question of the optimal breadth of the patent system.
More specically, we ask if, in the purpose of fostering innovation and growth, would be
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appropriate to privatize basic research or instead to maintain it into the set of the publicly
funded economic activities. Post 1980, the US intellectual property institutions facili-
tated the patentability of basic research. In this section the model presented throughout
chapter 2 is briey recalled.
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived individuals. Time t  0
population P (t) is assumed growing at rate g  0 and its initial level is normalized
to 1. There is an innity of sectors (industrial lines), normalized to the unit interval.
Each sector is characterized by an R&D sector and a manufacturing sector, where the
di¤erentiated consumption goods are produced. The economy labour endowment divides
into skilled and unskilled. Skilled labour is the only able to perform R&D activities.
Consumer Analysis
The study of the consumers behaviour (and the resulting optimal consumption trajec-
tory) is pretty standard as in the benchmark Schumpeterian growth model. For the
sake of shortness, here it is just briey exposed, hence the reader interested in a de-
tailed analysis of this part of the model is referred to its original source (Grossman and
Helpmann (1991a) pages 86-89). Consistently, with the standard quality ladder growth
model (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a and Segerstrom, 1998), here it is assumed that
consumers derive utility form consumption according to the following utility function:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
jdjt (!)
#
d!; (4.1)
where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; ::: (that is, a
product that underwent j quality jumps) and produced in industry ! at time t. Parameter
 > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades.
Each representative consumer is endowed with L > 0 units of skilled labor andM > 0
units of unskilled labor summing to 1. Hence he also inelastically supply labour in
exchange for any positive wage.
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At each instant, the households allocate their income to maximize the instantaneous
utility (4.1) subject the following static budget constraint :
E(t) =
Z 1
0
X
j2Jt(!)
pjt(!)djt (!) d!. (4.2)
As usual E(t) is the per-capita consumption expenditure and pjt(!) denotes the price of
a product of quality j produced in industry ! at time t.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the static demand function:
djt(!) =
8<: E(t)=pjt(!) for j = jt (!)0 otherwise. (4.3)
Households face a dynastic intertemporal utility additively separable in the log of the
expenditure. Therefore, the consumer will only choose the expenditure trajectory, E(),
of each family member according to his intertemporal preferences (equation 4.4) subject
to the individuals intertemporal budget constraint (equation 4.5):
U =
Z 1
0
e rt ln[E(t)]dt (4.4)
subject to
Z 1
0
e I(t)E(t)dt 5 W (0), (4.5)
where W (0) denotes the present value of human capital plus the present value of asset
holdings at t = 0, and I(t) =
R t
0
i(s)ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real interest
rate up to time t .
The optimal intertemporal expenditure prole satises the following Euler equation:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (r + g) (4.6)
where i(t) = I(t) represents the instantaneous market interest rate at time t.
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Manufacturing production
This section describes the rmsbehavior in the nal good sectors. It closely resemble
Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. The reader already familiar with such model can easily skip
it, without hampering the understanding of the following sections.
The technology of the production occurring in the di¤erentiated manufacturing sectors
represented by the following CRS production functions:
y (!) = X (!)M1  (!) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (4.7)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!) is the output ow per unit time, X (!) andM (!) are, respectively,
the skilled and unskilled labour input ows in industry ! 2 [0; 1]. ws and wu denote the
skilled and unskilled wage rates. In each production line the quality leader seeks to
minimize its total cost ow C = wsX (!) +wuM (!) subject to constraint (4.7). Setting
y (!) = 1, the solution to this cost minimization problem are the conditional unskilled
(4.8) and skilled (4.9) labour demands (i.e. the per-unit labour requirements):
M (!) =

1  


ws
wu

, (4.8)
X (!) =


1  
1 
wu
ws
1 
, (4.9)
and the (minimum) cost function is:
C(ws; wu; y) = c(ws; wu)y (4.10)
where c(ws; wu) =
h 
1 

 (1 )
+
 

1 
 i
wsw
1 
u is the per-unit cost function.
Choosing unskilled labour as numeraire imposes wu = 1, hence from equations (4.8)
and (4.9) the rms skilled labour demand are negatively depending on skilled (/unskilled)
wage (ratio)2:
2Since unskilled labour is uniquely employed in the nal good sectors and all price variables (including
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x(!)  X(!)
P (t)
=
1
ws


1  

M . (4.11)
In each industry, at each instant, rms compete in prices. Given demand function (4.3),
within each industry product innovation is non-drastic, hence the quality leader will x
its (limit) price by charging a mark-up  over the unit cost (remember that parameter 
measures the size of product quality jumps):
p = c(ws; 1)) d = E
c(ws; 1)
. (4.12)
Hence each monopolist earns a ow of prot, in per-capita terms, equal to
jt =
   1

E = (   1)wsx

(4.13)
jt = (   1) 1
1  M . (4.14)
Equations (4.13) and (4.14) were derived in Chapter 2, but they are reproduced in Chap-
ter 4 for ease of reference. From equation (4.14) follows:
   1

E = (   1) 1
1  M ) E =

1  M: (4.15)
Therefore, the Euler equation (4.6) implies a constant real interest rate:
i(t) = r + g. (4.16)
wages) are assumed to instantaneously adjust to their market clearing values, unskilled labour aggregate
demand
R 1
0
M (!) d! is equal to its aggregate supply,MP (t), at any date. Since industries are symmetric
and their number is normalized to 1, in equilibrium M (!) =MP (t).
101
Innovation Process according to the Benchmark Scenario
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 described four alternative patent policy scenarios. According to
the benchmark scenario, basic research is funded exclusively by the government. Applied
research, instead, is carried out but private researchers who try to complete the results
generated in the rst step by transforming them into tradeable products. Then, these
products are protected by everlasting patents.
The following Figure 9 reproduces Figure 1 of Chapter 2, and provides a graphical
representation of the macroeconomic structure: the whole set of industries f! 2 [0; 1]g is
divided into two subsets of sectors: at each date t, there are industries ! 2 A0 temporarily
lacking basic ideas and, therefore, with one quality leader, no applied research and a mass
of basic researchers, and the industries ! 2 A1 = [0; 1]n A0, with one research tool and
one quality leader and a mass of applied researchers directly challenging the incumbent
monopolist.
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Basic R&D is usefully performed only in ! 2 A0 sectors, whereas applied R&D
activity aiming at a direct product innovation is carried out only in A1 industries. When
a quality improvement occurs in an A1 industry, the innovator becomes the new quality
leader and the industry switches from A1 to A0. Similarly, when a seminal idea arises in
an industry ! 2 A0 this industry switches to A1.
In the present contest, the expression "innovation system" is adopted to denote the set
of individuals and institutions that make an innovation happen. This denition appears
important here. In fact, di¤erently from the standard Schumpeterian growth model, in-
stitutions and individuals (i.e. rms or self-employed researchers) do not usually share
a common motivation for their activity. More precisely, according to the Schumpeterian
literature the aim of the R&D rms is to secure the prot associated with the mo-
nopolistic rents connected to top-quality manufacturing production. Instead, academic
researchersactivity is often "curiosity driven": university researchers keep investigating
along intellectual trajectories even when they know that no private rm will ever prot
from adapting to their market the new knowledge they may create. Unguided by the
invisible hand, researchers keep devoting their e¤orts just to prove that they are able to
re-invent a second, third, ..., nth genial - but socially useless - idea aimed at enriching
their cv and justifying their academic carrier. Hence their rewards are not aligned to
downstream needs and, more important, their e¤orts might, from a social viewpoint, be
wrongly targeted.
To incorporate the partially "un-focussed" research behaviour of the public researchers
into a general equilibrium innovation-driven growth model, Chapter 2 assumed that pub-
lic researchers are allocated across di¤erent industries according to a uniform distribution.
Given our technological assumptions, this labour is redundant from the economic view
point.
Hence, the xed amount of skilled workers, LG, hired in the basic public R&D being
uniformly spread over the product space is also equal the per sector amount of R&D.
Therefore, each basic research labour unit has a probability per unit of time of making a
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discovery equal to 0 L aG . Therefore the probability that in any given A0 sector a useful
research tool will appear is LGB  L1 aG 0, whereas the probability that an existing
research tool generates a new marketable product is n1 aA 1.
The equilibrium nancial arbitrage equations impose the following system to be sat-
ised:
ws = 1n
 a
A v
0
L (4.17a)
rv0L =    L1 aG 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(4.17b)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
. (4.17c)
Equation (4.17a) is the free entry condition in applied research in any given sector ! 2 A1:
it equalises the skilled wage to the marginal expected gains of inventing the next version
nal product.
Equation (4.17b) equalises the risk free interest income3 achievable by selling the stock
market value of a leader in an A0 industry, rv0L, to the ow of prot  minus the expected
capital loss from being challenged by a research tool discovering, L1 aG 0 (v
0
L   v1L), plus
gradual appreciation in the case of such event4 not occurring, dv
0
L
dt
.
Equation (4.17c) equals the risk free income per unit time deriving from the liquida-
tion of the stock market value of a leader in an A1 industry, rv1L, and the relative ow of
prot  minus the expected capital loss deriving from the downstream applied researcher
rms endeavour, n1 aA 1v
1
L, plus the gradual appreciation if replacement does not occur,
dv1L
dt
.
3The reader may view r as the real interest rate, exogenous in a microeconomic framework, or equal
to the constant subjective rate of time preference in an alternative macroeconomic framework with linear
instantaneous utility function (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992, or Howitt 1999). The reader can easily
verify that we have used the Euler equation and the derivative of the population-adjusted rm value with
respect to time in order to get to the simplied expression of safe rate of returns in terms of r = i   g
instead of r.
4In continuous time the probability of this event tends to 1 as dt ! 0. This is why this probability
does not appear in the equation.
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After aggregating over the set of sectors, the dynamics of the mass of industries
depicted in Figure 9 can be mathematically described by the following rst order ordinary
di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))n1 aA 1  m(A0)L1 aG 0. (4.18)
In the stationary distribution the ow of industries entering the A0 group must equal the
ow of industries entering the A1 group.
The skilled labor market clearing condition applies:
x+ LG + (1 m(A0))nA = L; (4.19)
from which, together with the denition of x, it is possible to solve for the equilibrium
mass of per-sector applied research challengers:
nA =
L  1
ws
 

1 

M   LG
(1 m(A0)) . (4.20)
Hence the dynamics of this economy is completely characterized by the di¤erential
equation system (4.17a)-(4.17c) and (4.17), with cross equation restriction (4.20).
In the steady state dv
0
L
dt
=
dv1L
dt
= dm(A0)
dt
= 0.
Patentable Research Tools Scenario
As in the previous benchmark scenario, the stock value of all rms is determined by pri-
vately arbitraging between risk free consumption loans, rm bonds and equities, viewed as
perfect substitutes also due to the ability of nancial intermediaries to perfectly diversify
portfolios and eliminate risk5. As in the previous section, the value of the manufac-
5Hence, despite individuals being risk averse, average returns will be deterministic, the risk premia
will be zero, and agents will only compare expected returns. As usual in this class of models, we invoke
the law of large numbers, which allows individuals who invest in a continuum of sectors with idiosyncratic
risk, thereby transforming probabilities into frequencies.
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turing monopolistic rms is related to their prots, their expected capital losses (due to
obsolescence) and stock market gains.
The optimal applied R&D employment in an A1 sector is easily obtained from the
rst order conditions of the applied R&D rm:
nA =

(1  a)1(v0L   vA)
ws
 1
a
. (4.21)
Costless arbitraging between risk free loans and rmsequities implies that at each instant
the following arbitrage equations must hold in equilibrium6:
ws = 0n
 a
B vA (4.22a)
rvA = (n

A)
1 a 1(v0L   vA)  wsnA +
dvA
dt
(4.22b)
rv0L =    (nB)1 a 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(4.22c)
rv1L =    (nA)1 a 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
. (4.22d)
The skilled labor employment in the manufacturing sector is inversely related to the
market value of patented research tools:
x =
1
ws


1  

M = min

naB
0vA
; 1


1  

M . (4.23)
The skilled labor market clearing condition states:
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L (4.24)
The unique equilibrium per-sector mass of entrant basic R&D rms consistent with the
condition (4.24) is obtained by solving equation (4.24) for nB:
6Please go back to chapter 2, page 71 for a complete description of the meaning of equations (4.21a)-
(4.21d).
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nB =
L  x  (1 m(A0))nA
m(A0)
. (4.25)
Reconsider the inter-industry dynamics depicted by Figure 9 (which reproduces Figure
1 of chapter 2). In the set of basic research industries a given number of perfectly
competitive (freely entered) upstream researchers, nB, have a ow probability of becom-
ing applied researchers, while in the set of the applied R&D industries each of the nA
per-industry applied researchers has a ow probability to succeed. Hence the industrial
dynamics of this economy is described by the following rst order ordinary di¤erential
equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (4.26)
System (4.22b)-(4.22d) and equation (4.26) - jointly with cross equation restrictions (4.23)
and (4.25) - form a system of four rst order ordinary di¤erential equations, whose
solution describes the dynamics of this economy for any admissible initial value of the
unknown functions of time v0L, v
1
L,vA, and m(A0).
In a steady state, dv
1
L
dt
=
dv0L
dt
= dvA
dt
= dm(A0)
dt
= 0.
Experimental Use Defense Scenario
Along the way indicated by Green and Scotchmers (1995) pioneering microeconomic
model on the division of prots between sequential innovators, the recent patent literature
results stressed the veto-nature of patent rights. As Vincenzo Denicolò (2007) did not
miss to remark:
"To be of any economic value, patent rights must be enforced: as has aptly
been said, a patent is just a "ticket to sue.
Put into di¤erent words, a patent gives the inventor the exclusive rights to manufac-
ture, use or sell the invention. Hence it is important to characterise all these rights as
veto-rights. This is the purpose of our fourth scenario: to emphasize the e¤ect of ex-post
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bargaining between a basic patent holder and its developer. In fact, a product innovation
can be patented and yet infringe another patent (the patented research tool). This kind
of strategic R&D dimension of the patenting activity is known as "Experimental Use
Defence", "Research Exemption Environment" or "Safe Harbour Exemption", and it has
been subject to intense recent juridical controversies7. In particular, the famous Supreme
Court decision on Madey vs. Duke University suit8 de facto removed any possibility to
appeal for its applicability. As a result after 1980, except under very narrow circum-
stances, it has not been possible for a patent infringer to be allowed to infringe in the
name of science However, in cases where access to research tools through the marketplace
is highly problematic, a research exemption is deemed desirable (Mueller, 2004). For this
reason, more recently, the Supreme Court of the United Stated overruled such restrictive
applicability in the 2006 decision on the Merck KGaA vs. Integra LifeSciences Ltd. In
this case, the US Supreme Court claried that broad immunity from patent infringement
exists for any pre-clinical research and experimentation that is reasonably relatedto
the process of developing new drug candidates.
Ex post bargaining is rationally expected to transfer to the basic research patent
holder a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the value of the nal product patent, representing its
relative bargaining power. Unlike Green and Scotchmers (1995) assumption of a unique
downstream researcher, we here assume that the downstream unauthorized research with
a patented research tools can be carried out by a multitude of freely entrant R&D rms,
thereby implying a demand e¤ect on R&D inputs dissipating expected prots. Our analy-
sis is also valid in the case of reach-through licensing agreements, which seem pervasive
in the US. "For research tools ... [r]oyalities would be pass-through royalties from the
product developed to the tool." Maurer and Scotchmer (2004b, page 236).
7See Mueller (2004) for a detailed discussion of the research exemption debate in the US.
8The Madey v. Duke University case animated the debate among the academic community. In par-
ticular, the cause of the scandal was the courts consideration of Dukes experimental use of Madeys
patented invention as part of the university "legitimate business", hence, regardless of the prot moti-
vation the application of a science-motivated research exemption had to be precluded.
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We rst analyse non-exclusive licenses, while the next subsection will study exclusive
pass-through licensing agreements. In all our cases, we assume that the ultimate patent
on the nal product improvement can be granted to only one rm: the rst to invent it.
Let vB, v0L, and v
1
L denote respectively the present expected value of a basic blocking
patent (vB), an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and an A1 industry challenged leader
(v1L).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply that at each
instant the following equations shall hold in equilibrium9:
ws = 0n
 a
B vB (4.27a)
rvB = 1n
1 a
A
 
v0L   vB

+
dvB
dt
(4.27b)
ws = 1n
 a
A (1  ) v0L (4.27c)
rv0L =    n1 aB 0
 
v0L   v1L

+
dv0L
dt
(4.27d)
rv1L =    n1 aA 1v1L +
dv1L
dt
. (4.27e)
Similarly the previous scenarios, the industrial dynamics of this economy is described by
the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1 m(A0))1 (nA)1 a  m(A0) (nB)1 a 0. (4.28)
The previous equations, supplemented with the skilled labour market equilibrium condi-
tion
x+m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA = L; (4.29)
and by equation (4.23) for x, determine the equilibrium trajectories.
9Please go back to chapter 3, page 88 for a complete description of the meaning of equations (4.21a)-
(4.21d).
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4.3 Estimating the unobservable
In this section, I ran simulations of the di¤erent scenarios. The regularities found sug-
gest that an economy in which public basic research is conducted in a non-prot oriented
manner can induce less or more innovations than an economy in which basic R&D is
privately carried out. The privatized economy outgrows the public basic research econ-
omy when the applied R&D productivity parameter, 1, becomes very low: in such cases
the equilibrium innovative performance of the private economy with patentable research
tools becomes better than the equilibrium growth performance of the economy with a
public R&D sector. In fact, if 1 is very small or 0 is high, the ow out of A1 will be
scarce, whereas the ow out of A0 will be intense. Therefore in the steady state m(A0)
will be small, thereby exalting the wasteful nature of the public R&D activity uniformly
diluted over [0; 1]   A0: in this case the social cost of a public R&D blind to the social
needs signalled by the invisible hand would overwhelm the social costs of the restricted
entry into the applied R&D sector induced by the patentability of research tools.
Patent data are indicators for the innovative performance of the economic system.
The aim of this section is to calibrate the di¤erent scenarios with U.S. data from 1975 to
1981. The basic/applied productivity parameters, 0 and 1, whose evolution cannot be
inferred by patent statistics because in the Seventies basic R&D outcomes could hardly
be patented, are here punctually estimated by using only skilled and unskilled labour as
inputs and numbers of qualied innovations as R&D output, as represented by patents.
Moreover, all variables are normalized by population.
By solving for the steady state values of the variables in a way consistent with the
data, this section provides the punctual estimates for the basic/applied R&D productivity
parameters, 0 and 1.
Chapter 2 estimated 0 and 1 by solving for 0 and 1 the steady-state equations of
the model. Here we adopt basic research expenditure (available every year) as a proxy for
the labor employed in basic research. The real expenditure on basic research is adopted
as a proxy for the labour employment in basic research. Since basic research is conceived
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as the research which is necessary to develop future product innovation, but lacking
in currently marketable applications, here it is assumed that the measure of industry
performed basic research is negligible. The source of the data is the National Science
Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators (2006). Figure 10 summarizes the trend
of the relative basic/applied research productivities punctually estimated by measuring
the publicly run basic research as the total basic research expenditure net of the industry
performed basic research (ENIPerf).
The following Figure 11 depicts the dynamics of the US innovation through the period:
it is striking to note how at the beginning of the period most sectors engaged basic
research, while at the end of the period the situation had completely reverted.
Estimates Robustness
The robustness of the estimates was tested under two kinds of perturbation: data and
parameters.
The NSF Science and Engineering Indicators publishes data on the number of doc-
111
torate holders from 1973 every two years. Chapter 2 punctually estimated 0 and 1 by
solving for the steady-state values of the variables in a way consistent with these data.
Here basic research expenditure (available every year) is used as a proxy for the labor
employed in basic research.
Table 3 reports the data and the parameters utilised and their sources.
The following gures 12 and 13 show the new estimates carried out by employing the
data on the total basic research expenditure net of the industry performed basic research
(ENIPerf) and the data on the total basic research expenditure net of the industry
funded basic research (ENIFund). The reader can verify as the estimates do not change
signicantly as a consequence of such perturbation.
Finally, the Figures 14 and 15 show the variations of the punctual estimates as a
result of di¤erent values of the congestion parameter according to the di¤erent measures
of basic research expenditure. The reader can notice that, even if is characterized by a
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larger variability, the pattern of both series appears to be remarkably similar.
Table 3: Data and Parameters
Variable or Para-
meter
Value Source
Mark-up 1:68 Roeger (1995) and Martins et al. (1996)
R&D congestions 0:3 Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000)
Skilled Labour Data U.S. Census, Current Population Survey
Unskilled Labour Data U.S. Census, Current Population Survey
Skilled Share in
Manufacturing
0:1 Assumption
Labour Force Data BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Statistics
from the Current Population Survey
Basic R&D Expendi-
ture (ENIPerf)
Data NSF Science & Engeneering Indicators 2005
Basic R&D Expendi-
ture (ENIFund)
Data NSF Science & Engeneering Indicators 2005
Skilled wage Data Mean income in current dollars, College 4 Years or More,
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual So-
cial and Economic Supplementsts
Innovation rate Data Patents data from the USPTO
Basic Research Pro-
ductivity
Estimation
Applied Research
Productivity
Estimation
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Patent Policy Assessment
To foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded?
This section tests Chapters2-3 results on the desirability of the US policy shift in view
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of the estimates just obtained with the new data. Recall that the procedure to compare
the innovative performance is made up of four stages, namely:
1. the FIRST STEP plugs the estimated values ^0 and ^1 as exogenous variables into
the system of equations characterizing the steady-state equilibrium of the hypo-
thetical scenario with patentable basic research and also computes the steady-state
equilibrium mass of skilled labour employed in basic research;
2. the SECOND STEP, using the endogenously determined (in the rst step) steady-
state equilibrium mass of skilled labour employed in basic research, evaluates the
innovative performances of the free basic research policy scenarios;
3. the THIRD STEP uses the estimated values ^0 and ^1 as exogenous variables in the
system of equations characterizing the steady-state equilibrium of the hypotheti-
cal scenario with research exemption, and evaluates the impact of reach-through
claims/research exemption in terms of innovation rate. It also computes the steady-
state equilibrium mass of skilled labour employed in basic research;
4. the FOURTH STEP, using the endogenously determined (in the third step) steady-
state equilibrium mass of skilled labour employed in basic research, evaluates the
innovative performances of the free basic research policy scenarios against the re-
search exemption scenario.
The following Figure 16 shows the result of comparing the patentable and the un-
patentable research tool scenarios. The data conrm the previous result that maintaining
free access to basic research ndings would have been better for innovation despite the
ine¢ ciency of the public laboratories and universities.
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Figure 17 shows the result of comparing the research exemption and the unpatentable
research tool scenarios. In this case it is not so easy to conrm the previous assessment.
In fact during the Seventies, no clear winner between the safe harbour exemption and
the unpatentable research tool scenarios emerges.
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4.4 Conclusions
The debate on the e¤ects of the patentability of research tools on the incentives to in-
novate is still very controversial, not only in the US but also in Europe and in other
important areas of the world. The previous Chapters 2-3 analysed from a general equi-
librium perspective the US policy shift towards the extension of patentability to research
tools and basic scientic ideas that took place around 1980. These normative innovations
have been modifying the industrial and academic lives in the last three decades, raising
doubts on their desirability. The losses from the monopolization of applied research in-
duced by intellectual property of research tools have been compared with the ine¢ cacy
of public research institutions to promptly react to downstream market opportunities.
Since results are not a priory unambiguous, this chapter used additional available data
to calibrate and simulate the model in order to check if the US did it right in changing
their institutions around 1980. Overall, the data largely conrm the results previously
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obtained with a di¤erent dataset: maintaining free access to basic research ndings would
have been better for innovation despite the ine¢ ciency of the public laboratories and
universities. The extension of the basic model to incorporate research exemptions and
reach-through licensing, looks more ambiguous.
119
Chapter 5
Upstream Innovation Protection:
Common Law Evolution and the
Dynamics of Wage Inequality
5.1 Introduction
As is well known, the US economy in the 1980s witnessed the following phenomena:
1. A sustained increase in the skill premium;
2. A sustained increase in the educated fraction of the population;
3. A strengthening of the intellectual property of upstream research1.
Points 1 and 2 were extensively examined within the macroeconomics debate (see
Acemoglu 2002a for an excellent review), and have motivated explanations based on di-
rected change, globalization, and government procurement. Acemoglu (1998 and 2002b)
and Kiley (1999) showed that education increases the market for the skill complementary
inputs, thereby driving up the protability of innovations that increase the productivity
of the skilled and therefore the returns to higher education. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) showed that the decrease in trade barriers, by enlarging the market size for suc-
1"Upstream" is meant to incorporate basic research and early stage development process.
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cessful innovation, increases the return to education. This is so because skilled labour is
used more intensively in the knowledge creation activities. Sener (2001) reinforced this
channel in the presence of unskilled Schumpeterian unemployment. Cozzi and Impullitti
(2009) document a progressive a change in the US government expenditure towards a
bigger share of high technology goods; this may have increased the prots of the tech-
nologically more dynamic sectors, thereby increasing the returns to college. The aim of
this chapter is to assess the potential marginal importance of point 3.
In the recent US history the patent system registered an explosion of upstream
patents2 (Heller and Eisemberg, 1998; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; National Research
Council, 2004). Upstream discoveries waiting for an industrial application slowly gained
more and more weight as the developers of research tools should considerate the reach-
throughclaims covering their research agendas. Such reach-through claims place a prime
value on the research tools underlying the nal innovations, enabling the patentee to se-
cure a greater stake in the downstream development and sales.
In order to provide new insights on the links between intellectual property, innovation,
education and inequality, this chapter combines a closed-country version of Dinopoulos
and Segerstroms (1999) dynamic general equilibrium model with cumulative innovation
and educational choice, with a two-stage cumulative innovation structure à la Gross-
man and Shapiro (1987) and Green and Scotchmer (1995). Basic and applied research
technologies are heterogeneous and the bargaining power of the upstream innovation
changes3, thus stylizing the evolution of the US jurisprudence after 1980. From that date
on, the US national system of innovation has been re-shaped by a sequence of important
new laws and by a cumulative sequence of sentences that set the precedents for future
modications in the jurisprudence. All these changes pointed to an increase in the appro-
priability of innovations at their initial stages4. The pro-early innovation cultural change
2Jensen and Thursbys (2001) empirical study found that the majority of the inventions licensed by
US universities in 2001 were in an embryonic stage of development ("no more than a proof of concept").
3Our framework somewhat complements Eicher and García-Peñalosa, (2008), that envisages endoge-
nous IPR based on rm choice, instead of on jurisprudence evolution.
4Including the Stevenson-Wydler act of 1980 and the Bayh-Dole act, of 1980, amended the patent
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is also reected in the increasing protection of trade-secrets - starting in the 80s with the
Uniform Trade Secret Act and culminating with the Economic Espionage Act of 19965
- as well as in the increasingly positive attitude towards software patents (Hunt, 2001,
Hall, 2009), culminating in the Final Computer Related Examination Guidelines issued
by the USPTO in 1996.
Being the US a common-law regime, the jurisprudence evolved gradually6 in the di-
rection of stricter intellectual protection of research tools, basic research ideas7, etc. This
process took a quarter century, culminating in the 2002 Madey vs. Duke University
Federal Circuits decision, which completed a process of elimination of the "research ex-
emption" to patent claims. This chapter conjectures that, along with other factors, it
may have contributed to lead the economy along a transition characterized by increasing
wage inequality and higher education attainments and innovation, after an initial produc-
tivity slowdown. Interestingly, the more recent cases seem to be witnessing an opposite
trend, most notably Merck vs Integra Lifesciences (2005), in which the Supreme Court
decided to re-a¢ rm research exemption in the pharmaceutical sector.
The US legal system, as the legal systems of most of the Commonwealth countries,
includes in the list of the sources of right the common law. The essence of the common
law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, by applying their common sense and
knowledge of legal precedent (stare decisis) to the facts before them. It is founded on
the concept of precedence on how the courts have interpreted the law: under common
law the decisions are reached by analogy, after comparing the facts of a particular case to
similar previous cases. During the early 1980s began a progressive process in which the
law, to facilitate the commercialization of inventions obtained thanks to government funding, especially
by universities.
5See Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2006).
6In our case, it is important to recall Janice Muellers (2004) account of the common law development
of a narrow experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability: with special reference to the
discussion of the change in the doctrine from 1976s Pitcairn v. United States, through 1984s Federal
Circuit decision of Roche Products, Inc. v.Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., all the way to Madey v. Duke
University in 2002.
7See Gallini (2002), Mueller (2001 and 2004), Scotchmer (2004).
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U.S. Court decisions changed from the old doctrine limiting the patentability of early-
stage scientic discoveries to the conception that also fundamental basic scientic ndings
(such as genetic engineering procedures or semiconductor designs) are patentable. Ideally
started in 1980 with the Diamonds vs. Chakrabarty case, in which the Supreme Court of
United States ruled that microorganism produced by genetic engineering could be granted
patent protection, according to some authors, this process culminated in 2002 with the
well-known Federal Circuit decision Madey vs. Duke University, by which the common
law fair use doctrine did not even allow universities to infringe patents on research tools
for teaching or experimental purposes (Mueller, 2004).
If what deeply characterizes common law (and sharply separates it from the Continen-
tal Europe type legal systems) is an uninterrupted continuity such that within the stare
decisis regime an institutional break point is even hardly conceivable, we must conclude
that the analysis of the e¤ects of the US patent policy on the economy is forced to include
the whole transition dynamics. In other words, if the common law shows a strong link
with its evolutionary history, we are not dealing anymore with an IPR revolution but
with its evolution. Hence, the cumulated stock of courts decisions up to time t determines
a ow of new decisions, or, the courts orientation in a given instant of time t depends on
the cumulated stock of sentences up to time t. The law and economics literature is cur-
rently modelling the evolution of the case law in the perspective of analysing Benjamin
Cardozos and Richard Posners view of common law as e¢ ciency promoting. In fact,
according to this inuential view, unlike civil law, being the common law decentralized,
it follows the aggregate decision making of several heterogeneous judges, whose idiosyn-
cratic opinions average one another. Moreover, the very sequential precedent structure,
implies that (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007b) one appellate court overrules anothers de-
cision, tending to progressive mitigation and e¢ ciency only if the majority of the judges
is unbiased, depending also on the judges e¤ort cost of changing the legal rule estab-
lished in a precedent. Appellate courts may change a previously established legal rule
also by "distinguishing" the case based on the consideration of a "previously neglected
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dimension" (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007a), which can facilitate convergence towards a
more e¢ cient legal rule. Empirical analysis is still scarce, with the notable exception of
Niblett, Posner, and Shleifers (2008) analysis of the evolution of the Economic Loss Rule
(ELR) in the US construction industry from 1970 to 2005, according to which the ELR
doctrine seemed to follow a clear increasingly narrow pattern for more than two decades
(1970-1993), which was then followed by a subsequent (1994-2004) inverse trend. Based
on these analyses, we inquire on whether the increasingly pro-upstream R&D court ori-
entation from 1980 to 2002 has been following an improvement in promoting innovation
or if it has ended up following the bias of less and less liberal judges. This chapter looks
for potentially detectable aspects of the time series of several important variables - skill
wage premium, education, innovation, labour force allocation, market value of patents,
etc. - associated with either long-term evolution of the legal rules. The argument here
follows a dynamic general equilibrium perspective, which forces us to assume that eco-
nomic agents are su¢ ciently intelligent to detect what "trend" is occurring, and suitably
take optimizing decisions.
Analysing the e¤ects of an expected and progressive change in the patent protection
of basic research entails to simulate the trajectories of all variables in their transitional
dynamics. Hence this work extracts lessons from the numerical results, useful to detect
whether an increasingly more strong basic research protection common law doctrine is
gradually facilitating the national system of innovation or evolving for the worse.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 set the
model. Section 5.4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5.5 focusses on the growth
maximizing steady-state upstream innovator share in a simple special case, useful as a
benchmark. Section 5.6 shows the numerical simulations. Section 5.7 concludes. Most
of the algebra is relegated to the Appendix.
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5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Households
Assume a large number of dynastic families, normalized to 1 for simplicity, whose mem-
bers, born at birth rate ~ and passing away at rate , live a period of duration D. The
resulting population growth rate8 is g = ~    > 0. This demographic structure implies
the following restrictions: ~ = ge
gD
egD 1 and  =
g
egD 1 .
At time t the total number of individuals is egt. Each individual can spend her
life working as unskilled or studying the rst Tr < D periods and then working as
skilled. Each individual cares only about the utility of the average family member.
Hence, despite bounded individual life, the individual decisions are taken within the
household by maximizing the following intertemporally additive utility functional:
U =
Z 1
0
e tu (t) dt; (5.1)
where  > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Per-family member instantaneous
utility u (t) is dened as:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
jdjt (!)
#
d!; (5.2)
where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; ::: (that is,
a product that underwent j quality jumps) and produced in industry ! at time t, and
bought at price pjt (!). Parameter  > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades.
Dening per-capita expenditure on consumption goods asE(t) =
R 1
0
hP
j pjt (!) djt (!)
i
d!,
the real interest rate as i(t), and time 0 family wealth asW (0), the intertemporal budget
8Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have rst developed the overlapping generations education frame-
work followed here. Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007) recently studied population
and human capital dynamics in continuous time and o¤ steady states and numerically calibrated in a
way methodologically more similar to ours.
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constraint is
R1
0
egt 
R t
0 i()dE (t) dt  W (0).
Following standard steps of quality ladders models9, the consumers will only buy good
with the lowest quality adjusted price, and the Euler equation follows:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (+ g) = r(t)  , (5.3)
where r(t)  i(t) g is the population growth deated instantaneous market interest rate
at time t, and, together with the transversality condition, determines consumer choice.
Individuals di¤er in their learning ability , which, for each generation, is uniformly
distributed in the unit interval. Hence an individual of ability  2 [0; 1] will be able to
acquire      units of human capital after an indivisible training period of length Tr.
The only cost of education is the individuals time, which prevents her from earning the
unskilled wage wu. In what follows we choose unskilled labour as our numeraire, and
therefore set wu(t) = 1 at all t  0.
Hence an individual born at t with (known) ability (t) 2 [0; 1] and who decides to
educate herself will earn nothing from t to t + Tr, and then earn a skilled wage ow
((t)    )wH(s) at all dates s 2 [t + Tr; t + D], which implies that at time t there will
exist an ability threshold 0(t) 2 [ ; 1] below which the individual decides to work as an
unskilled. Threshold 0(t) solves the following equation:
Z t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds = (0(t)   )
Z t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds; (5.4)
obtaining
0(t) =   +
R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()ddsR t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds
. (5.5)
It is important to notice that the ability threshold can change over time, because the
future real interest rates i(t) and skilled wage rates wH(t) are free to change. It is
9See Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998).
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worthwhile to notice that Dinopoulos and Segerstroms (1999) framework allows for a
strong dispersion within the skilled labour group: in fact, wH(t) is the amount of skilled
wage per-e¢ ciency unit of labour, whereas people actual earnings vary with their ability.
Since in a steady state i(t) = + g, the steady state level of 0(t) is
0 =   +
1  e (+g)D
[e (+g)Tr   e (+g)D]wH ; (5.6)
where wH denotes the steady state skill premium.
5.2.2 Manufacturing
In each nal good industry ! 2 [0; 1] and for each quality level j(!) of the good, produc-
tion is carried out according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology
y (!; t) = X (!; t)M1  (!; t) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (5.7)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!; t) is the output ow at time t, X (!; t) andM (!; t) are the skilled
and unskilled labour inputs. In each industry rms minimize costs by choosing input
ratios
X (!)
M (!)
=
1
wH(t)

1   . (5.8)
The total per-capita amount M of unskilled labour only works in the manufacturing
sectors. Therefore the aggregate skilled labour demand is equal to:
X(!; t) =
1
wH(t)


1  

M(t)P (t) (5.9)
In per-capita terms,
x(!; t)  X(!; t)
P (t)
=
1
wH(t)


1  

M(t)  x(t). (5.10)
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As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), skilled labour can also work in the R&D sectors. There-
fore, a higher skilled premium wH(t) frees resources for the R&D sectors.
Assume instantaneous Bertrand competition in all sectors, since only the owner of the
most recent top quality good patent can produce the top quality version of its sector good,
the equilibrium price will be equal to a mark-up  > 1 over the unit cost c(wH(t); 1).
Moreover, being demand unit elastic, per-capita demand is d(t) = E
c(wH(t);1)
. Therefore
is each sector the temporary monopolist who owns the top quality product patent earns
the same prot which, in per-capita terms, is equal to10:
(t) =
   1

E(t) = (   1)wH(t)x(t)

=
= (   1) 1
1  m(t). (5.11)
5.3 R&D and Innovation
The quality level j of each nal product of variety ! 2 [0; 1] can increase as a result of
R&D undertaken by private rms. In order to capture the interaction between basic and
applied research11, we assume - as in Chapters 2-4 - that a basic research idea is a pre-
requisite to applied research and applied R&D success opens the door for a further basic
research advance. Hence, the innovative process leading to a nal product quality is, as
in Grossman and Shapiro (1987), a two-stage process: in the rst stage R&D discovers
a pure idea; in the second stage R&D embodies that idea into a new product. The rst
stage - basic research - of the product quality jump is the outcome of a Poisson process
10The second equality builds on the Cobb-Douglas property that minimum total cost is 
1 

 (1 )
+


1 
 
ws w
1 
u X
 (!)M1  (!). Hence prot is (   1) times total cost. Using
eq. (5.9) and simplifying gives the result.
11According to Nelson (1959) and (2006), basic R&D is not only a source of inspiration for applied
R&D, but also continuously inspired by applied R&D, which raises important questions on why some
new discoveries actually work. This second point is also modelled by Howitt (1999), when knowledge
frontier advances are a result of applied R&D success frequencies.
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with probability intensity 0
P (t)

NB(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where 0 > 0 is a
basic research productivity parameter, NB(!; t) is the mass of research labour employed
in sector ! at time t, and a > 0 is a congestions externality parameter. The presence of
population size, P (t), in the denominator states that R&D di¢ culty increases with the
total population in the economy12, which delivers endogenous growth without the strong
scale e¤ect13, as suggested by Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995), Young (1998),
Peretto (1998 and 1999), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999), and recently
conrmed empirically by Ha and Howitt (2006) and Madsen (2008).
The second stage - applied research - completes the basic research idea and generates
the new higher quality producible good according to a Poisson process with probability
intensity 1(t)
P (t)

NA(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where 1(t) > 0 is an applied
research productivity, viewed by the rms as a constant; NA(!; t) is the mass of research
labour employed in sector ! at time t; and a > 0 is the congestions externality parameter.
Dening nB(!; t)  NB(!;t)P (t) and nA(!; t)  NA(!;t)P (t) , as the skilled labor employment in
each basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector, we can express the expected innova-
tion rate in a !0 sector undertaking only basic R&D as 0nB(!0; t)1 a and the expected
innovation rate in a !00 sector undertaking only applied R&D as 1(t)nA(!00; t)1 a. All
stochastic processes are independent both across sectors and across rms. Hence, the
existence of a continuum of sectors implies that the law of large number applies and
aggregate variables evolve deterministically. Since all sectors switch from hosting only
basic R&D rms - belonging to subset A0(t)  [0; 1] - to hosting only applied R&D -
belonging to subset A1(t)  [0; 1] - the mass of sectors belonging to each type will ow
deterministically14. Notice that A0(t)[A1(t) = [0; 1] and A0(t)\A1(t) = ;. Moreover, in
our model, symmetric equilibria exist, allowing us to simplify notation: nB(!; t)  nB(t)
and nA(!; t)  nA(t). Therefore, if m(A0(t)) 2]0; 1[ is the Lebesgue mass of the A0(t)
12Population density favour innovation at the local level (see Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt, 2001):
according to this solution to the strong scale e¤ect, the dilution of R&D is not related to population
density, but with the overall size of the economy.
13See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (2005).
14Provided the initial mass Lebesgue mass of each was positive.
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subset - and hence m(A1(t)) = 1   m(A0(t)) the Lebesgue mass of A1(t) subset - its
evolution would be deterministic and described by the following rst order di¤erential
equation:
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a  m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (5.12)
In order to truly capture the distinction between pioneering and follow-on innova-
tions, in this chapter - unlike in the previous ones - we follow the literature, by think-
ing of pioneering inventions as ones that generate more spillovers or are in some sense
"more important" than the subsequent follow on innovations. We assume that the ag-
gregate output of basic research increases the productivity of applied research: 1(t) =
1

1 + 0
hR 1
0
nB(!; t)d!
i1 a'
, where 1 and ' are positive constants. This formula-
tion introduces the possibility of cross-fertilization of applied research by other sectors
basic research ndings15. In symmetric equilibrium 1(t) = 1
 
1 + 0 [nB(t)]
1 a'.
We assume free entry into basic and applied research. Each inventor, be she basic or
applied, is granted a patent. However, though the rst R&D rm that invents a new nal
product gets the patent anyway, it will infringe the patent held by the previous basic
research inventor. Therefore it will have to bargain with the basic research patent holder
in order to produce the new version of this good.
The share, (t) 2]0; 1[, of the nal product (applied) patent value assigned - at the
end of the negotiations taking place at time t - to the upstream (basic) patent holder16
captures time t court orientation towards intellectual property. New laws, patent law
amendments, changes in the jurisprudence towards stronger patent claims and weakening
15This is complementary to Howitts (1999) assumption of general knowledge, Amaxt ; being positively
a¤ected by the aggregate applied R&D.
16Assuming that basic and applied innovators matched and targeted applied innovator-specic inno-
vations, could re-read this strategic interaction as Aghion and Tiroles (1994a and b) research unit (RU)
and customer (C). Then our case would clearly correspond to when RUs e¤ort is important ( ~UC > UC),
which implies that "the property right is allocated to RU" (Aghion and Tirole, 1994b, p. 1191). In this
light, our (t) generalizes Aghion and Tiroles (1994a and b) equal split assumption.
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research exemptions would correspond to increases in (t), whereas a gradually looser
upstream patent holder protection and stronger research exemptions would correspond
to a declining (t). In the rest of the paper we will consider gradual changes in patent
policy in terms of the sign of _(t). In fact, we assume that the following holds:
_(t) = (1   )(   (t)): (5.13)
Equation (5.13) is a linear di¤erential equation with constant coe¢ cient, which describes
the speed of change in (t) per unit time. Parameter  < 1 guarantees asymptotic
stability and  2]0; 1[ is the steady state. We will consider the progressive tightening
of intellectual property rights in the US as the result of a sudden change in , which
determines a gradual increase in (t) from its previous lower steady state level to its
new level. It is important to notice that we are in a rational expectation framework: all
economic agents after the regime change can predict the successive increases in (t), and
the transition to a tight IPR regime is known to the agents from the beginning and all
decisions are re-optimized. Hence all our numerical simulations are immune to Lucas
critique, unlike other models that, albeit assuming dynamic general equilibrium, treat
the gradual policy changes as a sequence of surprises. The reason why we think our
approach is appropriate is that from 1980 on IPR policy has steadily and progressively
been tightening and progressively become more and more biased toward earlier innovator.
This steady upstream shift of innovation incentives was too regular not to be incorporated
in peoples expectations17, which leads law scholars to view 1980 as a sort of structural
break of equation (5.13), and forces us to study the whole transitional dynamics of the
models economy. The statutory decisions taken in the early 1980 triggered a gradual
change in the common law18. Maybe such exogenous technological-scientic modications
were taking place which imposed statutory intervention to change an otherwise binding
17Unless focussing attention only on a short time span, as in Chapter 2.
18According to Fon and Parisi (2006), such a case evolution could also appear in a civil law system.
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set of precedents19: this has inaugurated the new era, which would be represented by an
increase in  and a resulting re-adjustment of the judicial system, thereby dragging the
whole economy.
5.4 Equilibrium
In this section we keep time notation, because, since we are considering dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium, all endogenous variable can change over time, as will be shown in the
numerical simulations.
Let us dene vB,v0L, and v
1
L as the present expected value of a basic research patent
(vB), of an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and of an A1 industry challenged leader (v
1
L).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply that in equi-
librium at each instant the following equations shall hold:
wH(t) = 0nB(t)
 avB(t) (5.14a)
r(t)vB(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
1 a  (t)v0L(t)  vB(t)+ dvB(t)dt (5.14b)
wH(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
 a (1  (t)) v0L(t) (5.14c)
r(t)v0L(t) = (t)  0nB(t)1 a
 
v0L(t)  v1L(t)

+
dv0L(t)
dt
(5.14d)
r(t)v1L(t) = (t)  1(t)nA(t)1 av1L(t) +
dv1L(t)
dt
(5.14e)
The value of a monopolist in an A0 industry, v0L, has to obey equation (5.14d): in fact,
the shareholders of the current quality leader compare the (population growth adjusted)
risk free income, rv0L, obtainable from selling their shares and buying risk free bonds
19"Second, it may be impossible to reverse the precedents of the past when changing economic condi-
tions warrant such a reversal. Precedent tends to weigh heavily upon decisions of the court, as perhaps
it should. But rulings of a century ago, say on questions of pollution, may not be optimal today. If the
bias imparted by precedent is too great, however, a change in precedent may be impossible, even if it
would be benecial to many parties involved" (Goodman, 1978, p. 406).
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to the expected value of their prots, , net of probable capital loss, 0n1 aB (v
0
L   v1L),
in case a new basic research result appears in the industry. Since we assume perfect
and costless nancial markets, all idiosyncratic risk is diversied away and investors only
compare expected returns.
As soon as a new basic R&D result appears in the industry, the incumbent monopo-
lists value falls down to a lower, but still positive, value v1L, which has to obey equation.
(5.14e): as before, risk free income is equated to expected prots net of expected capital
loss, but now the probability of the basic research ideas being completed by applied
research in the industry, 1n1 aA , is the monopolistic prot hazard rate, as the arrival
of the new nal product implies the complete displacement of the current leading edge
product.
Equation (5.14a) characterizes free entry into basic R&D (in an A0 industry), equal-
izing the skilled wage to the probability 0n aO of inventing times the value vB of the
resulting patent.
Equation (5.14b) equated the risk free income from selling a basic R&D patent, rvB,
to the expected present value of holding it in an A1 industry. These expected increase
in value deriving from someone elses - the nA downstream researchers- discovering the
industrial application, of value v0L, plus the gradual appreciation in the case of someone
elses R&D success not arriving, dvB
dt
.
Equation (5.14c) is the free entry condition for downstream completers that rationally
expect to appropriate only fraction 1   of the value of the nal good monopolist.
As in the previous section, the industrial dynamics of this economy is described by
the following rst order ordinary di¤erential equation:
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a  m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (5.15)
These equations must be supplemented with the skilled labour market equilibrium con-
dition
x(t) +m(A0(t))nB(t) + (1 m(A0(t)))nA(t) = h(t), (5.16)
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where h(t)  H(t)=P (t) is the aggregate population-adjusted human capital.
5.5 Analysis of a Benchmark Special Case
Though the numerical simulations of Section 6 will illustrate the main properties of
our economy, it is useful to provide some qualitative analysis under special parameter
conditions. The results of this sections are obtained under the assumption that  = 0,
which greatly facilitates the analytical derivations. Since all steady state equations are
continuous in all variables and parameters, the sign of the derivatives of the steady
state equilibrium endogenous variables remain unaltered in a positive neighbourhood
where i > 0. Notice that in the steady state the real interest rate is i = r + g, and
our assumption implies i = g > 0. Hence equations where  appears do not formally
change20. For simplicity, we will also assume ' = 0: this eliminates the externality of
basic research on applied research.
Notice that equation. (5.14b), the steady state denition and r = 0 imply:
vB = v
0
L.
From this and from equations (5.14a) and (5.14c):
nA =

1
0
1  

 1
a
nB. (5.17)
This conrms Denicolos (2001) Proposition 1 in our extended framework. From equa-
tions (5.14d) and (5.14e), the steady state denition and r = 0 we can write:
v0L =
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L. (5.18)
20More generally, even assuming g = 0, and therefore  = 0 would not imply complications, as
straightforward application of De LHospitals theorem would imply lim!00 =  + D(D Tr)wH .
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Imposing the steady state into (5.15) and using (5.17) yields:
Lemma 1 The steady state equilibrium fraction of industries where basic R&D is active
is
m(A0) =
1
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
: (5.19)
Remark. What Lemma 1 states is that the higher the di¢ culty of basic research
(applied research), i.e. the lower 0 (the lower 1) the higher the fraction of sectors where
basic (applied) R&D is needed.
This has implications for R&D enhancing regulation:
Proposition 1. The growth maximizing upstream inventor share, , of the nal
good patent value is equal to:
 =
1
0 + 1
=
1
0
1
+ 1
: (5.20)
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark. Our analysis implies that innovation-maximizing basic research patent
claims should be neither too broad nor too narrow. Since in this example time costs
nothing, both applied (direct) and basic (indirect) research should be given equal reward
if their R&D technologies are the same (0 = 1). Interestingly, Green and Scotch-
mers (1995) and Scotchmers (2004) benchmark parameter value is 1
2
, as well as Aghion
and Tiroles (1994a and b) equal split assumption. A similar assumption was made by
Denicolos (2001) patentable and infringing second-stage innovation. In our perpetual in-
novation framework, as  increases basic research should be compensated more in order
to maximize growth.
Proposition 1 states that the innovators should be rewarded proportionally more in the
stages of R&D where innovation is harder to achieve. Plugging  into equation. (5.17)
implies that at the optimal policy nA = nB. Hence the optimal share is higher in the
(sub-)industries where (equilibrium) innovation is slower - expected times 1
0n
1 a
B
> 1
1n
1 a
A
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imply  > 0:5 and viceversa - which is consistent with Hunts (2004) testable implication
for innovation promoting patentability standards21.
Our analysis is also related to Hunt (2006), in which each duopolist, when obtaining
a patent, get a ticket to sue the rival and to grab a share 0 <  < 1 of the value of
its innovation. In his model, Hunt proves that if  is relatively too high the increase in
patent protection discourages R&D. Here we follow a similar logic, though in a sequential
framework: endowed with too much bargaining power, the basic research patent holder
may end up capturing a large part of the downstream innovation, thereby discouraging
total R&D.
5.6 Numerical Simulations
This section illustrates the representative time trajectories of endogenous variables fol-
lowing the announcement of a regime change in the law of motion of the share of the nal
value of applied R&D that will be assigned to the basic researcher. This corresponds to
a sudden change in the steady state value of equation. (5.13) that gradually drives the
system towards the new steady state. Several discrete approximations of the di¤eren-
tial equations (5.28), (5.31), (5.13), (5.34), (5.14b), (5.14d), (5.14e), (5.40),(5.41), (5.38),
(5.39), (5.15), and cross-equations restrictions (5.14a), (5.14c), (5.10), (5.11), (5.16), and
(5.35) were run, obtaining quite regular results.
It is also assumed that in the common law regime the policy/courts orientation change
is not only gradual but also expected ahead of time.The following gures show the sim-
ulations obtained for the following parameter values:  = 0:1, a = 0:3,  = 1:68,
0 = 1 = 1, ' = 0:01, D = 40, n = 0:01, r = 0:05, Tr = 4,   = 0:75, which are standard
in the literature. As for the common law adjustment parameter, we set  = 0:9. More-
over, no di¤erence in the qualitative and little quantitative di¤erence was associated with
21An interesting extension of our paper would be obtained by breaking the symmetry assumption over
the product space.
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robustness analysis: for example, setting ' = 0 through ' = 1 did not change almost
anything.
Assume that the economy begins with a steady state associated with a given value
of . Then  changes and the common law share of the basic research inventor starts to
head to its new steady state value.
In order to make di¤erent simulations comparable, we plot the trajectories of the
deviations of the value of each variable from its initial steady state value, divided by its
initial steady state value.
Figure 18 assumes that, after a long term (40 periods) initial value of  = 0:35, it
suddenly changes to  = 0:5. As a consequence of Proposition 1, such a change will be
benecial for long term growth.
Such a change is clearly growth improving from a steady state perspective: in the
long run the new steady state is characterized by a higher rate of aggregate growth,
a higher skill premium, a higher fraction of population choosing to educate themselves
("college students") and a higher aggregate human capital. A higher value of  means a
higher fraction of the nal invention appropriated by the basic researcher who invented
its basic research pre-requisite and a lower value of the nal product appropriated by
the applied researcher who invented its commerciable version. Therefore basic research
is becoming more protable (higher "Basic Patent Value", vB) and applied research less
protable. Consequently basic research employment increases - both at the aggregate
("Basic Research") and at the industry, ("Nb") level - and applied research employment
decreases both at the aggregate ("Applied R&D") and at the industry, ("Na") level.
A consequence of this is that in the long run the stock market value (v1L) of an A1
monopolist increases - as it faces less obsolescence - while the long run the stock market
value (v0L) of an A0 monopolist decreases, as it faces more obsolescence. Since the positive
incentives to basic R&D outweigh the negative incentives to applied R&D, R&D becomes
more protable and more skilled labour is demanded. Therefore the skill premium, wH ,
increases as well as the present discounted value of high skill labour, thereby inducing a
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larger fraction of the population to enrol at university. This will gradually increase the
supply of human capital and decrease the supply of unskilled labour.
In the transitional dynamics, it is important to notice that as the change in the long-
term court orientation  is forecast by the private actors, all the stock variables - (t),
h(t), m(t) , and m(A0(t)) - are predetermined, and for example, by equation (5.11),
(t) is constant. Hence only jump variables such as prices, wages, and employment
can change. Being (t) monotonically increasing, the relative incentives of basic versus
applied research are gradually changed in favor of basic and to the detriment of applied
research. However, the dynamics of (t) interacts with the intrinsically dynamic nature
of the R&D process, in a way that is not captured by the mere comparative statics of
steady state analysis: in fact, the expectation of higher future values of (t) certainly
favours current basic research - the completion of which will take place in the future -
without harming current applied R&D with the same intensity. To x ideas, imagine that
basic research takes place in one period, as does applied research: the announcement of
a higher  next period does not penalise current applied R&D while instead encouraging
current basic research - which is promised a higher share of the future discovery. In
our continuous time framework the same e¤ect is at work: the two-stage Poisson process
of our Grossman and Shapiros (1987) framework implies that periods are stochastic
in length and meanwhile

(t) > 0 favours the expectedly late fruits of basic research
more than it reduces the expectedly earlier gains of applied research. As a consequence,
aggregate R&D is favoured, and the increase in the demand for nB(t) is matched by a
lower decrease in the demand for nA(t), which implies that the di¤erencem(A0(t))nB(t) 
[1 m(A0(t))]nA(t) increases and must be matched by a decrease in x(t): the increase in
the net demand for R&D labour can be satised only by a decrease in the manufacturing
skilled-labour employment. This temporary excess demand for skilled labour is the reason
for the immediate increase the skill premium. As time passes, the increase in w(t)
will encourage marginally able students to enrol to college, thereby leading to a future
increase in the aggregate supply of human capital and to a partially o¤setting e¤ect on
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w(t). However, as long as (t) keeps increasing, the demand for R&D labour continues
to grow, though the decline in

(t) will eventually correct the previously mentioned
intertemporal asymmetry that favoured basic research more than it disincentived applied
R&D. Such results are consistent with the conclusions of Waelde (2005) and Waelde and
Woitek (2004) which, in a di¤erent framework, show how economic uctuations originate
endogenously in the economy and the R&D acts a mechanism to generate them.
Interestingly, the aggregate innovation rate initially decreases: the reason is that R&D
is shifting upstream towards basic research, thereby reducing applied R&D; this slows
down the completion of existing basic research projects, which has a negative e¤ect on
innovation. However, in the longer run, the increase in the ow of basic research results
will more than compensate a thinner applied R&D e¤ort.
It is interesting to observe an initial slump in innovation follows the benecial increase
in IPR, which may resemble the puzzling "productivity slowdown" measured in the US
during the early Eighties22. Our stylized representation suggest that economists should
not lose their optimism about innovation enhancing policies based on shorter term R&D
reallocation e¤ects coupled with improvements in the population educational choices.
Notice that this explanation of the productivity slowdown complements the observation
of GDP decrease associated to the mere reduction in manufacturing production x(t),
which is a consequence of the reduction in available inputs (skilled labour) and therefore
not accounted for by the Solow residual.
Figure 19 assumes that the initial value of  was 0:55 and it suddenly changes to 0:65.
Such a change will be detrimental to long term growth, because the basic research patent
owner gets entitled to too large a share of the nal invention value. This discourages
applied R&D too much, which more than o¤sets the increase in basic research. Therefore
the demand for skilled labour will fall and so will the skill premium and education.
22Of course, other important explanations, based on ICT or on adjustment costs, are not contradicted
by our analysis.
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Interestingly, the short term reactions of the skill premium and of manufacturing
production could inspire wrong interpretations of the true long term e¤ect of normative
changes. In fact, as in the previous discussion, upon impact all stock variables are given,
and mainly short term announcement e¤ects prevail. Most notably, the expected gradual
increase in (t) fails to penalize current applied R&D in the order of magnitude as it
favours current basic research: basic R&D will be entitled of a larger share of the results
of future applied R&D, not those of current applied R&D. Such temporary win-win
situation boosts aggregate R&D labour and therefore raises the skill premium. However,
as

(t) sets in, the temporary relief for applied R&D disappears, and its smaller share of
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the nal product patent penalizes it so much that the ensuing drop in R&D employment
outweighs the increase in basic research employment - the whole e¤ect being corroborated
by the gradual increase in 1   m(A0(t)) - dragging the skill premium below the initial
steady state level and therefore leading towards the new steady state, characterized by
less R&D employment and less innovation.
Let the author that the simulations cast doubt on empirical evaluations of narrowing
IPR policies based on relatively short term e¤ects. The short term e¤ects of a harmful
tightening of upstream IPR look misleadingly similar to those of a benecial bargaining
power transfer towards basic researcher institutions.
The gures shown in this chapter are considerably robust and representative of the
pro-upstream IPR changes mentioned so far: changing parameters returns very similar
patterns of short, medium and long run dynamics.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the gradual evolution characterising the common law system
implies gradual dynamics of the allocation of R&D, human capital, innovation and wage
inequality. In light of well-known evidence of the steady increase in the skill premium
and in education occurred during the Eighties and Nineties in the US, which set the basis
for the innovative boom, the simulations presented here suggest that the driving force
could have consisted in a benecial gradual change of the court orientation, in favour
of more protection of previously under-protected early stage innovators. On the other
hand, should at some point early stage innovators become too protected, opposite trends
could appear, as illustrated in Figure 19.
Since the common law system implies gradual change to new IPR regimes, the whole
transitional dynamics has been analysed. The transition to a stricter regime does not
always appear to be monotonic. This shows how assessments based on short term data
could be misleading. For example, benecial restrictions in IPRmay result in a temporary
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reduction in innovation, which may seem a bizarre productivity slowdown.
5.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From equation (5.33) and (5.6) follows that the steady state
level of human capital per-capita is an increasing function of the skilled premium wH ,
which we can write as h(wH).
Plugging equation (5.17) into the skilled labour market clearing condition (5.16) yield:
"
m(A0) + (1 m(A0))

1
0
1  

 1
a
#
nB = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (5.21)
with 	0(wH) > 0. Inserting equation (5.19) into (5.21) we obtain:
nB


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (5.22)
Plugging equation (5.18) into equation (5.14a) and (5.14e) we obtain:
wH = 0n
 a
B v
0
L = 0n
 a
B 
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L (5.23a)
 = 1n
1 a
A v
1
L = 1

1
0
1  

 1 a
a
n1 aB v
1
L (5.23b)
From the denition of prots and the steady state mass of unskilled labour, we know
that  = (wH), with 0(wH) < 0. Dividing the last two equations side by side implies:
nB
1


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = (wH)
wH
. (5.24)
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Plugging (5.24) into (5.22) gives:
1 = 	(wH)
wH
(wH)
 (wH) (5.25)
where 0(wH) > 0. Therefore there exists a unique steady state level of the skill premium
obtained as the solution to equation. (5.25). It is important to notice that, in this
example, the steady state skill premium is independent of .
The steady state innovation rate can be rewritten, after using (5.24), as:
0n
1 a
B m(A0) =
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a
1 a
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
a = (5.26)
=
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
a (5.27)
The numerator does not change with  as previously proved. The innovation rate is
maximized when the denominator is minimized. Hence we need to nd a value of  such
that

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
is minimized, which implies expression (5.20).QED.
5.8.1 Labour Supply and Education Dynamics
Unskilled Labour Supply
As previously shown, individuals born at t with ability (t) 2 [0; 0(t)] optimally choose
not to educate themselves, thereby immediately joining the unskilled labour force. Hence
a fraction 0(t) of cohort t remains unskilled their whole life. Summing up over all the
older unskilled who are still alive - hence born in the time interval [t D; t] - we obtain
the total stock of unskilled labour as of time t:
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M(t) =
Z t
t D
~N(s)0(s)ds = ~
Z t
t D
egs0(s)ds
where ~ is the birth rate, N(s) is the population at time s.
To stationarize variables, we divide by current (time t) population egs, obtaining:
m(t)  M(t)
N(t)
= ~
Z t
t D
eg(s t)0(s)ds.
Its steady state level is:
m = ~
1  eg( D)
g
0 = 0.
The change in the stock of the population-adjusted stock of unskilled labour is obtained
by di¤erentiating m(t) with respect to time:
_m(t) = ~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)  gm(t) (5.28)
As in Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007) we obtain a crucial role
for delayed di¤erential equations.
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College Population
The individuals born in t with ability (t) 2 [0(t); 1] optimally choose to educate them-
selves, thereby becoming college students for a training period of duration Tr. Hence
summing up over all the previous cohorts who are still in college - hence born in the time
interval [t  Tr; t] - we obtain the total stock of college population as of time t:
eC(t) = ~ Z t
t Tr
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = ~
Z t
t Tr
egs(1  0(s))ds.
In per-capita terms:
ec(t)  eC(t)
N(t)
= ~
Z t
t Tr
N(s)
N(t)
(1  0(s))ds = ~
Z t
t Tr
eg(s t)(1  0(s))ds. (5.29)
In a steady state:
ec = ~ 1  eg( Tr)
g
(1  0). (5.30)
Taking the derivative of equation. (5.29) with respect to time we obtain:
:ec(t) = ~ (1  0(t))  ~e gTr (1  0(t D))  gec(t). (5.31)
Human Capital
The stock of skilled workers will coincide with those students who have completed their
education and are still alive, born in [t D; t  Tr]:
eH(t) = ~ Z t Tr
t D
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = ~N(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s))ds (3)
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The total workforce (including students) in equilibrium equals total population, hence:
M(t) + eH(t) + C(t) = egt.
Due to heterogeneous learning abilities, in order to obtain the aggregate skilled labour
supply, we need to multiply each skilled worker by the average amount of human capital
that she can supply, given by the average skill of her cohort net of dispersion parameter
 :
Z 1
0(t)
(    ) 1
1  0(t)d =
1 + 0(t)  2 
2
.
Therefore the aggregate amount of skilled labour in e¢ ciency units (skilled labor supply)
is:
H(t) = ~N(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 )
2
ds
Dividing by time t population, we can express per-capita human capital as:
h(t)  H(t)
N(t)
=
~
2
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 ) ds. (5.32)
The steady state value is:
h = ~

eg( Tr)   eg( D) (1  0) (1 + 0   2 )
2g
(5.33)
The dynamics of human capital can be studied by di¤erenciating this expression with
respect to time:
:
h(t) =  gh(t) +
~
2
e gTr(1  0(t  Tr)) (1 + 0(t  Tr)  2 )  (5.34)
+
~
2
e gD(1  0(t D)) (1 + 0(t D)  2 ) .
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5.8.2 Transitional Properties of Educational Choice
The study of the transition dynamics of this model is complicated by the skilled/unskilled
labour dynamics and by the endogenous population choice under perfect foresight. Key
to the solution is the transformation of the integral equation for the ability threshold
level for education into a set of di¤erential equations.
Dening the present value of the unskilled wage incomes asWU(t) =
R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds
and the present value of the skilled wage income as WS(t) =
R t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds, we
know from (5.5) that
0(t) =   +
WU(t)
WS(t)
. (5.35)
Dening
R1(t) = e
  R t+Dt i()d , and (5.36)
R2(t) = e
  R t+Trt i()d (5.37)
we can write:
_WU(t) = R1(t)  1 + i(t)WU(t) (5.38)
_WS(t) = R1(t)wH(t+D) R2(t)wH(t+ Tr) + i(t)WS(t). (5.39)
Di¤erentiating equations (5.36)-(5.37) with respect to time we obtain:
_R1(t) = R1(t)(i(t)  i(t+D)), and (5.40)
_R2(t) = R2(t)(i(t)  i(t+ Tr)). (5.41)
These equations allow us to cast our model in a framework that can be studied in terms
of delayed di¤erential equations.
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5.8.3 Expenditure and Manufacturing Dynamics
From equations (5.11) follows:
   1

E(t) = (   1) 1
1  m(t). (5.42)
Log-di¤erentiating with respect to time, using Euler equation (5.3) and the unskilled law
of motion (5.28) yield:
i(t)  (+ g) =
_E(t)
E(t)
=
_m(t)
m(t)
=
~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)
m(t)
  g (5.43)
that - since r(t) = i(t)  g - can be rewritten as
r(t)   =
~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)
m(t)
  g, (5.44)
In the steady state: r(t) = .
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Chapter 6
Competition and Productivity
Growth: a Schumpeterian Approach
6.1 Introduction
So far this thesis has considered innovation in the form of better products introduction,
i.e. vertical product innovation. In this nal chapter, process innovation is introduced
to explore from a Schumpeterian growth perspective the link between competition and
innovation had been largely explored within the industrial organization literature. In
particular, the concept that market power provides the innovators with the reward for
their research e¤ort, and thus constitutes an incentive for any innovative activity, has
been also examined extensively (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991a and 1991b; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Caballero and
Ja¤e, 1993).
A large theoretical and empirical literature has focussed on competition as a deter-
minant of productivity growth. In the spirit of Joseph Schumpeters (1942) trade-o¤
between static and dynamic e¢ ciency, the link between market power and growth has
been embedded into the modern Schumpeterian debate since its earlier contributions
(see Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a and 1991 b; Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
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Aghion et al., 2005; see also Aghion and Gri¢ th, 2005 for a recent survey). A large
and growing body of recent analyses have focussed on industry level evidence to try to
establish whether competitive pressure can act as an engine of innovation (Nicoletti and
Scarpetta, 2003; Gri¢ th et al 2006). Using data on regulation in many OECD countries,
Alesina et al. (2005) nd clear evidence that entry barriers in di¤erent sectors act as a
deterrent for investment in those sectors.
The thesis that innovation should decline with competition was also tested empir-
ically: most contributions seemed to invalid it by pointing out a positive correlation
between competition and innovation (Geroski, 1995; Nickell, 1996). Boone (2000) ex-
plores the impact of competitive pressure on a rms incentives to invest in product and
process innovations. He presents a model with heterogeneous rms where the e¤ects of
competition on a rms innovations depend on whether the rm is complacent, eager,
struggling, or faint, and the trade-o¤ between product and process innovations at the
industry level emerges as a consequence of a rising competitive pressure.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that deregulation has a positive e¤ect on growth
in sectors (or countries) that are closer to the technological frontier, while this positive
e¤ect tend to disappear for more backward sectors or countries (see Aghion et al. 2006).
This chapter presents a simple model inspired by Lucas (1990) and where the pro-
vision of essential services (intermediate inputs, for example nancial services or trans-
ports) for the production of the nal good is characterized by a non-competitive market
structure. The model also incorporates the framework developed by the recent recast
of the endogenous growth presented in Aghion and Howitts (2009) book (chapter 4).
The ultimate purpose is to show how the lack of competition in an intermediate essen-
tial sector, like the service sector, is actually able to prevent productivity increase in
the nal sector. A large empirical literature documented how the presence of regulatory
barriers in non-manufacturing sectors is detrimental for the economic performance in
many countries. Barone and Cingano (2011) consider the e¤ect of the upstream service
regulation in downstream service-intensive manufacturing industries. They nd that re-
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laxing regulation (in the form of barriers to entry or restrictions on prices or fees) in
service industries (like professional services, utility providers, or nancial services) has
a non-negligible positive impact on the value added, productivity, and export growth of
intensive service utilizers. In line with this approach, pioneered for the nancial services
by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the model presented in this chapter examines the e¤ects
of the presence of monopolies in the service sectors on the manufacturing sectors which
use these services as inputs for their production.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 sets up the model. Section
6.3 describe the detail of the innovation process and derives the policy implications.
Section 6.4 sets up the aggregate properties of the economy and computes the aggregate
growth rate for the nal output. Finally, section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The Model
This section describes a model with imperfect competition in intermediate service markets
in a modied version of the basic multisector Schumpeterian model of Aghion and Howitt
(2009, chapter 4).
Consider an economy composed of a mass L of identical one-period-living individuals.
Assume that, at every time t = 1; 2; ::, these individuals only care about consumption ct,
their instantaneous utility function being u(ct) = ct. Each individual is endowed with
one unit of labour, which she supplies inelastically.
In this economy, the nal output is produced with a technology represented by a
Dixit-Stiglitx production function, with perfectly competitive rms combining labour
and a continuum of intermediate services:
Yt = L

1Z
0
AitS
1 
it di (6.1)
where Yt is the nal output produced in the economy at time t; L is the economy labour
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supply; Sit is the quantity of the service i 2 [0; 1] used in the production of the nal
good. The productivity coe¢ cient Ait is the TFP characterizing the sector i at time t;
 2 (0; 1).
The economy is made up of three sectors: a nal good sector (competitive), a con-
tinuum intermediate service sectors (monopolistic), and a continuum of R&D sectors
(monopolistic). The nal output Yt is used for consumption, investment, intermediate
service production, and R&D.
Each intermediate service producer i 2 [0; 1] has its own monopoly, and sells the
service at a price which reects its marginal productivity on the nal sector, obtained
from equation (6.1) as:
pSit =
@Yt
@Sit
= (1  )

AitL
Sit

. (6.2)
Similarly, the wage rate w must equalize the marginal product of labour in the nal
sector, which is again derived by di¤erentiating equation (6.1) respect to L:
w =
@Yt
@L
= L 1
1Z
0
AitS
1 
it di. (6.3)
Each monopolist seeks to maximize its prot taking the demand function from the nal
sector, equation (6.2), as given:
max
Si
tSi = max
Si
pSitSit   bSit = max
Si
(1  ) (AitLt) S1 it   bSit,
where b denotes the unit cost for the service production.
The rst-order condition for the maximization problem is:
(1  )2 (AitL) S it   b = 0
from which follows the equilibrium quantity of the intermediate service provided in the
industry i:
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SMit = AitL
"
(1  )2
b
# 1

. (6.4)
By substituting equation (6.4) into equation (6.2), one can get the price of the interme-
diate service as a function of the unit cost:
pMSit =
b
1   . (6.5)
Hence, being the monopolistic price pMSit higher than the unit cost ((1  ) 2 (0; 1)),
the quantity of the intermediate service provided to the innovative nal sector is actually
lower than the quantity that would be o¤ered had the market been perfectly competi-
tive, with marginal cost pricing pSit = b. Plugging pSit = b into equation (6.2), gives
competitive supply SCit = AitL
h
(1 )
b
i 1

> SMit;8 2 (0; 1).
6.3 Process Innovation
The result of the activity of each R&D sector is increasing the TFP and the output in
the nal good sector. More specically, in each period and in each sector, an individual
is randomly selected to get an opportunity to produce a probability of innovation  2
[0; 1], by sustaining a R&D cost, in terms of the nal good, represented by quadratic
function 
2
2
Ait, where Ait reects the increasing di¢ culty in advancing more sophisticated
technologies. By paying the R&D cost, the individual can attempt an innovation. If
successful, the innovation will create a more e¤ective process for producing the nal
output using service i. Specically, the single-factor TFP of the service i will go form
the current period value Ait up to Ait, where  > 1.
If the potential innovator (i.e. the individual selected to attempt an innovation)
in a sector i is successful, she will gain a perfectly enforceable patent on the new use of
service i in that period. Thus the reward for the successful innovator is represented by the
increased nal good production, here denoted it, that she will eventually appropriate.
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Since the potential innovator succeeds with probability , the expected revenue is given
by it, while, independently from her succeeding, the cost of the R&D activity is given
by 
2
2
Ait.
Following an innovation in service industry i in period t, the patent holder is able to
extract the whole surplus of the buyers - i.e. the nal good producers - by setting the
price for the newly introduced production technique as pAit = it. For such a price the
nal good producers are indi¤erent between buying the technology from the monopolist
or adopting the technique which is available at lower price, hence they end up with buying
the new technique from the monopolist.
By substituting equation (6.4) into the nal good production function, equation (6.1),
yields the value of the nal output:
Yt = L

1Z
0
Ait
(
AitL
"
(1  )2
b
#) 1 

di, (6.6)
which, after some simple algebra becomes:
Yt =
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

L
1Z
0
Aitdi. (6.7)
The increase in the value of the nal production bore by the di¤erence in the productivity
in the service industry i where innovation has occurred is given by:
it =
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

LAit  
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

LAit =
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

L (   1)Ait
Hence, in every service industry, ex ante, the individual selected to attempt an innovation
faces the following expected prot maximization problem:
max

 (   1)AitL
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

  
2
2
Ait. (6.8)
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which implies the following rst order condition:
(   1)AitL
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

  Ait = 0 (6.9)
From equation (6.9) it easy to verify that the following Lemma 2 holds.
Lemma 2 The innovation arrival rate occurring with a non-competitive intermediate
service, MSi = MS, is lower than the innovation arrival rate associated with a perfectly
competitive service sector, CSi = CS.
Proof. The rst order condition for a maximum in the perspective innovators ex-
pected prot maximization problem (6.9) implies:
MSi = (   1)L
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

 MS
and
CSi = (   1)L

(1  )
b
 1 

 CS:
Therefore the statement follows, with MS < CS, 8 2 (0; 1).
6.4 Growth
The aggregate properties of the economy depend on the aggregate productivity parameter
At =
1Z
0
Aitdi,
which, plugged into equation (6.7)) gives:
Yt = AtL
"
(1  )2
b
# 1 

. (6.10)
The economys GDP equals the output of the nal good Yt minus the amount used to
produce each intermediate service:
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GDPt = Yt  
1Z
0
bSitdi. (6.11)
Using equation (6.4) to substitute for each Sit into this integral and combining it with
equations (6.10) and (6.11) yields:
GDPt = AtL~
where the composite parameter ~ =
h
(1 )2
b
i 1 
   b
h
(1 )2
b
i 1

. The economys GDP its
proportional to its e¤ective labor supply. It is worthwhile to notice that, since (1  )2 <
(1  ), the barriers to competition in the service sectors reduce the level of per-capita
GDP. Since the focus of this chapter is on the growth e¤ects, we move on to the growth
rate analysis.
Since per capita GDP, At~, is proportional to the aggregate productivity parameter
At, the economys growth rate gt is proportional to the growth rate of At:
gt =
At+1   At
At
. (6.12)
In each industry i, with independent probability  an individual will innovate, resulting
git =
Ait Ait
Ait
=    1; and with probability 1    the individual will fail to innovate,
resulting in git = Ait AitAit = 0. Hence, good luck in some sectors will be o¤set by bad luck
in other sectors:
Ait =
8<: Ait with probability Ait with probability 1   .
By the law of large numbers, the fraction of sectors that innovate in each period will
be . Therefore the economy-wide TFP parameter At can be expressed as  times the
average TFP among sectors that innovated at time t, plus (1  ) times the average TFP
among sectors that did not innovate at time t:
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At+1 = At + (1  )At.
From equation (6.12) follows:
gt =  (   1) . (6.13)
Equation (6.13) expresses the growth rate of the economy as the frequency of innovations,
, times the proportional increase in the TFP resulting from each innovation, (   1).
Therefore, if the service industries are monopolized, the equilibrium growth rate will be
MS (   1), strictly lower that the growth rate CS (   1), which would prevail if the
services were open to perfect competition.
6.5 Conclusions
The model presented throughout this chapter stressed out a possible mechanism through
which non-competitive intermediate markets curb TFP growth in the nal sectors. Un-
like more sophisticated models (like, for example Bourlès et al. 2010), here the unique
channel through which the lack of competition in the intermediate sectors can restrain
productivity growth in the nal sectors is the limited provision of the essential services oc-
curring just because of the limited competition (monopoly in the extreme case examined
here).
Nevertheless, the very simple structure adopted allowed the model to clearly highlight
a mechanism through which the non-competitive market structure in the intermediate
service sectors directly negatively a¤ects the innovation arrival rate of the economy. The
structure adopted here also allowed examining the e¤ects on the economy of presence of
two di¤erent monopolized tasks: the intermediate service provision and the use of the
innovation. The second is conceived as non-competitive for the newly introduced more
productive processes complementary to the intermediate services are immediately pro-
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tected by patents. On the contrary, the service providers operate in a non-competitive
environment only because of the regulation of the market, in the form of unspecied
barriers to entry. Given the widely documented relevance of such sectors for the devel-
oped economies (professional services, utility providers, transports, nancial services), it
appears important to study the e¤ects of such a regulation on the innovative capacity of
the economy. Albeit the very simple structure adopted, the model presented throughout
this chapter captured the e¤ect of both sources of monopoly power: the patents resulting
from the R&D activity, positively a¤ecting the heterogeneous productivities of the dif-
ferent segments of the nal good production technology (by increasing the TFP attached
to each intermediate service), and the barrier to the competitive entry in the provision
of services determined by the market regulation detrimental to industry innovation and
macroeconomic growth.
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Chapter 7
Final Conclusions
My thesis investigated endogenous growth theory and institutional aspects of growth
enhancing policies. In particular, within a dynamic general equilibrium model, I tried
to show how changes in the patent law, in the system of innovation incentives, and in
the court orientation (with a special reference to common law systems) may a¤ect the
long term performance of the economy with special attention to innovation, functional
inequality, and education.
The importance of integrating the traditional microeconomic approach to the eco-
nomics of innovation with the general equilibrium approach appeared in fact more and
more evident in the purpose of examining the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on market and
non-market oriented institutions in the innovation process. In this sense, here I tried to
give microeconomic foundation to the channels through which the system of innovation
incentives operates in generating better or worse performances in terms of both basic and
applied research at the macroeconomic level.
Since the 80s, the patent system in the US has undergone substantial changes re-
sulting in an increase in the patent protection granted to the rst inventors In other
words, patent holders became better protect their inventions against imitation as well as
subsequent innovation. In an environment with sequential innovation, these overlapping
patent rights across sequential innovators lead to contrasting e¤ects on the incentives for
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R&D. On one hand, the traditional view suggests that stronger patent rights improve
the protection for existing inventions and hence increase its value to the patent holders.
On the other hand, the recent argument against patent protection suggests that stronger
patent rights stie innovation by conferring too much power onto existing patent holders,
who use this power to extract surplus from subsequent innovators rather than providing
more innovation1. In this thesis, I developed a growth model to shed some light on this
current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sties innovation. In particu-
lar, Chapter 1 introduced the reader to the R&D-based growth theories and provides an
explanation of the early attempts and of the main successful approaches followed by this
literature to envisage a way for modelling the human inventive activity into an economic
growth model. Throughout the chapter, emphasis has been placed on the di¤erence
between horizontal and vertical innovation processes: the horizontal innovation process
consists of an ever expanding product variety which may be interpreted both as nal
goods and as intermediate inputs for the production of the nal output, while the verti-
cal innovation process is so dened because new ideas get incorporated into better-quality
versions of the existing goods, in the form of either a new good which provides a higher
quality service or in the form of a new production process for the same good. In this
case growth is generated by a random sequence of quality improving innovations (verti-
cal) resulting from uncertain research activities on the existing goods which can be
produced at a lower cost providing the same quality service of the actual vintage. Since
the rst generation of the Schumpetarian growth models was a¤ected by the so called
scale e¤ect on the per-capita output growth rate ( i.e. the per-capita output growth rate
increases with the number of researchers in the economy), this chapter showed the main
mechanism identied to remove the scale e¤ect, namely the increasing di¢ culty in R&D,
the dilution e¤ect, and the updating cost productivity adjustment.
Chapter 2 developed an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research to
analyse the growth e¤ects of the patentability of basic research. Since in 1980 the Bayh-
1See, for example, Bessen and Meurer (2008), Boldrin and Levine (2008) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004).
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Dole Act granted the US universities the right to patent and license the results of federal
government funded research, the patenting activity of non-for-prot research institutions
has been steadily increasing in the US and the trade-o¤ between providing the basic
innovators with the right incentive and the need of non-restricting the access to basic
knowledge has become one of the most debated in the dialogue between industry and
academia. In a rst scenario, only the public sector institutions undertake basic research,
rendering all results publicly available for rms, racing to nd patentable applications.
In a second scenario basic research itself is privatized, and hence patented by private
rms. I have estimated the unobservable research productivity parameters with the US
data immediately preceding the major reorganization of university and basic research in
the 80s, and used such estimates to simulate the two scenarios. The resulting simulations
show that public R&D system, prevailing at that time, was indeed outperforming every
privatized alternative scenario.
Chapter 3 calibrated a modied version of the same model to simulate the introduc-
tion of Kremers (1998) mechanism for inducing innovation by means of auctions for new
patents, run by the public sector in order to nance innovators and freely disseminate
most of the new ideas. My work is the rst attempt to use Kremers idea to address the
issue of the patentability of basic research and the nancing of early innovation. It turns
out that private research would have been enhanced if the government bought out the
research tool patents and rendered them publicly available to the private applied R&D
rms, as suggested by Michael Kremer (1998).The same Chapter 3 also studied quanti-
tatively the impact of the so called research exemptionof patented basic knowledge.
Under the research exemption doctrine, if the second innovator is successful in develop-
ing a saleable product or process, then he or she can patent it and yet infringe another
patent.
Chapter 4 tried to provide robustness to the results: the data largely conrm the
results previously obtained with a di¤erent dataset: maintaining free access to basic
research would have been better for innovation despite the assumed ine¢ ciency of the
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public laboratories and universities in targeting the right sectors to devote their research
e¤orts.
Chapter 5 analysed the macroeconomic e¤ects of patent protection by incorporating
a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill
acquisition. We considered three issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection
of intellectual property rights; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining
power of the upstream innovators; and (c) the implications of strengthening patent pro-
tection on wage inequality and growth. It showed analytically and numerically how the
jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can
be related to the well-known changes in wage inequality and in education attainments.
Basic research patents may have grown disproportionately due increasing jurisdictional
protection, eventually compromising applied innovation, education, and growth. By sim-
ulations, it is showed that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may mislead the
econometric assessment of the temporary vs persistent e¤ects IPR policy.
In the model economies presented throughout Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this disser-
tation, several market failures are present, in particular:
1. imperfect competition in the nal good sectors;
2. external e¤ects of R&D via the intertemporal spillovers;
3. external e¤ects of basic R&D on applied R&D;
4. free entry into R&D patent races.
The rst three market failures would suggest a less than optimal equilibrium amount
of R&D, while the patent races would suggest too much R&D as a possible outcome.
Moreover, since the composition of R&D between basic and applied research plays a
major role in this framework, it is likely to expect that a social planner would prefer it
to be as balanced as possible.
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A formal social planner solution has not been attempted by this dissertation. How-
ever, the di¤erent welfare levels associated with the di¤erent institutional scenarios envis-
aged regarding the patentability of basic research results can be computed, and has been
computed by the author, in several numerical simulations of the models presented. A gen-
eral conclusion is that there is no specic welfare-maximizing institutional arrangement,
because, depending on the parameters, the public basic research scenario - characterized
by unpatentable basic research outputs - may or may not dominate the privatized basic
research scenario. Hence, no general result would be emerging from a welfare analy-
sis:depending on the values of the relevant parameters the welfare performance of the
decentralised economy could be lower or higher than the rst best. The most interest-
ing result of my simulations is that the more di¢ cult basic research relative to applied
research the better the public basic research scenario; on the other hand, the more di¢ -
cult applied research relative to basic research, the more desirable a privatized scenario,
characterized by patentable basic research outputs.
Finally Chapter 6, explored a way of introducing an additional source of market power
in the Schumpeterian model, beside the monopoly power conferred by patents. Speci-
cally, we assumed that (as widely documented by the empirical literature) the provision
of essential services (intermediate inputs, for example nancial services or transports) for
the production of the nal good is characterized by a non-competitive market structure.
The model showed how the lack of competition in an intermediate essential sector, like
the service sector, is actually able to prevent productivity increase in the nal sector.
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